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ABSTRACT  
 
            Since 1950s, the concept of Kongwu (空無, Emptiness, Nothingness)   has 
migrated into American-European experimental performances, including those of 
John Cage and Cage-influenced artists who developed Happenings, Fluxus, and 
intermedia practices. This research-through-practice investigates how the concept of 
kongwu, an intercultural synthesis of Chinese Daoism and Indian Buddhism, may 
shape the principles underlying performance making and how performance may, in 
turn, elucidate Kongwu way of making sense the world.  
The installation-performance, Poem without Language contemplates 
Kongwu’s distrust of language by undermining the communicative purpose of writing 
and responds to Nam June Paik’s approach to media language. The research 
practice, One Street, Three Persons, Different Narratives, and Different Memories 
responds to John Cage’s use of silence to revise time and measurement, and 
exposes the habit, how we experience the ‘present’ as accumulations of the past, 
and how we order experiences as a linear continuity, which we call ‘time’. My 
performance, … is Present suggests different definitions of the ‘meditative mind’ and 
‘being-here-and-now’ and critiques the relationship between embodiment and 
identity in Marina Abramović’s construction of ‘suchness’.  
Three works offer one response to the poetics and politics of intercultural 
encounters in the context of Chan/Zen in intermedia performance. My research-
through-practice sheds light on Kongwu way of experiencing, particularly Kongwu’s 
attitude towards language, time, and self. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This research investigates how the concept of Kongwu may shape the principles 
underlying performance making and how performance may, in turn, elucidate the 
philosophy of Kongwu. The reciprocity between Kongwu, as a philosophy, and 
performance making offers one understanding of the way we structure our 
experiences and orient ourselves when we encounter the world. Kongwu (空無, 
emptiness, nothingness), an intercultural synthesis of Chinese Daoism and Indian 
Buddhism, has contributed to the development of aesthetics, philosophy and 
spirituality in many East Asian cultures, including China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam. The concept of Kongwu has been loosely translated into English as 
‘emptiness’, ‘nothingness’, ‘void’, ‘blankness’, and ‘suchness’. Particularly since the 
1950s, the concept of Kongwu has migrated into American-European experimental 
performances, including those of John Cage and Cage-influenced artists. 
My research is driven by a series of questions: what happens when one 
tradition migrates into other contexts; why has Chan/Zen philosophy been connected 
to intermedia performances; how might Kongwu, with an inherently intercultural 
approach to making sense of the world, offer a different understanding of temporality 
and experience for performance practitioners; how might Kongwu be used to explore 
the experience of ‘being present’ and simultaneously disengage from the search for 
authenticity and presence; and what are the implications of Kongwu for performance 
making?  
Three practices shed light on the Kongwu way of experiencing, particularly 
Kongwu’s attitude towards language, time, and self. My installation-performance 
Poem without Language contemplates Kongwu’s distrust of language by 
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undermining the communicative purpose of writing and responds to Nam June Paik’s 
approach to media language. The research practice One Street, Three Persons, 
Different Narratives, and Different Memories responds to John Cage’s use of silence 
to revise time and measurement, and exposes the habit, how we experience the 
‘present’ as accumulations of the past, and how we order experiences as a linear 
continuity, which we call ‘time’. My performance … is Present suggests different 
definitions of the ‘meditative mind’ and ‘being-here-and-now’ and critiques the 
relationship between embodiment and identity in Marina Abramović’s construction of 
‘suchness’.  
The three chapters of the thesis chart the triangulation between the Kongwu 
attitude, the selected artist's approach to performance, and my response 
performance. My analysis of the Kongwu attitude defines the focus for my analysis of 
these three artists and begins to address the issues associated with articulating 
Kongwu in performance. Further, my research-through-practice reflects how 
experience is mediated by the mechanism of language and dualistic differentiation 
and how we experience ‘the present’ through ‘the past’. By offering a definition of the 
‘meditative mind’ that differs from Abramović's definition of the ‘no-thinking mind’, my 
work … is Present suggests a different approach to embodiment, one that does not 
entail enhancing the identity of the self.  
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Chan/Zen in Intercultural and Intermedia Performance  
 
Concerning the undercurrent of Chan/Zen philosophy in intercultural and 
intermedia performance practices (Baas 2005; Baas and Jacob 2004; Friedman 
1998; Marranca 1991; Munroe 2009; Westgeest 1998), John Cage’s version of Zen, 
which primarily comes from the interpretation of Alan Watts and D. T. Suzuki (Cage 
1961:xi), is often mentioned. While Suzuki popularised Zen in American-European 
societies, Cage transformed musical compositions into intermedia performances by 
incorporating Zen philosophy. Those influenced by Cage include the Fluxus artists 
George Brecht, Nam June Paik, and the performance artist Marina Abramović, who 
has incorporated ‘Eastern’ philosophies or ‘non-Western’ spiritual practices into her 
performance practices. The shared ‘East-West’ interest in the philosophical 
implications of emptiness and nothingness have led to very different approaches to 
performance and versions of emptiness, as artists express diverse longings, reinvent 
the self, and chart paths for transformation.  
As Said analyzed, Orientalism used ‘the Orient’ to project the desires of ‘the 
Occident’ and to define the European self, and identified with the ‘relationship’ 
between the self and the other and “its ideas about the Orient”, which can be 
represented as the essence of the Orient ([1979]2003:1-3). The undercurrent of 
Chan/Zen philosophy in performance art exemplifies the long tradition of East-West 
interaction that Western artists have romanticised the ‘other’, making ‘East’ or ‘Zen’ 
an empty marker and a mirror, a tool useful to imagining one’s utopia and to 
mobilizing oneself on the march toward one’s own version of newness. The dualistic 
East-West categorisation provides a convenient context for artists to position 
themselves in. Theorists take advantage of such dualistic pairings to retell familiar 
8 
narratives and build discursive constructs that map out how Western artists have 
manifested culture-specific longings and instrumentalised the 'non-Western' in ways 
that allow them to resist modernist ideology and respond to the concept of progress. 
Critiques of modernist ideology often reinforce the dualistic relationship between 
East and West. That this constructed relationship is often taken as real causes 
essentialisation of both the East and the West. 
In recent years, scholars of religion and East Asian studies have reconsidered 
Zen’s construction in the twentieth century (Cox 2003:43; Faure 1996 and 1991; 
Heisig and Maraldo 1995; Sharft 1995 and 1993), and particularly have critiqued the 
specific historical construction of Suzuki’s Zen. Suzuki’s brand of Zen Buddhism 
could be seen as self-Orientalism. Suzuki was the important mediator of East-West 
dialogue, who introduced Zen Buddhism to the Western societies. He conceived of 
Zen as particularly Japanese, yet, at the same time, universal (Cox 2003: 35). 
Others have noted that Suzuki’s Zen and the Kyoto School’s ‘absolute emptiness’ 
supported Japanese nationalism and militarism (Heisig and Maraldo 1995; Sharft 
1995 and 1993) and challenged the illusion of Zen as being “ahistorical”, as implied 
by Suzuki (Faure 1993:65 in Cox 2003:36). His interpretation of Zen Buddhism 
enhanced the mystical and exotic differences to the ‘West’. Suzuki suggested that 
Zen Buddhism is the “spirit of the East” (1970: 347). He claimed that Chan as the 
distinct school originated in China, but the true spirit of Zen is uniquely Japanese 
(1970: 347). Then, he emphasized that the nature of Zen is universal. As the 
representative of ‘Eastern’ spirituality, Suzuki projected his utopia and built an ideal 
"spirit of the East" (1970: 347), onto his ‘Zen Buddhism’. By doing so, he created the 
quality of ‘East’, or, in fact, ‘Japaneseness’. What revealed was not only a teaching 
of Zen, but the historical constructs that made his version of Zen possible. 
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Both East and West essentialize the result of categorisation as the intrinsic 
nature, and consequently define the relationship between East and West as the 
quality of each. The concept of Chan/Zen emptiness has been employed in cultural 
campaigns to create new collective and individual identities. The ‘East’ has used 
emptiness to self-orientalise, and the 'West' has exploited emptiness to establish an 
absolute otherness against which to essentialise ‘West’ (Cox 2003:43). Both ‘East’ 
and ‘West’ have employed similar categorisations to find positions from which to 
appeal to the desire for authenticity. One could respond to the construction of Zen 
and its connection to Japanese Nationalist expansion (Faure 1996 and 1991; Heisig 
and Maraldo 1995; Sharft 1995 and 1993). Or, as Nam June Paik did, he 
condemned Zen for its ‘Asian poverty, and commented that Suzuki’s Zen as the 
“cultural patriotism” is the “suicide of Zen” (Paik 1979:n.p).  
Because of those reasons, I don’t follow Suzuki’s interpretation of Zen 
Buddhism to understand ‘emptiness’, but use the stories from Chan Buddhism and 
Nāgārjuna's The Book of the Middle Way in which he explains his notion of śūnyatā, 
translated as suchness, emptiness and nothingness. Nāgārjuna’s notion of śūnyatā 
becomes the foundation of the different schools in Eastern Asian Buddhism, and the 
philosophical constructs in Kyoto school’s Absolute Nothingness and Suzuki’s Zen. 
One could, similarly, ask which version of emptiness/nothingness an artist 
constructs. One could argue that self-invention’s use of emptiness and emptying out 
has encouraged artists and theorists to not only produce new selves, but to promise 
universality. Cage, for example, sought musical and social solutions through Zen, 
and Abramović has sought to produce the experience of presence through 
explorations of non-Western meditative practices and the construction of a unique 
version of ‘being here and now’.  
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The Concept of Kongwu and Different Versions of Emptiness and Nothingness 
The concept of Kongwu is often translated as void, empty, nothing, blank, 
emptiness, and nothingness. Those translations have the connotation of ‘no-things’, 
the absence of ‘being’, the lack of ‘presence’, non-existence, and non-being. Those 
connotations mean the opposite of fullness in the traditional Western metaphysics 
and ontology. Yet, this is not the case for the concept of Kongwu. The concept of 
Kongwu does not mean non-existence, as opposition to existence, nor mean non-
being, as the opposition to being, so I use the term Kongwu without using English 
words to emphasise the different linguistic associations and philosophical contexts 
that the concept of Kongwu can operate. 
In the lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), Heidegger critiqued the 
Western metaphysics tradition (Heidegger 1998: 82-96). He rejected Aristotle’s view 
to take nothing as the absence of being, absence and the lack of substance, and 
being as fullness, presence, and substance. Furthermore, he developed the 
‘Nothing’ as the foundation of metaphysics. For Heidegger, the Nothing is akin to the 
original beginning, which gives birth to all beings and Being (Ma 2007:179-182; Yao 
79-82).  Even though Heidegger does not take the Nothing as substance (a being of 
no-thing) as Aristotle viewed, the Nothing becomes the original of all beings (Yao 79-
82), as a way to go back to Being, things as themselves. Heidegger’s Nothing is not 
the opposition to being of beings, but the Nothing points to the desire of knowing the 
original being, and promises that we, human being can know Being (Ma 2007:30). 
Presence and Being emerges from the Nothing. As Derrida notes in Speech and 
Phenomena, Heidegger stills wants to “through very language” (1973:160) and 
through the Nothing to seek Being that is transcendent from language and find a 
route back to the ‘thing as themselves’ as the authentic presence (1973:157-60). 
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Heidegger’s Nothing is not a substance, and is the opposition to fullness and 
being, but becomes the most authentic ground for Being, which resonates with 
Laozi’s view on Wu (無, Nothing) as being (Yao 2010:83). According to Yao, in 
Chapters 2 and 40 of Dao-De-Jing, Wu is the origin, which gives birth to all beings 
(Yao 2010:83). Such view implies an objective existence of Wu, and Wu has a 
unified presence. Heidegger cited Laozi’s Wu to elaborate his own notion of 
“ontological difference” and “Being” (Ma 2007:5,119-43), and developed his 
metaphysics based on the Nothing. However, the similarity between Heidegger and 
Laozi is actually full of discontinuity. For example, according to Ma, “the word You 
overlaps with the sense of “having.” It means “to be present” or “to be around,” and 
has nothing to do with how the terms “Being” or “existence” are used in Western 
philosophy or in Heidegger’s thought”(Ma 2007:5). The word You and Wu in Chinese 
philosophy never have the same meaning in Heidegger's own metaphysics nor the 
Western metaphysics (Ma 2007:5-6). 
Even though Laozi and Zhuangzi both were often considered as the founders 
of Daoism, their views on Wu (無, nothing) and Dao (道, way) are different (Billeter 
2011; Luo 2012:154; Wu 2006:43). Zhuangzi never considered Dao as something 
with the unified presence (Billeter 2011; Luo 2012:154; Wu 2006:43). Consequently 
Zhuangzi’s Wu, different from Laozi’s Wu, does not refer to something universal, but 
the perceptual process and experiential events (Wu 2006:43). Because of this 
distinct understanding of Wu, Zhuangzi’s Wu implies the practice of living and 
aesthetics (Wu 2006:43) and Laozi’s Wu implies the metaphysical search. Laozi 
takes Wu as the ontological origin; Zhuangzi takes Wu as a particular perceptual 
process and a specific experiential event. Heidegger’s ‘Nothing’ is more similar to 
Laozi’s Wu. Because of the emphasis on the particular perceptual process and 
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experiences, Zhuangzi developed the particular linguistic strategies to demonstrate 
his concerns on the way of living, and the possibility to practice a different patterning 
of experience and perception (will discuss further in Chapter One and Three). 
 To understand the way of experiencing to which Kongwu refers, such as the 
meditative experience of ‘no mind’, one has to understand how the expression of 
experience, and culture-specific modes of expression, have shaped experiential 
possibilities. In Buddhism, Nāgārjuna claims about the dynamic quality of life rely on 
śūnyatā (空, kong in Chinese, emptiness), which is a reaction to “Hindu ontological” 
oneness (Streng 1967:36). Daoism developed Wu (無, nothingness, non-being) to 
undermine the dominant Confucian view of the ordering of life and moral behaviour 
(Yang 1993: 19-53). Daoism considers value judgments artificial and not in 
accordance with the Dao. Yet, the Dao cannot be named. What can be named is 
only another value-bounded result. The differences between the Daoist and Buddhist 
views result from specific cultural-historical conditions. The centuries-long 
amalgamation of Daoism and Buddhism gave birth to Chinese Buddhism, particularly 
Chan Buddhism and the meditation practices (Kohn 2010:33-46).  
The Book of the Middle-Way ( 中 論 , Zhong Lun in Chinese, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in Sanskrit) is central to understanding Nāgārjuna's concept 
of śūnyatā. Many Chinese Buddhism schools that “claim to teach the Middle Path” 
(Chen 1969:396) were influenced by Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā and revised his 
philosophical modes of inquiry (Westerhoff 2010) through the intercultural syncretism 
of Daoism and Buddhism (Chen 1969:336-449). For example, Chan Buddhism 
applied the principle of emptiness to the ways of living and addressed the 
understanding of reality through an approach to language, akin to that of the Daoist 
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Zhuangzi, who relied on shocking conversations and stories to understand Dao 
(Chen 1969:445-6). Zhiyi (智顗, 538-597 A.D), as the founder of the Tia-tan Buddhist 
School, integrated the Daoist and Buddhist meditation traditions and reworked 
Nāgārjuna’s twofold reality into a threefold reality (Swanson 1989:1-17).  
Not all Buddhist schools accepted Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā. In The Book of the 
Middle Way, many chapters record the debates between Nāgārjuna and other 
Buddhists or non-Buddhists schools. All the different schools come from the different 
interpretation of pratītya-samutpāda (dependent-origination, dependent-arising), 
which means “things are formed in existence depending on other things” 
(Streng1967: 60). Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā is a critique of Abhidharma tradition. The 
Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia such as “Burma, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, 
Laos, and Thailand” is one of eighteen schools of Abhidharma that “does not teach” 
śūnyatā. (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:219-20). Within the Mahayana 
Buddhism, the Mind-Only school partially agrees Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā. Those 
different views do not point to the problem of ‘truth’, to offer the most ‘authentic’ or 
‘truthful’ answer, because they are merely the different discourses, the products of 
the social, historical, cultural and linguistic conventions. However, various Buddhist 
schools are useful devices in terms of various effects and practice that different 
discourses can activate in a certain context.   
Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā is not a view of a substantialist, nor a nihilist. Śūnyatā 
does not mean the absence of being and existence, neither the origin of beings 
(Laozi’s’s Wu and Heideggar’s Nothing). According to Huntington (1989:25-32), 
Western reception of Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā and Buddhism went through different 
stages. These Scholars interpreted Buddhism as Nihilism, Absolutism, and through 
post-Wittgensteinian pragmatism and deconstruction (Huntington 1989:25-32). From 
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Nāgārjuna ‘s perspective, nihilism and absolutism are different forms with the same 
need of a “stable ego-self “(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:144). The different 
Western interpretations of Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā are the products of academic 
preference in its specific time and space. As Foucault would say, episteme creates 
the possibility and limit of knowledge ([1970] 2005). For Kongwu, every interpretation 
of ‘emptiness’ or ‘nothingness’ is merely ‘the ‘known’, a result of a distinctive way of 
knowing in a circumstance, conditioned by its intellectual, social, cultural and 
historical convention.   
From the perspective of Kongwu, whatever meaning of ‘being’ that one 
intends to understand is merely the result of a particular way of knowing and 
‘seeing’, which is ‘the known’, ‘the perceived’ or ‘the seen’. Therefore, ‘being’ is by 
default already a consequence of dualistic differentiation, meaning the subject-object 
dichotomy and the function of the dualistic pairs in language. When we claim one 
understanding of ‘being’ and one definition of ‘presence’, we already accepted the 
assumption of a subject-object dichotomy. In other words, we identify with the result 
of the dualistic differentiation as the ‘being’ of things. The concept of Kongwu has the 
different attitude towards ‘being’, and forces us to confront the issue of experience 
and temporality without grasping a foundation of self-identity.  
 
Performing Kongwu’s Attitude toward Language, Time, and Self  
 
My primary inquiry is in the context of performance making, which determines the 
construction of Kongwu in my research and practice. The selection of texts for 
analysis in this thesis aims to clarify how Nāgārjuna’s principles and Zhuangzi’s 
linguistic strategies underpin my practices, and directly address the problem of 
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language, time, and self, which is fundamental to performance practice. 
With respect to performance making, I focus on the dialogue between 
performative languages and the problematisation of Kongwu. The understanding of 
temporality in Fluxus works resonates with “the Buddhist analysis of time and 
existence in human experience” (Friedman 1998: 250). But to what the label of ‘Zen 
Buddhism’ and the Buddhist sense of time and experience refer requires clarification. 
Elucidation of the philosophical implications of a Kongwu approach to performance 
practice, and particularly of the effects of Kongwu’s understanding of experience and 
temporality, demonstrates how the Kongwu perspective shapes the principles 
underlying performance-making and, additionally, offers an analytical context that 
escapes the narrative constructed by the dualistic East-West pairing. 
Bolter and Grusin defined “remediation” as the complex “repurposing” 
between medium, and response to each other (2000). We can remediate Zhuangzi’s 
concerns and Nāgārjuna’s logic into performance practices to reconsider the primacy 
of experience without grasping a concept of the self-identity in performance practice. 
Moreover, this remediation creates intermediality between the medium of philosophy 
and performance. The Fluxus artist Dick Higgins suggested that by using 
“intermedia”, we recognised a “new mentality” that emphasises “continuity”, instead 
of “categorization” (Higgins [1965]2001:50). Higgins used John Cage as an example 
of intermedia because Cage explored “the intermedia between music and 
philosophy” (Higgins [1965]2001:50). Performance can create “Third Space” 
(Bhabha 1994:37) where “ambivalence” (Bhabha 1994:217) occurs, the categories of 
‘East’ and ‘West’ are untenable. Performance can create an “in-between” moment 
(Bhabha 1994:4) when the hierarchy between the strong and weak medium, the 
boundary between self and other are suspended. Performance introduces 
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indeterminacy. In this sense of intercultural and intermedial, my research-through-
practice offers one response to the poetics and politics of intercultural encounters in 
the context of Chan/Zen into performance. 
 Artistic practice has the freedom to absorb various frameworks and 
synthesise them as encounters of scientific theories, technology, art, and humanity. 
Moreover, it has the capacity to create a liminal space-time for these intersecting 
frameworks and, consequently, generate different experiential possibilities. 
Perceiving performance as kinaesthetic networking is the best approach to 
synthesizing diverse contexts and making abstract theories, historical discourses, 
and culture-specific frameworks in confronting the unpredictability of human and 
non-human consciousness, physicality, and materiality. Performance where 
“intersensuality thus joins intertexuality” (Kapchan 1995: 483) is, thus, intended to 
trace assumptions and has the capacity to act and articulate potentialities in the 
fractures of different realities and worldviews. In this way, performance can help us 
reconsider how we structure our experiences. By incorporating Kongwu’s rather 
counter-intuitive attitude into performance practice, we can rethink how we 
experience our experience as the real as the condition in which we live.  
As concerns the performance of Kongwu, it is useful to note that both Daoism 
and Buddhism distrust language and symbols, and question the validity of using 
conceptual ordering to present the world as it is. For Kongwu, the ‘reality’ we think to 
be never can be without the mediation of the observer's own engagement. The label 
of Kongwu reflects the mediation enacted by the observer’s experiencing, as the 
observer encounters the world and claims the ‘being’ of the world by taking the result 
of experience with differentiation as real. Kongwu disengages itself from the 
anthropocentric organisation that constructs ‘reality’, which is the condition with 
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which we engage and in which we live. In many stories of Koan in Chan Buddhism, 
which are records of the teaching between masters, students and monks, the master 
often used non-sense gestures and actions to communication. The masters do not 
intend to communicate a result from a specific perspective or a ‘what’, but they 
perform to trigger a way of perceiving without identifying with indicators. They 
communicate to expose the habitual way of understanding, which is, taking ‘the 
perceived’ as the thing in itself. Bolter and Grusin defined hypermediacy that 
“reminds the viewer the medium” (Bolter and Grusin 2000:272). “Sometimes 
hypermediacy has adopted a playful or subversive attitude, both acknowledging and 
undercutting the desire of immediacy”(Bolter and Grusin 2000:34). The particular 
way of considering the functioning of communication in Koan creates a 
“hypermediacy”, and could help to consider how we use performative languages in 
performance.  
 
The three chapters of the thesis chart the triangulation between the Kongwu 
attitude, the selected artist's approach to performance, and my response 
performance. Kongwu reconsiders how the subject-object dichotomy governs the 
way ‘we’ experience and bring the world into ‘being’ for us, which implies the 
impossibility of the absolute split of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and questions the reification 
of the ‘relationship’ between subject and object. For the concept of Kongwu, the 
fundamental assumption within any particular way of knowing is that ‘subject’ uses 
language and concepts to describe and indicate the experience of ‘object’. 
Consequently this activity creates a ‘relationship’ between subject and object, and in 
turn the result of describing and indicating circulates back to be the sources and 
evidence of the ‘subject’. ’Subject’ is being assumed as a creator of the relationship 
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and description. Yet ‘subject’ is the functioning of describing and building a 
relationship. In Chapter one, I outline Kongwu’s attitude by discussing the problem of 
language and focus on how an object we think to be is the product that we take the 
relationship between subject and object as the object within itself. In Chapter Two, to 
consider the problem of time from the concept of Kongwu, we confront the 
assumption of human being as the measurement of all things, which makes the 
division of ‘before’ and ‘after’ possible, and constructs a feeling of events happening 
in a train of past, present, and future. In Chapter Three, we analyse how the whole 
process of functioning circulates back to produce the sense of ‘self’. 
Specifically, I focus on how Paik, Cage, and Abramović put the concept of 
Kongwu into practice. Paik's approach to media resonates with Kongwu’s distrust of 
language. His use of media turns the spectators’ attention to the medium’s 
materiality and mechanism. For example, the co-presencing of the ‘real’ fish and the 
‘live’ TV fish in his installation Real Fish/Live Fish questions how we interact with the 
description of an object and know the ‘being’ of an object. His installations 
externalise the effects of language on our ways of experiencing and exposing the 
function of experiencing as a form of mediation of our encounters with the world. 
Though Cage influenced Paik and though many artists who developed intermedia 
practices were Cage’s students, the thematic structure of my examination of Kongwu 
lends itself best to analysis of Paik in Chapter One and Cage in Chapter Two. 
Through integrating Zen Buddhism and reconsidering the time measurement in 
music, Cage questioned the ‘being’ of music. Cage’s notion of time echoes 
Kongwu’s attitude towards time, thus providing us with an intercultural context in 
which to analyse time in performance practice and Cage’s expansion of music into 
intermedia practice. Abramović has explored the meditative experience and the 
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concept of ‘suchness’, enhancing the possibilities of performance and the potentiality 
of the body and mind. Particularly in her performance The Artist is Present, her 
investigation of the 'no-thinking mind' and her version of being-here-and-now provide 
a vantage point from which to examine the relationship between the process of 
experiencing and constructing an identity of the self.  
 
Chapter One explores the dichotomy inherent in our use of language to 
describe experience when, in fact, experience is governed by language and, 
particularly, language’s dualistic differentiation. Dualistic differentiation means the 
subject-object dichotomy and the dualistic pairs of language that is the mechanism 
by which that language can function. I discuss how language triggers emotions, 
value judgments and actions, which are seen to constitute ‘reality’, the condition with 
which we engage. When we perceive our habit of experiencing through dualistic 
differentiation, we sense the ‘real’ we think to be.  
Paik’s approach to media resonated with Kongwu’s distrust of language. I 
show how Paik shifts the viewer’s attention away from the message and toward the 
mechanism by which the media produces the message in Zen for Film. Paik further 
explores the process of seeing in the TV Buddha series and reflects on our habit of 
taking indications of experiences as the ‘beings’ of things in Real Fish/Live Fish and 
Real Plant/ Live Plant. Reflecting on the process of writing in Chinese calligraphy, 
the spatial organisation in ink landscape painting, and electronic writing in video 
devices, I create a traceless writing that cannot serve the expected purpose of 
writing and uses multiple closed circuits that disrupt the traditional tunnel-vision 
perspective. My performance, Poem without Language dissolves the communicative 
purpose of writing and responds to Paik’s approach to media and Kongwu’s distrust 
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of language.  
Chapter Two rethinks the notion of time from the Kongwu perspective, with 
reference to Nāgārjuna, Sengzhao, and Dōgen. Kongwu considers the experience of 
time to be an illusion of continuity that results from the operation of language and the 
fixed position of the observer. The past is a memory of the present, and the future is 
an expectation generated by past accumulation in the present. Past accumulation 
means a collection of earlier experiences, language, concepts, personal histories, 
cultural backgrounds, and social conventions as the accumulation of ‘already-there’.  
Past accumulation shapes a particular way of perceiving. The present comes into 
presence in the relationship between the constructions of past and future. Whether 
memory and the description of experience are possible without the intervention of 
language and conceptualisation, and whether ‘time’ can be conceptualised linearly 
without a constructed continuity, is dubious, according to Kongwu.  
 Chapter Two shows how Cage revised the notion of time in 4’33” and 0’00” 
(4’33” No.2) by giving up the measurement of time, and how Cage’s revision echoes 
Kongwu’s attitude toward time. Critically, the intercultural dialogue in these works on 
the issue of temporality enables Cage’s expansion of music into intermedia 
performance. Cage developed the idea of nondual listening through the operation of 
silence. My work, One Street, Three Persons, Different Narratives, and Different 
Memories further investigates nondualistic experiencing by exposing the mechanism 
via which we experience the ‘present’ through the ‘past’, as the accumulation of 
experiences. In this way, my work reconsiders how we experience ‘the’ experience 
and how we order experiences as a train of past, present, and future and construct 
the feeling that events happen in a sequence.  
Chapter Three reconsiders how we identify with our individual collections of 
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experiences and appropriate accumulations of experiences as the sources of our 
selves. To examine the production of self-identity, we realise how past accumulation 
not only shapes a particular way of perceiving, but is precisely the ‘self’. In my 
analysis of Abramović’s ‘no-thinking mind’ and ‘being-here-and-now’, I compare the 
relationship between the process of experiencing and the identity of the self implied 
in Abramović’s performances and examine her narrative framework from a Kongwu 
perspective. I scrutinise why Abramović emphasises the experience of ‘being-here-
and-now’ in her encounters with ‘others’: East and Nature. Referencing Nāgārjuna 
and Zhuangzi, I probe how Abramović’s version of ‘suchness’ is trapped in the habit 
of experiencing through dualistic differentiation and identification.  
The performance … is Present creates a dialogue between a ‘real’ performer 
and a performer inside a TV. The reciprocity between the two performers 
demonstrates how, if one does not identify with the content of experience, one 
cannot establish identity. My performance suggests definitions of the ‘meditative 
mind’ and the experience of ‘being-here-and-now’ that differ from those offered by 
Abramović. Moreover, by erasing the subject in the title, the performance … is 
Present critiques the relationship between the embodied process and the identity of 
the self, as implied in Abramović’s The Artist is Present.  
Taking Paik’s approach to media, Cage’s view of time and measurement, and 
Abramović’s approach to presence and experience as its starting points, my three 
performance works facilitate dialogue about these artists’ practices. To clarify the 
Kongwu perspective, my research-through-practice focuses on how we live in the 
effect of language and language’s dualistic differentiation, construct the illusion of 
continuity as time, and identify with collections of experiences to create another 
illusion of continuity, the identity of the self.  
22 
1. When Language Cannot Function: Responding to Nam June Paik 
through Poem Without Language 
 
Introduction  
 
Kongwu supports the way in which such artists as John Cage, Allan Kaprow, and the 
Fluxus artists Nam June Paik and George Brecht have considered the possibilities of 
performance and experience in intermedia practice. The philosophical implications of 
Kongwu ( 空 無 , emptiness, nothingness) in Daoism and Buddhism have been 
understood with reference to the 1960s European-American avant-garde. Revisiting 
the historical context of Kongwu and its relationship to performance raises the 
questions: what happens when one tradition migrates into other contexts. In this 
chapter, I investigate the relationship between Kongwu's understanding of the world 
and the principles underlying performance.  
As concerns Kongwu, one has to understand that the ‘world’ we see is the 
result of observation with differentiation, and we take the result of differentiation as 
the ‘being’ of the world. To understand this assertion, we investigate Kongwu’s 
attitude toward language and how the looping effects of language form. We use 
language to indicate, describe, and document what we experience, but we end up 
being governed by language, particularly its dualistic mechanism. We act according 
to the emotions, feelings, and value judgments that dualistic differentiation triggers. 
We live in the ‘reality’ that results from the looping effect of the dualistic ordering of 
things.  
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How might Kongwu’s distrust of language shape the underlying principles of a 
performance? Performance can be seen as an activity in which symbols and 
markers are produced via the use of dance, words, and body gestures in theatre; 
tempo, rhythm, and tone in music; and media, visual, and sonic technology. I 
analyse how Paik uses media, reveals the mechanisms by which media produces 
messages, rethinks habitual patterns of seeing, and questions the implications of 
allowing the results of selective seeing to be taken as the ‘being’ of a thing. My 
research-through-practice further reconsiders how performance language resonates 
with the distrust of language in Kongwu. With reference to Zhuangzi’s linguistic 
strategy, I show that the writing of Chinese calligraphy on the surface of water is a 
traceless action, that is, an undocumented writing that constitutes a ‘poem without 
language’. By disrupting the expected function of writing, water calligraphy therefore 
shifts attention from content to the process of writing itself. Concentrating on Paik’s 
approach to media and spatial organisation in ink landscape paintings, I further show 
how the use of multiple sets of closed circuits create an orchestra of gazes that 
contemplate the looping effect; what we see is the result of seeing with 
differentiation, and the result of such seeing we take as the ‘being’ of the thing. 
 
1.1 Reconsidering the Looping Effects of Language with Reference to Kongwu  
 
In order to understand how language governs the way we can perceive and 
experience from the perspective of Kongwu, I introduce Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatā and 
Twofold Reality, use the Chan/Zen proverb to discuss the relationship between 
things and indicators. The two Chan/Zen poems examine how the human being (the 
subject) can occupy the centre of experience. By using the ink landscape painting, 
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we investigate how the spatial organization in the painting demonstrates the 
uncertainty between the observer and the observed and distrust of language.  
From the perspective of Kongwu, what we often experience is the result of 
experience with differentiation. Then we mistake the result of selective seeing as the 
‘being’ of the world. Selective seeing means a particularly way of perceiving (seeing, 
listening and sensing) conditioned by social, cultural and historical backgrounds as 
well as limited by past experiences, language, and social convention. Foucault’s 
concept of episteme can help to understand selective seeing. In The Order of 
Things, Foucault examines Velazquez's painting Las Meninas (1656, The Maids of 
Honour) to address the relationship between reality and representation, and the 
possibility of knowledge (Foucault 1970:3-18). According to Foucault’s analysis, 
Velazquez made the act of representation to be seen, and created a painting that is 
reflective to its mechanism of representation, and its mediation that determined what 
could be invisible or visible. Through the example of Velazquez's painting Las 
Meninas, Foucault argues that what could be known and be visible is determined by 
its historical episteme. Episteme, as Foucault defines, refers to “the conditions of 
possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a 
practice” (Foucault 1970: 183). As Foucault suggests, each episteme has its sets of 
assumptions that determine what can be thinkable and knowable. Then, one 
episteme could replace another. A claim of ‘truth’ and the knowledge of things could 
replace another version. In other words, the ‘truth’ is merely the functioning of a 
specific episteme, but one takes what can be represented in a particular episteme as 
the ‘being’ of objects (Foucault 1970: 370). Foucault doubts the ‘truth’ produced by 
its specific historical conditions. Similarly, the concept of Kongwu forces us to 
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confront the issue that we take the indicator as the thing in itself, calling for dis-
identifying with ‘the seen’.  
The circulation between language and our emotion, feeling and action is the 
looping effect of language, which becomes a ‘reality’, the condition with which we 
engage everyday. Because of the dualistic differentiation that means the subject-
object dichotomy and the dualistic pairs of language, language can perform the 
functions of describing, indicating, and documenting. We use language to 
understand the world. In fact, we are governed by language. Language exercises 
emotive influence and affects value judgments. When we use language to point to 
something, it triggers associated memories and feelings and affects our subsequent 
actions. We live with the effects of language. The looping effect of language implies 
that the ‘I’ is being assumed as a creator of the relationship between the ‘I’ and the 
‘world’, but indeed the ‘I’ is the functioning of describing and building a relationship 
(will further discussed in Chapter Three). In this sense, we take our descriptions of 
experience as ‘real’. The functioning of language has been mistaken as the reality.  
Nāgārjuna coined the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness, nothingness), which 
derives from several presuppositions:  twofold reality and dependent-origination. 
 
Whatever is dependently co-arising  
That is explained to be emptiness.  
That, being a dependent designation,  
Is itself the middle way.  
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995:69) 
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The principle of pratītya-samutpāda (dependent-origination, dependent-arising) 
means that “things are formed in existence depending on other things” (Streng1967: 
60). Everything, when considered as an entity, is only a temporal aggregation of 
multiple elements in the specific condition. That a specific entity can exist 
presupposes the co-existence of the entities of not-this-one. Every ‘thing’ is an 
aggregation of things not-itself. ‘Self’ is already including not-self. Dependent-arising 
refutes the view that everything is independent, with its own absolute essence.  
According to Streng, Nāgārjuna’s reinterpretation of dependent-origination 
does not “assert the annihilation of things” (Streng 1967:159), but rules out the 
search for “first cause” (Streng1967: 60 and 159). For Nāgārjuna, “cause” should be 
regarded as “an orderly set of circumstances or conditions —— which themselves 
are conditioned”. So cause does not lead to “an original source” (Streng1967: 61).  
Śūnyatā, as a linguistic label, functions without being trapped in the dualistic ordering 
of experiences by either the position of absolute being or absolute nonbeing 
(nihilism), which is the middle-way (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:546). As an extension 
of dependent-arising, śūnyatā does not imply that things do not exist, but that each 
thing has no self-contained essence and substance, as we claim when 
conceptualising the ‘being’ of the world. The concept of śūnyatā is not non-existence, 
no-things. The concept of Twofold reality (Conventional Reality and Ultimate Reality) 
operates in a way to avoid taking śūnyatā as nihilism or another absolutism.  
In Nāgārjuna’s Twofold Reality, Conventional Reality refers to a circumstance, 
a result of the habitual way of perceiving conditioned by the historical cultural, 
linguistic conditions, and social agreements, and caused by the subject-object 
dichotomy. Conventional Reality is merely what can be thinkable and knowable, 
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conditioned by its specific circumstance. As Foucault’s concept of episteme noted, 
episteme is the base that determines the possibility of knowledge, and produces a 
version that we think to be of reality. Conventional Reality has to depend on its 
specific sets of condition to be possible.  
Ultimate Reality does not suggest the independent absolute essence of reality 
possible, but refers to a particular way of experiencing that one does not identify with 
the result of the habitual way of perceiving. Ultimate Reality responds to the function 
and effect of Conventional Reality. The phenomenon of Conventional Reality is the 
foundation for the significance of the second truth, Ultimate Reality (Nāgārjuna and 
Garfield 1995:68). Kongwu’s worldview is based on the notion that the Twofold 
Reality is driven by simultaneous workings. According to Nāgārjuna, Conventional 
Reality is the outcome of one’s seeing and describing. If one understands the 
meaning of Ultimate Reality, one realises whatever ‘being’ we can know is the result 
of experience with dualistic differentiation.  
The dynamic of Twofold Reality resists the dualistic separation of 
Conventional Reality and Ultimate Reality. In chapter twenty-four, “Examination of 
the Four Nobel Truths”, of Mulamadhyamakakarika (Book of the Middle-Way), 
Nāgārjuna responded to other Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) who criticised 
Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness and promotion of nihilism. If everything were really 
empty, as Nāgārjuna had stated, the four Buddhist truths for practice – knowledge, 
abandonment, meditation, and manifestation – should not exist (Nāgārjuna and 
Garfield 1995:67; Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:326-31). Nāgārjuna’s opponents 
charged that his statement “all is empty” was nihilistic (Nāgārjuna and Garfield 
1995:295-7), because his concept of emptiness could “turn out to be another 
absolutistic” position (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:326–7). They further alleged 
28 
that all being empty did not explain causality and the phenomena of birth and death, 
arising and disappearing. To clarify, Nāgārjuna stated:    
 
The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: truth 
relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit.  MKV℗ 
p.492; MKV(V) 1p.214  
  (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:331) 
 
Nāgārjuna explained the need to develop the concept of Twofold Reality and the 
operation of śūnyatā in the linguistic realms and as concerns the nature of reality and 
perceptions of the world. “Truth relating to worldly convention” refers to the 
Conventional Reality that results from linguistic markers (Nāgārjuna and Han 
1997:536), representational systems, contexts and social conventions. Ultimate 
Reality means that one does not identify with whatever versions of ‘truth’ resulting 
from Conventional Reality, particularly the subject-object dichotomy. Śūnyatā as a 
linguistic strategy responds to the first reality, Conventional Reality (Nāgārjuna and 
Han 1997:536).  
Habitually, one takes Conventional Reality as real. However, one needs to 
dispense with the habit of identifying with the results of dualistic discrimination. 
Ultimate Reality expresses understanding of the provisional position and responds to 
the problem of taking Conventional Reality as real, with absolute substance. Though 
Nāgārjuna called the second truth Ultimate Reality, he also expressed the 
understanding that there is no such thing as a ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ with absolute 
substance and fixed essence. Even ‘emptiness’ itself does not have any absolute 
essence (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:542), as the nihilists hold. Conventional Reality is 
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thus the result of dualistic differentiation that constructs the conditions in which we 
live, and Ultimate Reality requires that that we each dis-identify with the result of a 
particular way of seeing, without being governed by the dualistic construction. To 
understand the kinds of conditions in which we live, we can look at the looping effect 
that differentiation causes. 
 
Taking the Indicator as the Thing: The Finger is Not the Moon  
 Differentiation is the foundation upon which language indicates, describes, 
and documents experience. As concerns Kongwu, we experience the world by taking 
the result of differentiation as the thing in itself. The Zen proverb, ‘the finger is not the 
moon’ addresses our tendency to take the indicator as the thing in itself. In volume 
nine of Dazhi Dulun (大智度論, Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom), a 
teacher uses his finger to point to the moon and indicate what it is. The student only 
sees the finger and does not see the moon. The teacher asks, “I used the finger to 
point to the moon, so why do you see the finger as the moon, not the moon? 
(Nāgārjuna and Jia 1997:273-280). The finger, as the indicator, points to something 
that is not the indicator itself. Indication can, therefore, function according to dualistic 
pairs, and the ‘finger is not the moon’ proverb reveals that indicators habitually 
trigger our emotions, leading us to act out responses. Hence, chain-effects shape 
the worlds in which we live. 
Zhuangzi addressed the influence of language upon not only our emotions, 
but our value judgements:  
 
The “this” is also “that.” The “that” is also “this.” According to “that,” there is a 
system of right and wrong. According to “this,” there is also a system of right 
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and wrong. Is there really a distinction between “this” and “that”? ... Not to 
discriminate “that” and “this” as opposite is the very essence of Tao (Way). 
There you get the Axis of Tao. There you attain the Central Ring to respond to 
the endless. 
 (Chuang [Zhuang] 66 in Yip 1993: 71)  
 
Bound by discrimination, one prefers good to bad, right over wrong, and sees the 
world through a value-bounded perspective that makes arbitrary connections 
between the observer’s learning experiences, social conditions, memories, and 
habits. We conduct ourselves according to ‘this’ or ‘that’. We live in the effects of 
differentiation that generates value judgements. In this sense, we take the indicator 
as the real.  
 
Occupying the Position of the Observer as the Centre of Experience 
The indicator is about something, but is not about the thing in itself. The 
aboutness is the relationship we establish between the world and the self. Then, we 
take the relation as the world. The indicator points to something that is not the 
indicator itself. To follow the direction of the indication, we do not meet the thing; 
rather, we encounter the ‘self’. We assume the human being occupies the position of 
the observer. A network of indicators is the outcome of our experiencing the world 
through the ‘I’, as the centre of experience. Put to our purposes as humans, 
language mediates subject and object, bringing the subject closer to the world. This 
employment of language assumes that the ‘I’ as a unified entity should occupy the 
position of the observer.  
 Shen-xiu and Heing-neng’s poems question the assumption that we need to 
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occupy the position of the observer to understand the world, even in spiritual 
practice. The Fifth Patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism, to know his students’ 
understanding of reality, asked them to write poems. Shen-xiu wrote:  
 
The body is the Bodhi tree;         
The mind is like the mirror bright,             
Take heed to keep it always clean,              
And let no dust collect upon it.  
(in Xiong 1998: 138) 
 
The Bodhi tree is the symbol of true wisdom in Buddhism, and the mind, as a mirror, 
reflects the world. The monk Shen-xiu（606-706 A.D）used the metaphors of the 
Bodhi tree and the mirror to describe the specific body-mind state necessary to truly 
understand the world. Specifically, he assumed there is a self that empties the self.   
The monk Hui-neng (638-713A.D), who later became the Sixth Patriarch of 
Chinese Chan Buddhism, challenged Shen-xiu’s approach: 
 
The Bodhi is not like the tree;  
The mirror bright is nowhere shining;  
As there is nothing from the first,  
Where does the dust itself collect?  
(in Xiong 1998: 139) 
 
In “there is nothing from the first,” Hui-neng questioned why we assume the self as 
the reference point from which to understand the world, that is, selective 
32 
experiencing. When we have assumed this position from the beginning, we 
experience through selective perception. Then, what we experience is the outcome 
of selective experiencing.  
Dust may be viewed as a metaphor for accumulations from the past that 
cause dualistic thinking and experiencing with selection. When Sheng-xiu said, “let 
no dust collect upon it”, he assumed the position of the self (the metaphor of the 
mirror), thereby avoiding the collection of dust upon “it”. Yet, he forgot that the self is 
the collection of past experiences with which we identify. Though he did not want 
past accumulations (dust) to constitute his experience, he still conceptualized of the 
self as a unified entity and something obtained through the purging of past 
accumulations. Past accumulations means memories, personal histories, the cultural 
and social backgrounds, which often condition a particular way of experiencing. 
Sheng-xiu thereby claimed that ‘this’ was better than ‘that’, according to Buddhist 
wisdom – ‘that’ being accumulations from the past. According to Sheng-xiu, what 
one needs to do is make ‘this’ better and more precise. The self being taken as the 
reference point as a foundation, dualistic opposition becomes possible. For Hui-
neng, without assuming the self as the centre from which to understand the world, 
we cannot experience dualistic opposition, according to ‘this’ or ‘that’. We experience 
in a nondualistic way.  
The issues posed by the poems of Hui-neng and Sheng-xiu rethought the 
unconscious habit, the subject-object dichotomy that governs our way of 
experiencing. When we reconsider how the indicator functions, we not only revisit 
the problem of dualistic thinking, but also the position of the observer. Shen-xiu still 
assumed ‘I’ as a unified entity and remained trapped in the loop of language 
because he retained the self who accumulated Buddhist teaching as his principal 
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reference point. Hui-neng challenged whether the experiencer could or should be the 
centre of experience. Then, we confront a way of understanding the world and 
studying experience without assuming a ground of self, a unified entity (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1991).  
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch used their cognitive experiment on colour to 
suggest a “groundlessness” without a subjective ground as ego-self and an objective 
ground as the world ‘out there’ (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:217).  
 
color provides a paradigm of a cognitive domain that is neither pregiven nor 
 represented but rather experiential and enacted. It is very important to note 
 that just because color is not pregiven does not mean that it does not exhibit 
 universals or that it cannot yield to rigorous analysis by the various branches 
 of science. 
    (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:171) 
 
They proposed an enactive approach to experience, a middle-way between 
objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism and subjectivism shared the same desire: 
“the craving for an absolute ground” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:141). 
Because of “the basic logic of representationism”, objectivism tended to search for 
“an outer ground in the world” and subjectivism for “an inner ground in the mind” 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:141). They pointed out that the dualistic 
treatment of mind (subjective) and world (objective) is “not given and ready-made”, 
but a product of “the history of mind and nature” that can be traced back to the 
Cartesian mind (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:141). They used Nāgārjuna’s 
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Middle-Way and the meditation practice to interpret the perception of colour and to 
propose that the core of experience is the lack of a unified self. 
The “groundlessness” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:217), being the 
core of experience dissolves the Cartesian divide of subject and object. From an 
enactive perspective, the foundation is “circularity” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991:16), and not “separation” that is the foundation of representationalism (Barad 
2007: 137). The enactive approach and the perspective of Kongwu both rejected 
representationalism, and proposed that we cannot find a foundation of ‘self’ in the 
experience.  
Barad investigated the implication of Niels Bohr’s physics-philosophy to the 
production of knowledge, and suggested that we cannot localise “the agency in 
individuals (whether human and nonhuman)” (Barad 2007:x). Bohr questioned “the 
Cartesian belief in the inherent distinction between subject and object, and knower 
and known”(Barad 2007:138). According to Barad, Bohr’s physics-philosophy that 
rejects “atomistic metaphysics” (Barad 2007:138) forces us to confront Newtonian 
worldview, “Cartesian epistemology and its representationalist triadic structure of 
words, knowers, and things” (Barad 2007:138).  In discussing the scientific practices, 
Barad noted “one of representationalism’s fundamental assumptions: the view that 
the world is composed of individual entities with separately determinate 
properties”(2007: 55). The “most forms of realism” often share this assumption, and 
“presuppose a metaphysics that takes for granted the existence of individual entities, 
each with its own roster of non relational properties” (Barad2007: 55). From a 
nonrepresentationalist realist perspective, Barad proposed that realness “does not 
necessarily imply “thingness”: what’s real may not be an essence, an entity, or an 
independently existing object with inherent attributes” (Barad 2007: 55). If we follow 
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Barad’s analysis, because of the concept of dependent-arising and Nāgārjuna’s 
śūnyatā, ‘the real’ in Kongwu did not “subscribe to an individualistic metaphysics” 
(Barad 2007:56). Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of dependent-origination by śūnyatā 
suggests a very different understanding of reality, and can be understood as the 
nonrepresentationalist account of the reality.   
Barad raised the controversies between Bohr and Heisenberg, and Barad’s 
interpretation emphasised the distinction between Heisenberg and Bohr to develop 
“an agential realistic ontology” that focuses on the process of “intra-actions that 
phenomenon comes to matter” (Barad 2007:140). Yet, if we consider the problem of 
the subject-object dichotomy, similar to Bohr, Heisenberg questioned the 
assumptions embedded in our understandings of nature and science. Heisenberg 
developed the principle of indeterminacy and the concept of probability and 
challenged the Newtonian notion of the “pure case” (1958a:53), with a neutralized 
observer and an “objectively real” (Heisenberg 1958a:129). In quantum physics, the 
notion of nature as the observed object results from a chain of processes and 
interactions between the device, observer, and the rest of the world (Heisenberg 
1958a:128-131).  
Heisenberg stated, “what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed 
to our method of questioning” (1958a:58; 1958b:105). The observer’s culturally 
conditioned subjective input determines the observer’s methods of seeing and 
measuring (Heisenberg 1958a: 56-8). Heisenberg reminded us, by paraphrasing 
Niels Bohr, “in the drama of existence, we are ourselves both players and 
spectators” (Heisenberg 1958a:58). For quantum physics, the scientific method, 
including the formulation of a theoretical motivation and the construction of a 
measuring device, reflects the operations of an intersubjective network of collective 
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“practicing scientists” (Wallace 2005: 317). Science, this “specialized intersubjective” 
network, “illuminates facets of the world of experience, not the world independent of 
experience” (Wallace 2005: 317, original emphasis). The utilisation of certain 
observational instruments in the lab depends upon a mentality based on scientific 
theoretical assumptions. When one constructs a definition of reality, the observer 
and the observed, the active and passive roles, circulate incessantly in a loop.  
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993) argued that the concept of the 
pure subject, which is different from the object, is a modern illusion, based on the 
first internal “Great Divide” (1993: 99) between society and nature within European 
modern society and on Newtonian objectification of nature, which assumes human 
beings to be totally neutral observers. Analysing how the second “Great Divide” 
between “us [European]” and “them [non-European]” emerged (1993: 99), Latour 
argued that the moderns never really “separate humans from nonhumans any more 
than the ‘others’ totally superimpose signs and things”(1993:104) and never abandon 
the “ancient anthropological matrix” (1993:107) that anthropologists would use to 
describe premodern tribal societies, weaving nature, culture, humans, and 
nonhumans together (1993:107). The two Great Divides do not describe reality, but 
only enable the European cultural-specific way of establishing relations with others, 
which is to be “felt modern” and universal (1993:103). In other words, because one 
claims separation, one may make an effort to establish a relationship between the 
self and other. Given the assumption of the totally neutral observer, one takes the 
dualistic ordering of things, the relational, as the real. Therefore, the ‘being’ of the 
world and universality are assured.  
Latour argued that even the “anti-moderns, like the post moderns” can critique 
modernism, because they have accepted the Great Divides (Latour 1993:46-9). He 
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proposed to “the field of nonmodern worlds” (Latour 1993:49) to disengage the 
dualistic pairs that purify the boundaries between self and other. The Great Divides 
not only create separation, but also cause value judgements and violence. While the 
dualistic mechanism advances technological innovation, it also causes violence in 
the form of imperialism, colonialism, and race and gender discrimination. We have to 
dissolve the effects of dualistic thinking and find a way to disengage from the 
violence that results from inferring the real from dualistic purification. Kongwu 
examines the looping of dualistic pairs, opens up a nonmodern field, and seeks the 
path to experience in a nondualistic way.  
In The Order of Things, Foucault traced the changes “in the fundamental 
arrangement of knowledge” and pointed out that “man is a recent invention” 
(1970:422). Human as the centre to order things could disappear as it appeared. 
Man “would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 
1970:422). If we take the anti-representationism seriously suggested by Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch’s experiment on color perception, the physics-philosophy of 
Bohr and Heisenberg, and the problem of the fundamental separation between 
human and non-human suggested by Barad and Latour, and apply these to our 
everyday experience and feeling as the practice suggested by the concept of 
Kongwu, we can release from an anthropocentric ordering of things.  
 
Reconsidering the Mechanism of Language in Ink Landscape Painting  
 Ink landscape painting provides insight into how a specific worldview, 
particularly distrust of language, may shape artistic language, and how we can 
disrupt the function of language through indicative tools. Kongwu disputes the notion 
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that the world should be organised into a picture that can be viewed from a single 
position, as posited by Cartesian perspectivism; this is considered an 
“epistemological elaboration” that requires human intellectual intervention (Yip 1993: 
48). Yip discussed ways of seeing and positioning in Chinese landscape paintings. In 
many, “the perspective evaporates before the viewing eye” (Yip 1993: 81). Travellers 
among Mountains and Streams, a Northern Song school landscape painting by Fan 
Kuan (990–1020), exemplifies the principle that “[d]istance is not absolute” (Yip1993: 
81). According to Yip, in the lower right corner of the forest, hills and rocks appear 
very small, indicating that the viewer is at a distance from them. The mountain far 
behind the hills and rocks appears huge and imposing, as if right before the viewer’s 
eyes (Yip1993: 81). The painting avoids a single perspective and shows multiple 
points of view from different angles. The spatial relationship between objects is 
moveable. The position of the ‘I’ is multiplied, existing in different locations 
simultaneously, unable to occupy an absolute fixed position. For Yip, the culture-
specific spatial organisation and representation in Chinese landscape paintings are 
mobilised by the poetics of Kongwu with the question, “How can we take this as 
subject (principal) and that as object (subordinate)? Merely one form of being among 
millions of others, what right do we have to classify other forms of beings? How can 
we impose ‘our viewpoint’ upon others as the right viewpoint, the only right 
viewpoint?” (Yip 1993: 71). The spatial organisation in Chinese landscape paintings 
thus questions the position of the observer.  
When Bryson analysed multiple perspectivism and the subject in the corner, 
not the centre, of the Chan ink painting Landscape by Sesshu (1420-1506), he 
argued that the spatial language found in Sesshu’s painting questions “the 
occupation of the self” before generating gazes (Bryson 1988:88). The painting 
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includes “the object’s remainder, the other views which pass out from the object to all 
those uncountable places where the viewer is not” (Bryson 1988:103), and 
acknowledges “the viewer’s remainder, the sum of other views that the viewer 
excludes by assuming this view” (Bryson1988:103). Hence, the painting questions 
the gaze generated by the tunnel vision of the fixed viewing subject and causes 
dualistic differentiation. 
Kongwu suggests that we cannot grasp the result of any fixed measurement 
as ‘being’ and rethinks the circulation between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’. The 
observer’s position and perceptual process are the primary mediators of the 
relationship between the observer and the thing being observed, before any 
technological tool and observing device come into play. The concept of Kongwu 
acknowledges this level of mediation, an active complex network that activates any 
attempt to purify the boundaries between self and other or nature and culture. 
Consequently, one gives the world an objective being through intellectual elaboration 
and constructs a worldview and universality.  
‘Being’ refers to the enclosed circuit, the result of selective observation from 
an anthropocentric view; Kongwu refers to the quality of not being caught by the 
enclosed circuit. The object of perception can only refer to the specific conditioning 
of possibilities. As a result, the identity of the thing becomes uncertain, without 
serving the human purpose. Ink landscape painting, as an example, responds to the 
Kongwu attitude towards language. In performance practice, the question raised is 
how this attitude shapes the principles underlying performance. Using Paik’s 
installation, I elaborate on how performance resonates with Kongwu’s orientation 
toward language. 
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1.2 Nam June Paik’s Approach to Media: From The Traces of the Observing 
Tool to The Traces of Observing  
 
Paik’s approach to media, particularly his mechanisms of indicating, representing, 
and documenting, resonates with the Kongwu perspective of language. I investigate 
how Paik uses the tools of indicating to disrupt the self-contained circuitry of 
language and our habitual patterns of experiencing in everyday life. Kongwu 
reconsiders our entrapment in the looping effects of language and takes issue with 
our description of experience as reality, particularly with the influence of indicators on 
our emotions and value judgements. Kongwu has developed a meditation practice 
that dissolves the habits reinforced to us by dualistic differentiation. The meditator 
learns to shift attention away from the content of experiences but remains aware of 
the process of experiencing that produces ‘the’ experience. Paik brings the viewer’s 
attention not to the message itself, but to the media mechanism used to produce the 
message. He thereby uses the convenience of technological tools to reflect how we 
perceive the world and reconsiders how we bring the ‘real’ into ‘being’.  
Nam June Paik (1932-2006), a Korean-born American artist, was often 
considered as the Father of Video Art. He studied aesthetics, music, art history at the 
University of Tokyo (Decker- Phillips 1998:24), and wrote a dissertation on Arnold 
Schönberg. He moved to Germany to pursue his doctoral studies (Kaye 2007:32). In 
1958, Paik worked with the composer Karlheinz Stockhausen at the electronic music 
studio (Grunenberg and Wismer 2011:11) and met John Cage. Paik moved to New 
York in 1964. 
Paik’s encounter with Cage transformed his attitude towards music as well as 
visual arts. Paik’s exhibition Exposition of Music — Electronic Television in 1963 was 
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his first solo exhibition at the Galerie Parnass in Wuppertal, Germany, also an 
important “intermedial experiment” (Grunenberg and Wismer 2011:11). In the leaflet 
of Exposition of Music—Electronic Television, Paik wrote that his electronic 
television “represents a contrast to electronic music, […] which shows a pre-defined, 
determined tendency both in its serial compositional method and in its ontological 
form” (Paik 1963 in Media Art Net 2005). Paik’s statement revealed his move from 
determinism to indeterminism. As Harithas indicated in the forward to Nam June 
Paik: Video ’n’ Videology 1959-1973, Paik’s interest in indeterminacy “has roots in 
Zen Buddhism and in contemporary Western philosophy and science”(Harithas in 
Paik 1974), particularly cybernetics and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Inspired 
by John Cage’s indeterminacy which reconsidered the ontology of music, in 
“Afterlude to the Exposition of Experimental Television”, Paik wrote, 
“INDETERMINISM and VARIABILITY is the very UNDERDEVELOPED parameter in 
the optical arts, although this has been the central problem in music for the last 10 
years” (Paik 1964 in Paik 1974: n.p). Paik remediated John Cage’s music and 
philosophy in his television experiment.  
Even though Paik was influenced by John Cage and Cage’s use of Zen 
Buddhism in music, long before the academic scholars in Buddhism studies and 
East Asian studies criticised Suzuki’s version of Zen (discussed in the Introduction 
Chapter), Paik commented on Suzuki’s Zen in 1964.    
 
 Now let me talk about Zen, although I avoid it usually, not to become the 
salesman of “OUR” culture like Daisetsu Suzuki, because the cultural 
patriotism is more harmful than the political patriotism, because the former is 
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the disguised one, and especially the self-propaganda of Zen (the doctrine of 
the self-abandonment) must be the stupid suicide of Zen. 
 (Paik 1964 in Paik 1979: n.p)  
 
He continuously wrote,  
Zen consists of two negations.  
   The first negation:  
      The absolute IS the relative.  
   The second negation:  
     The relative IS the absolute.  
The first negation is a simple fact, which every mortal meets every day; 
everything passes away… mother, lover, hero, youth, fame,… etc.  
The second negation is the KEY-point of Zen.  
That means… 
 The Now is utopia, what it may be.  
 The Now in 10 minutes is also utopia, what it may be.  
 […] 
 The Now in 40 million years is also utopia, what it may be.  
Therefore  
 
We should learn,  
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 How to be satisfied with 75% 
 […]  
 How to be satisfied with 9% 
 How to be satisfied with 0% 
 How to be satisfied with -1000%... 
 
Zen is anti-avant-garde, anti-frontier spirit, anti-Kennedy. 
Zen is responsible of Asian poverty.  
How can I justify ZEN, without justifying Asian poverty??    
(Paik 1964 in Paik 1979: n.p) 
 
Paik was aware of the self-orientalisation in Suzuki’s Zen, in which Zen becomes a 
tool to re-centre the self. Paik was aware of the very different assumption of 
transformation and improvement embedded in Zen, so he did not see Zen as a 
utopia or solution implied in Cage’s Zen, but condemned Zen for its “Asian poverty”. 
In this context, Paik reflected Zen philosophy and responded to Cage’s works 
through his television experiment. Even though Paik was influenced by Cage’s art 
and philosophy, to consider the thematic structure for introducing the concept of 
Kongwu and its relevance to performance, I analysed Paik's works first before 
Cage's works in the next chapter.     
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Traces of the Materiality of the Medium in Zen for Film (1964) 
In Zen for Film (1964), a loop of unexposed blank 16mm film leader is 
projected onto a wall. Throughout the length of the projection, there is no content, 
only a bright square of light. The spectators could notice the traces of scratches and 
dust accumulations on the film. Paik often engaged with the projection, by standing 
in front of the projection and back to the spectators. As the result, his shadow and 
body were present in the square of light. By projecting blank film in Zen for Film 
(1964), Paik disrupts the function of film, indicating and documenting our expectation 
that visualising technology be used for performance purposes. Paik asks the viewer 
to pay attention not to content, but to the mechanism by which the visualising 
technology operates. Akin to an observational tool, film usually provides a frame 
through which to observe the world and documents the results of selective framing. 
By emptying film of its contents, Paik reflects on the selective framing that film 
usually provides and on the traces of materiality in film.  
Viewers of Zen for Film’s blank content may see not only the film’s materiality, 
but also the viewing environment reflected on the blank screen as dust and shadow. 
The viewer is aware of the environment in which the film projection and the act of 
seeing are situated. Zen for Film, according to Kaye, “points to a plurality of times” 
and the limit of its medium in the “intersection of times” (2006:42). The film provides 
a measurement and a structure of time. However, through repeated projection and 
the passage of time during which the film is not projected, the scratches and dust on 
the surface of the film have challenged the measurement provided by the film itself. 
These material traces reveal a sense of time that is different from the pre-assumed 
time structure of the film projection (Kaye 2006: 42). The content becomes the 
scratches produced by the projection and the dust left when the film is or is not being 
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used. Thus, Zen for Film records film’s materiality and traces from film’s interaction 
with the environment. It, therefore, documents its own medium’s temporalities.  
The content being projected is this observing tool’s own traces. When film 
does not produce a recognisable image, its materiality is revealed, and its 
mechanism is observed. By emptying film of its expected photographic images, Paik 
disrupts the viewer’s habits and asks the viewer to think critically about the selective 
seeing that results from the framing of film and its emotive influence. By playing the 
empty film at twenty-four frames per second, Paik makes the viewer aware of the act 
of seeing and reflects to the audience its habitual behaviours. What we can see is 
limited by a medium’s mechanism (such as the film here). Paik questions the utility of 
film as a way to frame views, measure time, and observe the world.  
 
How Would a Buddha Watch TV?  
In the TV Buddha series, Buddha Watching TV (1974), and Enlightenment 
Compressed (1994), Paik uses a closed circuit TV-camera installation and Buddha 
sculpture to reflect upon how we perceive and understand the world. He puts a 
Buddha statue in the position of a TV viewer. A video camera records the Buddha 
statue, so the Buddha looks at its own ‘live’ image on the TV screen. In the context 
of Buddhism, the Buddha reflects the notion that an observer can experience the 
world in a nondualistic way, meaning without judgment and differentiation and 
without being conditioned by the accumulated past. Multiple programmes are 
available on TV simultaneously, and we select one from many to watch and respond 
with emotions and opinions. Paik asks how Buddha, as the symbol of observation 
without selection, would watch TV, and tentatively responds that Buddha would 
watch the TV set itself, its process of transmission, but not the content that the TV 
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plays. Given the nondualistic nature of its seeing, Buddha would not identify with the 
stories, contents, and emotive influence of TV programmes or experience the 
looping effects of indicators that TV produces.  
Buddha would likely look at its own image in the TV and observes its own 
action of watching TV. In this case, the TV viewer is being viewed. If we understand 
the cultural significance of Buddha, we cannot interpret this as an act of narcissism. 
Instead, the Buddha looks at not the content, but the TV’s mechanism of transmitting 
symbols and producing messages. When one meditates, one shifts awareness from 
the content of experience to the faculty of experiencing itself. The Buddha does not 
identify with the buddle of experiences as the self, but questions the emergent 
process itself. Thus, meditation implies that when we follow the direction of 
indication, we do not meet the thing in itself, but we encounter the observer’s own 
mechanism of seeing.  
Paik investigates the act of viewing and its traces, regardless of whether 
technology comes into play. “During the Projeckt 74 exhibition”, Paik not only put the 
Buddha sculpture sitting in front of the TV, but also himself sat like a Buddha in the 
other enclosed circuit (Media Art Net 2005). The immediacy of live-feed reflects how 
‘past’ gazes determine ‘present’ gazes and amplifies the constant flow between the 
gazes of the present and past, as well as the circulation between seeing and being 
seen. TV Buddha reconsiders our habit of experiencing through dualistic 
differentiation, before any electronic mediation comes into play. The result of this 
observation refers back to the observer's self, resonating with principles underlying 
meditation. In TV Buddha, Paik demonstrates how he transfers the underlying logic 
of observation without duality in the context of meditation into media arts and 
performance. 
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The ‘Being’ of the Thing in Real Plant/Live Plant and Real Fish/Live Fish  
After examining the mechanisms by which observational tools are made 
effective and the observer’s act of viewing, Paik questioned the result of observing, 
the ‘being’ of the thing. In Real Fish/Live Fish (1982), Paik emptied two vintage TVs. 
He turned one TV into a fish tank with water, live fish, and plants. Inside the other 
TV, he placed a monitor on which we can view the live-feed video of the ‘real’ fish 
swimming in the fish tank. The ‘real’ fish and the ‘live’ video fish were swimming next 
to each other.  Paik crystallised critiques concerning the reality and representation, 
similar to those of Latour and Heisenberg, of our understanding of ‘being’ in the 
world. From a Kongwu perspective, Real Fish/Live Fish invokes at least three 
possible modes of perceptions that koan illustrated and referenced Nāgārjuna’s 
‘twofold reality’: “that phenomena are both ultimately empty and yet conventionally 
real” (Stalling 2010: 125). The koan appears in Chan/Zen Buddhist Transmission of 
the Lamp: 
 
Thirty years ago before I was initiated into Ch’an, I saw mountains as 
mountains, rivers rivers. Later when I got an entrance to knowledge, I saw 
mountains not as mountains, rivers not as rivers. Now that I have achieved 
understanding of the substance, mountains are still mountains, rivers still 
rivers.  
(in Yip 1993:101)1 
 
                                                
1 Wu-teng Hui-yuan, vol.17 in Ching-yin Wen-yuan-ke Ssu-k’u Chuan-shu Tzu-pu, 
no.359 (Taiwan:Shang-wu, 1983), 105 che, p. 735. 
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Using the koan to look at Real Fish/Live Fish via the first mode of perception, the fish 
has a self-inherent existence forms the basis for human communication. The live fish 
is distinguishable from the real fish when the camera’s eyes are in play. That it is 
living emphasises the fact that the closed camera-television circuit is capable of 
imitating the human eyes and mind, particularly the rapidity with which we receive 
the results of selective seeing.   
Via the second mode of perception, the fish, no matter whether real or live, is 
not taken for granted, as it is via the first mode. The fish, according to the law of 
dependent origination, does not have a self-inherent existence, but rather only exists 
in an interdependent network. The fish becomes a fish, a sign, and not a not-fish or a 
symbol of other ideas and signs, because we observe it with our intellectual, social-
cultural traces, and sensory constructions. Given this, the ‘being’ of the fish is 
trapped in the self-contained circuit of language. Whether the real fish becomes a 
fish, a sign, and not a not-fish or a symbol of other ideas and signs, depends on the 
relationship between references already present and the dualistic ordering of 
experience in the closed circuit of indicators. The technological gaze represents our 
human eyes and reproduces the simulated fish. Putting the fish perceived via the 
first and second modes together, with one swimming in the water and one swimming 
in the electric live-stream, Paik brings both to life.  
In Real Fish/Live Fish, the live fish (both the “real” fish in the water and the 
“live” fish swimming in the TV) come into ‘being’ because of dualistic seeing, but also 
are killed by the violence that language and vision perform via the differentiation. The 
being of each fish cannot refer to the thing in itself, but must rather refer to the 
mechanism that claims the ‘being’ of these things. The human subject who occupies 
the position of the observer with tunnel vision sees the world and assigns a being to 
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the ‘seen’. In this way, when encountering the world, the human subject can orient 
the self. Yet, being, in this context, serves an anthropocentric purpose. By 
experiencing in this way, we take the known, the result of selectively observing from 
the observer’s perspective, as evidence of what the real ‘is’.  
The simulated fish exteriorises the first mediation when we observe the “real 
fish” without the aid of any electronic media. The observer observes the fish by 
matching the phenomena with thoughts and filtering events through private 
perceptions and social-cultural impressions. The technological gazes simulate 
similar visual markers witnessed with the human eyes and mind. Given the 
similarities between the markers to which we are accustomed and the markers in the 
artistic medium, we can recognise the fish as being the fish inside the TV. The 
simulated live realm is as valid as the ‘real’ realm, with regards to its ability to 
stimulate an affective association and triggers the viewer’s memories. We rely on 
dominant visual and linguistic markers to identify the ‘being’ of the fish. The 
‘suchness’ of the fish is in the closed circuit, the habitual pattern that makes us 
match the experience to the idea, such that the fish is not a fish. 
Via the third kind of perception, one acknowledges phenomena, in terms of 
Nāgārjuna’s twofold reality, both as constituting conventional reality with a 
communicative function and as being ultimately empty if one attempts to assign 
‘being’ to a thing. The live is as valid as the real, with regards to its affective 
association and perceptive identification, so that the real is the live. When one takes 
the results of observation and gives ‘being’ to the fish, the ‘being’ manifests 
differentiation and is governed by measurement and representation. Thus, there is 
no need to deny provisional being to the fish in conventional reality. While one 
acknowledges that the fish is not a fish in itself and that its being is already mediated 
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by the observer’s dualistic seeing, one accepts this “provisional reality” as 
“conventionally true” (Stalling 2010: 125). Consequently, the fish is a fish. The third 
mode’s fish-is-a-fish perspective is different from the fish-is-a-fish perspective of the 
first mode of perception.  
Paik uses media and the tools of indicating and documenting to externalise 
our inner perceptual habits and consequently rethinks how we are governed by 
dualistic differentiation when we experience through our body-mind, without the aid 
of media. Paik step-by-step questions the mechanism by which media determine 
messages and explores the observer’s own self, which filters what one can 
experience and of what can be aware. Furthermore, he questions the outcomes of 
observing, the being of the thing, and how we bring the thing into the ‘being’ that 
becomes the ‘real’ with which we engage. The result of observing cannot be taken 
as the thing in itself, but only as what can be exposed to the mechanism of framing 
and differentiation. One acknowledges that one cannot occupy the position of 
observer as a neutral standing point, but one is already engaged in intersubjective 
play between humans and nonhumans. Acceptance of the conventionally real is not 
acceptance of nature in itself, but is rather acceptance of the representation of one’s 
“relation to nature” (Heisenberg 1958b:107). 
 
1.3 Poem Without Language: Disrupting the Purpose of Writing and Returning 
to the Act of Writing   
 
Performance is an activity that relies on symbols and languages, from the musical, 
visual, and somatic, to the written word and beyond. Yet, Kongwu distrusts language 
because of its dualistic differentiation and reconsiders how language governs our 
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experiences. How might this philosophical view affect our use of language in 
performance?  
 Paik used broken televisions, such as those in Zen for TV, inserting into them 
objects or rewiring their electronic paths. The broken or distorted televisions disrupt 
the production of sounds and images that serve the purpose of indicating, 
representing, and documenting. The materiality of the instruments undermines 
industrial conditioning. When television is unable to look far away and show things 
visually and sonically, expectations are disrupted, revealing the medium’s physicality 
and materiality. The viewer recognises that the television is a collection of parts and 
a mechanism of transmission. In this way, the viewer’s attention shifts from the 
message to the mechanism by which the media produces content that serves a 
human purpose.   
In Paik’s Real Fish/Live Fish, when we observe the ‘real fish’ without the 
camera’s eyes, we use our sensory organs and, through a constellation of past 
experiences and a linguistic network, know the being of the observed and bring the 
‘being’ to ourselves. This is how the fish comes into ‘being’ for us, the observers. The 
camera, as an extension of our eyes, observes the ‘real fish’, and the TV produces 
the description of the result visually and sonically – the ‘live fish’. The camera and TV 
can provide more precise descriptions of the results of our observation than we can 
provide with language and perceptions of our personal past experiences. We, 
however, know the ‘live fish’ not as real, but as the ‘real fish’.  
Similarly, Heisenberg pointed out that the most important contribution of 
modern physics itself was the proposition of a new concept of reality and its 
transformative philosophical implications in everyday life and as regards “a new 
foundation for the development of art” (Heisenberg 1958b: 108). Scientific 
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observation and measurement are more precise than the representations of 
electronic TVs and cameras or perception. Every day, we experience through a 
constellation of personal tastes, value judgements, and colloquial language. Yet, 
science still faces the problem of our assuming that measurement reflects nature in 
itself. Reflections, such as Paik’s, on the mechanisms by which media technology 
and scientific observation work raise the question of why, when we experience the 
world, we take the indication of experience that results from the arbitrary 
accumulation of past experiences and our network of indicators as real. How does 
the dualistic ordering of things govern the way we experience, how we experience 
‘the’ experience of which we are aware, and consequently how we claim the ‘being’ 
of the world?   
Zhuangzi, one of the main founders of Daoism, aimed to challenge the 
hierarchy built on language’s dualistic logic and its affective influence and moral 
judgment. He used several examples to illustrate that value is always “perspective-
bound” (Xi 1983: 215) and developed 巵 ⾔言  (zhiyan), a linguistic strategy for 
disrupting language’s function. 巵 (zhi) is a kind of wineglass that is unable to contain 
any wine. According to Guo Xiang, when zhi is full of wine, it is unbalanced and 
therefore turns upside-down (Xi 1983:235). When zhi is empty, it stands upright (Xi 
1983:235). Thus, zhi is an unstable container. From the perspective of functional 
value, it is unusable. Its unstable and unusable quality conflicts with its function as a 
wine glass. 巵⾔言 (zhiyan) proposed a language that is unusable for the function of 
communication and too unstable to contain any linguistic identification.  
With reference to zhiyan, Zhuangzi challenges the value of language and 
denies the hierarchy organised by language, such as of good over bad, long over 
short, strong over weak (Xi 1983:235). Zhuangzi’s linguistic strategy resists the 
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violence that language (differentiating via dualism) performs, thereby releasing us 
from the looping effects of language. My research, through the installation-
performance Poem without Language, develops writing that is traceless, 
undocumentable, echoing Zhuangzi’s linguistic strategies and the metaphor of 
zhiyan, the wineglass that cannot contain any wine.  
 
The Ancient Technology of Writing  
Poem without Language investigates how Kongwu shapes the principles 
underlying performance making – particularly, how we can disrupt the purpose of 
language using the tools of indicating. I developed a performance research project, 
Poem without Language, which involved writing Chinese calligraphy on the surface 
of water. Replacing the rice paper used in Chinese calligraphy with water, water 
writing amplifies the Daoists’ “decreative-creative dialectic” (Yip 1993: 72). As one 
writes, the writing disappears. Does the performer write water, or is water writing 
back on the performer’s gestural trace? Creation, in this instance, is the circulation 
between materiality and intention. The water constantly empties human intention and 
intellectual intervention.  
The materiality of water controls the decreative-creative dialectic, which is not 
totally under human control. Water writing does not welcome linguistic identification, 
but the process of the material defies linguistic naming: 
  
Tao, told, is not the constant Tao. 
Name, named, is not the constant Name. 
Nameless, the beginning of the world. 
Naming, the mother of a million things. 
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(Lao in Yip 1993: 66) 
 
The “Tao, told” and “name named” results from an anthropocentric perspective and 
“belongs to the realms of concepts and linguistic formations” (Yip 1993: 66). The 
notion of materiality is located here. Materiality is chaotic, is constantly becoming, 
and cannot be contained by names and signs. Things are self-generating and self-
organising, without language (wuyan duhua, 無⾔言獨化). According to Yip, “strictly 
speaking, any thought of a thing becomes itself a verbal act, the deverbalized world 
(wu-yen [wuyan] 無⾔言, wu-yu-chiech [wuyu jie] 無語界) is the first step toward 
grasping the totality of things”(1993:66). Water gives birth to form, and immediately 
this form dies away. The life force is in constant flow, without human-centred 
planning.  
 
1.1 I-Lien Ho, Poem Without Language 
 
Writing Chinese calligraphy on the surface of water expands Chinese 
calligraphy’s purpose of creating anti-representational and non-representational 
performances. The aesthetics respond to the non-anthropocentric worldview, 
dispersing the fixed position of the observer and cohering the materiality and 
physicality of the writing. Water writing interferes with writing’s quotidian purpose of 
55 
communicating and documenting. Materiality and physicality cannot be contained 
within linguistic and visual form. Bodily actions and gestures break the frame of 
vision, interfere with past-tense linguistic references, and bring attention back to 
experiences, not only to vision in the present moment, nor to the before or after, but 
also to the whole bodily senses, to the here and now. The act of writing does not 
serve the function of indicating the human being as the centre of experience. In this 
sense, when the writing cannot produce an expected result, the function dissolves 
and the act of writing stands on its own, as its centre.  
Chinese calligraphy, particularly the cursive style, distorts the shape of words 
and makes the linguistic and communicative functions secondary. When the 
communicative function breaks down, dominant human subjects are no longer 
instrumentalising words. In Chinese calligraphy, writing documents not only through 
linguistic markers, but also through visual traces. The gesture of each stroke 
emphasises the actions of the rest of the body and indicates how the body, its tools, 
and the environment interact in the action of writing. The gestural traces left on paper 
indicate how the next stroke should behave. Examining the interrelation of strokes in 
a sequence is one way that one engages in aesthetic judgment. When one writes on 
the surface of water, previous traces do not stabilise and become visual referents. 
Without these traces, one cannot decide the next stroke according to the aesthetic 
system of Chinese calligraphy. In other words, one cannot experience action by 
referencing past accumulation. Thus, traceless writing does not serve accumulations 
from the past; it is both the linguistics and the visuals of Chinese calligraphy that 
evoke aesthetic judgement. 
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The Orchestra of Gazes in Multiple Closed Circuits  
 The three closed circuits in Poem Without Language generate multiple 
perspectives, reminding us of the looping effect, that is, that what we see is the result 
of selective seeing. The multiple closed circuits facilitate the circulation of gazes. In 
the reflectivity fostered by circulation, back and forth, the performance considers how 
the self becomes the self, why ‘this’ is the object, and why ‘that’ is the subject. 
Multiple sets can create multiple “object’s remainders” and “viewer’s remainders” 
(Bryson 1988:103). Additionally, they may expose the ideology embedded in the 
spatial arrangement of a closed room with six faces and three dimensions, such as a 
white cube and a black box that create the illusion of an ideal enclosure for an 
“unmediated communication between the viewer’s eye and pure form” (Bryson 
1988:107) and the “framed” (Goffman 1986) behavioural codes enforced by 
theatrical performers and spectators.   
The ‘I’, the observer’s self, is the result of intersubjective exchange and 
cannot be assumed to be a unified entity or the centre of experience. The feedback 
loops in the multiple closed-circuit devices of Poem Without Language act as a 
metaphor, elaborating this view.  
 
 
1.2 The feedback loops  
 
My approach to electronic media resonates with the aesthetic, philosophical, 
and spiritual imagination in Kongwu’s poetics and landscape painting and in the 
cosmology embodied in Taiji body techniques. The ethereal electronic waves and 
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water flow re-imagine the organic, formless qi ( 氣 , energy, vital force) body 
circulating in the microcosm and macrocosm without a fixed location. The multiple 
perspectives orchestrated by the simultaneous live-feed sets, in conjunction with real 
body movements, explore the dispersed subjectivity that cannot be a unified entity or 
occupy the position of the observer. The orchestra of gazes reinforces the notion that 
a singular, stable self never exists as thought, but rather exists as a changing 
multiplicity, so that the labels ‘self’, ‘you’, ‘I’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are insufficient. 
Making the camera look at the result of its viewing, the projection on the wall, 
generates endless doubling. What the camera sees is in the loop and results from its 
selective seeing. This approach to media makes the representational tool 
contemplate its own functioning.  
 
1.3 I-Lien Ho, Poem Without Language 
The spatial organisation in ink landscape painting reconsiders the gaze by 
unsettling the position of the ‘I’ occupied by the observer and claiming the ‘being’ of 
the thing. For Kongwu, nature is a non-anthropocentric and self-regulating organism. 
Thus, nature cannot be contained by the ‘being’ we assign to ‘it’. What we can know 
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is the result of our assumed separation of the object and the subject via one-way 
tunnel vision. The ‘being’ of the world resulting from this kind of seeing is merely the 
product of the dualistic ordering that serves our human purpose. The subject cannot 
be a constant presence, a closed container from the very beginning of the logic of 
the gaze. If we unsettle the position of the observer, we could be released from the 
purpose of language that serves our anthropocentric way of seeing.  
Poem without Language does not foster tunnel vision, with the subject on one 
end and the object on the other. One can use closed circuits to extend the Cartesian 
mind-body that produces the tunnel vision gaze. On the other hand, one can use 
closed circuits to dispute that habitual gaze and transform the ‘mind’ into different 
horizons. The camera’s position insists on multiple trajectories of gaze and on the 
different temporality of each gaze. The positions from which the performance is 
viewed are also pushed into liminal, unstable, and exchangeable states. The body’s 
entry into the performance interrupts the frame of vision, what is inside and what is 
outside the selection, reminding us of the boundaries we institute to make contact 
with the world. The use of multiple perspectives does not suggest that the world ‘is’ 
or consists of multiple perspectives, but reminds us of the places where the ‘I’, the 
observer, is not. What we see is, in fact, the ‘relation’ that we establish to overcome 
the constructed separation and so cannot be taken as the real in itself. 
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Movement in Stillness: To See Seeing Arrive2 
 The action score in Poem without Language includes slowing and paused 
movements. The rhythm of pausing and slowing thwarts the expectation of bodily 
movement, evoking the idea of silence as a crime in music, first raised by John 
Cage’s aesthetics. The slowing and pausing of bodily movement resist the violence 
of vision. The spectator usually expects a body whose smooth, consistent motion 
provides information and content in a performance. What kind of spectator 
participation and anticipation arise when a body freezes in the middle of action, 
moves in slow motion, or delays the termination of motion via a very simple action, 
such as walking?   
 “Slowness and stillness call for patience in the microphysical kinaesthetic 
because bodily times are in plural time zones. Different sensations (touching, seeing, 
hearing and so on) have different rhythms within the body to receive, perceive and 
generate cues in the choreographic field” (Ho 2009: 33). By removing exterior 
movement, one acknowledges the micro-movement that is usually taken for granted 
or not acknowledged by our everyday awareness. The micro-movement in stillness 
is one point from which to approach the question of how eyes, which are able to see 
everything but themselves, produce the seen. 
 Stillness, the freezing of movement in the middle of action, and movement in 
slow motion also raise questions about how movement is initiated. Movement here 
also concerns the invisible or imperceptible micro-movements that lack 
                                                
2 The phrase, to see seeing arrive, is adopted from the sentence, “I want to 
watch watching arrive. I want to watch arrivances” (Cixous and Calle-Gruber1997: 
4). 
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representational visibility and resist language. The flow of psychosomatic 
consciousness, proprioception, and interioception circulates in the exterior and 
interior and the micro and macro-cosmos. The small dances, nearly immaterial, 
invisible, and imperceptible, support the visible, smooth means-ends movement. The 
stillness and slowness, which are analogous to meditation techniques, turn one’s 
attention to the complexity of experience without differentiation.  
To take stillness as movement brings nearly invisible or imperceptible micro-
sensory activities into the spotlight, instead of leaving them backstage. This recalls 
Han Zhuo’s (韓拙, 1095–1125) speculations on the use of white space as an ink 
trace (yi bai dang hei 以⽩白當⿊黑) in the spatial arrangements shared by Chinese 
calligraphy and ink landscape painting (Kao 1991: 83-88). According to Yip, “the 
emptiness of language” makes co-present the written that is fixed and solid and the 
unwritten that is fluid and empty (Yip 1993: 82). “The negative space, such as the 
emptiness in a painting” and “the condition of silence with meanings trembling at the 
edges of words in a poem” lead to “an art of noninterference akin to the workings of 
nature” that interweaves “unspeaking, concrete, changing nature” together (Yip 
1993: 82). This echoes Zhuangzi’s allegorical reminder that like language, “which we 
are to forget once it is pronounced, the fish trap can be forgotten once the fish is 
caught” (Yip 1993: 82). If movement in motion is the brighter side of the senses, and 
movement in stillness is the darker side of the senses, the rhythms of slowing and 
pausing movement may darken the bright senses and brighten the dark senses. 
Consequently the “vital rhythm” or “atmosphere” that usually lack visibility can be felt 
(Yip 1993: 82). To be still is not to be passive, but is rather to actively receive micro-
movement. It is not just to move, but also to be moved. 
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The possibility of our possessing the universe under a dominant visual 
narrative has been questioned. Frederic Jameson stated the “visual is essentially 
pornographic, which is to say that it has its end in rapt, mindless fascination” 
(Jameson 1992: 1). Disrupting smooth means-ends movement by pausing, delaying, 
slowing, or suddenly increasing speed may urge us to resist the drive to transform 
the world into a sheer commodifiable image and, thus, into the “spectacle” that Guy 
Debord, in Society of Spectacle (1983), argued was replacing diverse social 
relations, as mediated representational relations were used to serve the logic of 
consumerism. In choreography, slowness and stillness touch the limits of 
representation (Lepecki 2006: 43). 
Slowing and pausing rhythms may also make it possible to resist the violence 
of vision, as well as to transform vision into a form of inter-sensory meditation. 
Instead of mindlessly seeing, one can really consciously experience one’s own 
action of seeing and see seeing arrive. Dispensing with “vision as the master sense” 
(Jay 1988: 3) and the main means of accessing the world allows the other senses to 
catch up and operate via their own various rhythms, rather than under the threat of 
habitual speedy visualisations, and to thereby stretch “the structure of feeling” 
(Williams 1977: 132-3).  
The field of Kongwu moves away not only from linguistic organisation and 
reasoning, but also from “ocularcentrism’s essentializing gaze” (Stalling 2010: 226). 
Ocularcentrism’s essentializing gaze not only organises the world into a picture that 
prioritizes aesthetic perspectivism, but also constructs the world as a machine, 
adopting a scientific standpoint (Heisenberg 1963). Michel Foucault targeted the 
invisibility of visual knowledge that creates power via the cold scientific medical gaze 
and the gaze of panoptican. As Stalling noted, Luce Irigarary connected Western 
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ocularcentrism to the male gaze (Stalling 2010: 226). Ocularcentrism’s essentializing 
gaze also “enables Orientalists and anthropologists alike to construct knowledge of 
the other” (Stalling 2010: 226). Jay (1994) traced the anti-Ocularcentrism in the 
French intellectual discourse that resisted the desire to fix a version of truth by eyes. 
Jay warned of the dangers of using “vision as the master sense” (Jay 1988: 3) to 
construct our worldviews and even offered “critiques of power and hegemony” in the 
“modern era” (Jay 1988: 3). He refused to defend “the dominant visual order” (Jay 
1994:47), but argued that we didn't need to denigrate eyes, and called for a 
multiplication of "scopic regimes” (Jay 1994:591) to disrupt the unconscious habit: 
one takes ‘the seen' as the 'truth'.   
Kongwu, as  “nonmodern” (Latour 1993: 49), articulates a foundation of not  
"separation" that "representationalism has" (Barad 2007:137), but "circularity" 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991:16), so differentiation loses its power to 
categorise lives. Varela, Thompson and Rosch's research on colour perception 
(1991), discussed previously, and the concept of Kongwu proposed that the core of 
experience is the lack of a unified self. If we apply this enactive approach to sensory 
experience, including seeing, smelling, touching and hearing, we don’t have to 
denigrate our eyes, nor use other senses as “the antidote to the hegemony of the 
eyes”(Jay 1994:414). As Jay noted, for Foucault, we can continue the “search for 
essentializing immediacy” by using smell and touch (Jay 1994:416). The spatial 
organisation in the ink landscape painting and the multiple sets of closed circuit in 
Poem without Language exposed the habitual patterning of seeing to unsettle the 
separation of subject and object, and to disrupt the habit of treating 'the seen' as the 
‘real’. Kongwu seeks to dissolve not only the violence of language and vision, but 
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also the violence that differentiation performs, causing dualistic judgment and the 
anthropocentric ordering of things.  
 
Conclusion  
 
When language cannot function, dualistic differentiation cannot be performed. When 
we cannot order things dualistically, we cannot occupy the seat of the observer, nor 
can we take the result of our anthropocentric seeing as the thing in itself. ‘Being’ is 
an enclosed looping effect of language, pointing to ourselves and only indicating our 
relation to the world, not the thing in itself.  
Paik disrupted the expected function of media and brought the viewer’s 
attention not to the message, but to the mechanism of the media that determines the 
message. Further, Paik turned the observer’s body-mind into the observed, 
contemplating the inner perceptual pattern that first mediates the senses, before the 
aid of any media technology. Paik’s approach to media resonates with the 
philosophical implications of Kongwu, particularly Kongwu’s distrust of language. In 
Poem Without Language, I travel from the ancient technology of writing in Chinese 
calligraphy to the electric writing of cameras and projectors, transferring the spatial 
organisation in ink landscape paintings to the orchestration of gazes by multiple 
closed circuits. My work, therefore, reconsiders the function of writing. When writing 
cannot be documented and is traceless, it serves no anthropocentric purpose. My 
work demonstrates how the philosophical implications of Kongwu shape the 
principles underlying performance-making.  
Heisenberg used modern physics to validate the results of philosophical 
traditions (1958a:76-92). Where may Kongwu’s philosophical tradition be located in 
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relation to modern physics? At the very least, extending Heisenberg’s discussion, it 
may be said that Kongwu’s philosophy does not locate knowledge in the Cartesian 
mind, or in experience and perception, as do Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and Hume’s 
theories of sensualism and positivism. Even experience and sensation are, in some 
ways, more authentic than linguistic and logical reasoning in the field of Kongwu. 
Kongwu also does not take space, time, and existence as a priori forms of pure 
intuition, as Kant did. Heisenberg examined the “limitations of the applicability” 
(Heisenberg 1958a: 92) of each philosophical framework. Kongwu’s applicability and 
its own cultural-specific limitations also need to be re-examined using other systems 
and in other contexts.  
McLuhan has stated that technology is an extension of the mind. If, in this 
extension, the mind is a self-centred, closed subject and occupies an 
anthropocentric position, the instrumentalisation of otherness, the perception of the 
world as a machine, and the treatment of nature as a source of human development 
is to be expected. In a way, one could argue that colonialism and imperialism 
resulted from the expansion of a closed human subject and an assumption that 
otherness included human and non-human, with the non-human being a machine 
that could be objectified by human-centred instrumentalist logic. What kind of 
relationship between technology and humans, and what kind of worldview, may exist 
in Kongwu without the anthropocentric position? Paik fuses high technology with 
non-Western and maybe ‘premodern’ cosmology, to create futuristic cybernetic 
networks that are alternatives to the worldviews of capitalism and consumerism. My 
project Poem Without Language explores this kind of hybridisation.  
While Kongwu is ancient enough to be called ‘premodern’ or part of “the 
anthropological matrix” (Latour 1993:107), Kongwu’s critique can be seen as 
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“amodern” (Latour 1993:47-8) and an ancient “spiritual cyborg” (Davis 2004: 155) 
that hybridises the dualistic categories of human, nonhuman, nature and culture. 
Kongwu offers an approach to questioning the underlying assumptions upon which 
symbol and language systems function and even dominate our emotional 
associations and value judgments. Through Kongwu, we may reconsider the looping 
effects of language and the violence induced by anthropocentric gazes. This makes 
it possible for us to divest ourselves of the habit of ordering things dualistically and 
from anthropocentric gazes. By decentring the self that desires to occupy the 
position of observer, we can release ourselves from the enclosed loop of dualistic 
differentiation.     
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 2. When Time Never Arrives: Responding to John Cage through 
One Street, Three Persons, Different Descriptions, and Different 
Memories 
 
Introduction 
 
As the Fluxus artist Ken Friedman suggested, the understanding of temporality in 
Fluxus works has resonated with “the Buddhist analysis of time and existence in 
human experience” (Friedman 1998:250). Yet what the Buddhist analysis of time 
means and in which way that artistic practice resonates with the Buddhist view of 
time need to be unpacked. John Cage influenced many Fluxus artists. The concept 
of time had been an important issue for Cage. He developed silence to problematise 
the concept of time and measurement in music, so I use Cage as the case study to 
see how his view of time echoes the Buddhist view. 
The concept of emptiness or nothingness is one of the primary drives behind 
John Cage’s innovative composition, and the act of listening, all aspects of 
performance. Dr. Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki played a catalysing role to popularise Zen 
in Western societies around the post-World War Two period. Suzuki influenced 
Cage’s understanding of nothingness, which led Cage to reconsider time by music. 
However, to understand what the Buddhist concept of time means and consequently 
how the performance resonates with this specific worldview instead of considering 
only Suzuki’s version of Zen, I choose the primary texts to introduce how we can 
examine time from the Kongwu perspective. My version of Kongwu is what I found 
useful to connect theory, practice, and the case study in the following sections. 
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By using the texts of Nāgārjuna, Sengzhao, and Dōgen, I introduce the 
examination of time through the logic of Kongwu. All three authors rejected being-in-
time and proposed being-is-time. Nāgārjuna integrated various discourses of 
Buddhist schools, and proposed the concept of śūnyatā, which translates to 
emptiness or nothingness in English. Nāgārjuna applied the logic of śūnyatā to the 
notion of time in The Book of Middle-Way. Sengzhao is the first person to synthesise 
Daoism and Indian Buddhism into Chinese Buddhism as the foundation of Chan in 
Chinese or Zen in Japanese. He challenged the metaphor of flow that we use to 
describe the changing, and questioned its dualistic assumption. Japanese Zen 
master Dōgen’s assertion “when time never arrives” demonstrated Nāgārjuna’s logic 
of śūnyatā. The philosophical implication of quantum mechanism suggested the 
relativity of time and a “participatory universe” (Wheeler 1996:291). The relativity 
resonates with the practices in Fluxus and of John Cage. The artistic practices 
question the authorship and the artwork’s entity, exploring the observer as the 
participant. Through referencing the three texts and the philosophical implication of 
quantum mechanism, I elaborate upon how the worldview of Kongwu questioned the 
measurement of time and suggested a temporality of non-time. 
After defining the concept of time from the Kongwu perspective, I use John 
Cage’s work as an example to explore in what way the Buddhist concept of time 
resonated with the intermedia practice. My analysis shows how John Cage 
integrated the Kongwu worldview to rethink time and measurement in music. Cage 
revised his silence pieces, and shifted from musical time to clock time in 4’33” as 
well as from clock time to zero time in 0’00”. Cage reconsidered the notion of time 
that echoed the Kongwu perspective, and developed silence to create the “nondual 
hearing” (Loy 1999:69). Kongwu shed new light on understanding John Cage’s 
68 
operation of silence. Cage’s revision of time and silence helped to redefine music 
through, as Robert Ashley observed, the “transitional” operation of “theatre” (in Cage 
1962b:52), expanding musical into intermedia practice. 
 John Cage used silence to undermine dualistic listening and thus release 
sounds from the musical language, which liberates music from the accumulation of 
the past. As a result, one can listen without invoking the past. My work explores the 
nondual experiencing that Cage aimed for through the operation of silence. 
However, my work follows the reverse direction. By mimicking the habit of dualistic 
differentiation, my work exposes how the mechanism of differentiation has been 
governing our experiences, and reveals our habit of experiencing the ‘present’ 
through the past. By using two action tasks with the installation, my work exposes 
the way we experience time through dualistic discrimination according to the 
accumulation from the past. Consequently, we feel events happening in the train of 
the past, present, and future—the illusion of continuity.  
Through discussing the paradigm shift from absolute time in Newtonian 
worldview to the indeterminacy in quantum physics, I connect the worldview of 
Kongwu with the relativity of time and observers as participants in the quantum 
mechanism, and situate John Cage and Kongwu in the intersection of art, science, 
and spirituality. The way that the Kongwu perspective resonates with performance 
practices shows that Kongwu as an approach can unsettle the habit of differentiation, 
and can provide an alternative way to making sense of the world. 
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2.1 Time in Kongwu 
 
How has time been conceptualised? Does time exist before one notices it? Concepts 
of time and space have very often been taken as universal ontological categories for 
“ordering experience” (Koller 1974:202). Although “temporal experience” is universal 
and temporality is a “feature of human experience” (Koller 1974:202), how time is 
conceptualised as ‘time’ and how experience is ordered by time is cultural and 
situational-specific. Kongwu reconsiders the common sense that events are often 
thought to flow through the ‘river of time.’ For Kongwu, time is not something with 
persistent presence and is not independent from experience, but results from the 
interactivity between the observer and the observed. Kongwu suggests a worldview 
with a relativity of time. Before analysing John Cage’s works and elaborating how 
Kongwu as the spiritual and philosophical context fosters Cage’s development of the 
intercultural and intermedial performing strategies, I introduce the problem of time 
discussed in Nāgārjuna, Sengzhao, and Dōgen’s texts.  
 
The Debate of Time in Buddhism  
  Within Buddhism, there are various camps on the problem of time. The 
Mind-only school considers the past and future as not being real, but they maintain 
the present is real (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:400). The Sarvaastivaada school of 
thought considers entities taking place in the past, present, and future as real with 
the actual substance and the time that is associated with that entities as also existing 
(Kalupahana 1974:187). In chapter nineteen of Mulamadhyamakakarika (Book of 
Middle-Way), titled “Investigation of Time,” Nāgārjuna criticised Sarvaastivaada’s 
claims that time is real and that events traverse from the past to the future. 
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Nāgārjuna asserted that time is empty without self-nature; therefore, time is only 
relational. In this sense, time cannot have any absolute objectivity, so the concept of 
time is unreal.  
Nāgārjuna analyses the contingency of the ternary concept of time. The 
distinction of the different stages of events is only a conceptual structuring and a 
linguistic convention that serves as a communicative function. The distinctions that 
we express with the concepts of time (i.e., past, present, and future) have no 
ontological substance on the metaphysical level. Nāgārjuna elaborates upon this 
argument based “on the fact that a thing (bhāva) or its substance (bhāvasvabhāva) 
and time (kāla) are relative to or dependent upon one another” (Kalupahana 
1974:187) and on the assumption that “two things cannot be related unless they are 
coexistent” (Kalupahana 1974:188). He discusses whether the present and future 
are dependent upon the past.  
 
If the present and the future 
Depend on the past,   
Then the present and the future  
Would have existed in the past. 
 
If the present and the future  
Did not exist there,  
How could the present and the future  
Be dependent upon it? 
 
If they are not dependent upon the past,  
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Neither of the two would be established.  
Therefore neither the present  
Nor the future would exist.    
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995:50-1)  
 
Nāgārjuna opposes Sarvaastivaada’s perspective of the reality of time, which 
is the idea that cause precedes effect. In doing so, Nāgārjuna implies that if one 
knows the past accurately enough, one can know “with the absolute certainty what 
the present and future could be” (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:276) Nāgārjuna 
argues that if the present and future are not dependent upon the past, then they 
cannot be established. Furthermore, if the present and future are not dependent on 
the past, then the past, present, and future are independent (Nāgārjuna and Han 
1997:401). Therefore, the present and future do not have substance (Nāgārjuna and 
Garfield 1995:255; Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:277). Time does not have its 
own entity and is only “a set of relations” (Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995:257) that are 
‘seen’ when an observation is made.  
Time is not a container in which events take place (Inada 1974:173; Koller 
1974:202). Without an interaction between the observer and the event, time does not 
exist. Thus, time has no independent entity before one notices it and experiences the 
event changing. By using śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna aims to describe the experience and 
worldview that is attained without any explicitly stated point of view (Berman 
1997:50). Nāgārjuna applies the same logic to the concepts of the high, middle, and 
low as well as to identity: similarity and difference (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:403). 
Such distinctions are not “absolute distinctions” but relative distinctions, being only 
logical linguistic conventions (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:277). Nāgārjuna 
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argues that time is immeasurable because nonstatic time cannot be grasped as 
stationary time (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:405-8; Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995:50; 
Kalupahana 1974:188). If time were stationary, which would make it “manipulatable” 
(Kalupahana 1974:188), then we could have measured it. However, no such 
“enduring or static time” exists (Kalupahana 1974:188). 
To summarise Nāgārjuna’s arguments, time is empty and not real because of 
its lack of any self-nature. The concept of time is only a result of the observer 
becoming engaged to organise events. In this sense, time is the mental construction. 
Time is only the ‘seen’ and not the real as such nor within itself. In the Book of 
Middle-Way, Nāgārjuna, in chapter eighteen, proposed the immeasurability of time, 
and, in chapter one, discussed the motion of things as neither coming nor going, 
which implies the concept of non-time.  
 
Sengzhao’s “The Immobility of Things” 
         Sengzhao [Seng-chao] (僧肇 , 378-414 A.D.), the founder of Chinese 
Mādhyamika was a Daoist before he became a Buddhist monk. He undertook one of 
the earliest cultural translations between Chinese Taoism and Indian Buddhism, 
which further developed Chinese Buddhism schools, such as Chan Buddhism, later 
becoming Zen in Japan. Often Daoism and Buddhism have argued that things are 
changing as the flow of time. Sengzhao, as Chan observed, argued that the 
metaphor of flow itself is unreal (Chan 1963:346).  
In the chapter entitled “The Immobility of Things” in Zhao Lun [Chao-lun] (The 
Treatise of Zhao, 肇論), Sengzhao engaged the longstanding debate of motion and 
non-motion within the Chinese intellectual tradition by using Indian Buddhism, 
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particularly Nāgārjuna’s concept of śūnyatā (emptiness, nothingness) in 
Mādhyamika. In Zhao Lun, śūnyatā is equal to pen-wu (Berman 1997:43). Sengzhao 
used pen-wu (本無), meaning “original non-being” that is associated with Lao Tzu’s 
wu (無), meaning the nothingness full of existences within it (Berman 1997:43). 
However, Sengzhao did not believe the Daoist original non-being was the same idea 
as Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā (Tan 2008:197). Sengzhao did not use the term ‘time,’ and 
instead invoked the motion of the thing that synthesised the interrelation of being, 
space, and time concerning changes.  
Sengzhao relies heavily on “the language of paradoxes” to explain his 
conception of time (Berman 1997:44). He understands “the limits of language’s 
ability to express his doctrine on time” (Berman 1997:44). Sengzhao’s distrust of 
language can be traced to the Daoist position proposed by Laozi and Zhuangzi and 
the Buddhist position, particularly Nāgārjuna’s concept of śūnyatā.  In the chapter 
“The Immobility of Things,” Sengzhao defies common sense by asserting that an 
object does not move in the flow of time. Sengzhao explained:  
 
That the people call things are changing is according to that the past events 
were passing and unable to preserve in the present. However, what I mean by 
rest is that the things are not changing because the past events stayed in the 
past and did not come into the present. Things are not changing and not 
flowing. Things are moving because the past events did not come into the 
present. Things are not moving because the past events stayed in the past 
and the present events are rest in the present. Things are rest in the time they 
exist. These two perspectives are according to the same assumption, but they 
arrive at the opposite conclusions.  
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(trans. from Sengzhao and Hong 1996:39)  
 
He took an extreme position to reveal the language fallacy and to argue that a thing 
is never really flowing nor staying in the three containers of past, present, and future.  
By employing common sense, Sengzhao arrived at the opposite conclusion: 
things are at rest and do not move. He did not really agree with the immobility of 
things. He suggested it to compel people to reconsider their common assumption 
that things are moving and changing in the divisions of time. The appearance of 
changing is only the phenomenon that emptiness manifested temporally and what 
we perceive, but not what things actually are. He played with the contradiction 
between stillness and motion to empty the commonsense notions of ‘changing’ and 
‘moving’ concerning temporal events. By saying that things are either moving or non-
moving, one falls into the two extremes. By saying that things are neither moving nor 
non-moving, one follows the middle path (Fung 1983:263 in Berman 1997:50). 
He argued that neither the stillness of a fixed being nor a constant change 
could be real, because both resulted from the habit that the observer experienced 
dualistically through the self as the fixed reference. He proposed a statement of non-
duality that the object is neither changing nor unchanging, neither permanent nor 
impermanent, neither arriving nor leaving. By using the same logic, he argued that 
the difference between the present and the past is not real and solid with 
independent substances, as they appear to be. Sengzhao developed a viewpoint 
that is between being and nonbeing to understand the complexity of the human 
being’s interaction with things. He questioned the point of view that generates the 
description.  
In the first chapter of Zhao Lun, Sengzhao revealed how the concept of being 
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and nonbeing circulated. 
 
 
Even though everything lacks an intrinsic nature, it is experienced as being 
real. We cannot call events nothing (nonbeing). According to the principle of 
dependent-origination, every thing is non-existence. We also cannot call it a 
being. The nature of everything being a not-being-not-nonbeing suggests that 
being cannot be the opposite of nonbeing. If we would understand that being 
is being, then one must take the absence of the being as nonbeing. Nonbeing 
is relative to being. Only when being exists can nonbeing exist. Without being, 
there is no nonbeing. Where can we hold and attach to an absolute 
nonbeing?  
(trans. from Sengzhao and Hong 1996:26) 
 
How being and nonbeing depend on each other is how the concepts of past and 
present need each other to operate. Without the concept of past, we cannot 
differentiate the stages of events and thus experience the ‘present.’ Concerning the 
complexity of reality, he argued that the relationship between the name and the thing 
is only contingent through the principle of dependent-origination. This argument 
refers to Nāgārjuna’s two-truths, the relation between the conventional truth and the 
ultimate truth. In chapter nineteen, “The Investigation of Time,” in 
Mulamadhyamakakarika (The book of Middle-Way), Nāgārjuna asserted that without 
a similarity there is no difference; without difference there is no similarity.  
 The relationship between a signifier and the signified does not exist because 
the sign can truly refer to the thing itself, but because the binary system and the 
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differentiation between signifiers support the signifiers to exist and function. Both 
Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao assert the concept of jiaming anli (假名安立), meaning that 
signs and language create a ‘fictional being’ that is the ‘temporal place’ or shelter 
where the phenomena settle down for the human being’s purposes. We mistake the 
fictional being as the intrinsic nature. We differentiate things by using the system of 
symbols and the dual pairs in language and conceptual thinking. To track down this 
process, we could understand in which way the fictional being becomes ‘being’ and 
for whom. 
Even though the “clutter of the concepts” of flow, flux, and becoming are 
useful to disrupt the essentialist position and the concept of progress and to 
establish “time as becoming” (Grosz 1999:3), Sengzhao’s view can provide a critique 
on the obsession of ‘here and now,’ the fetish of the ontology of performance on its 
constant disappearing (Phelan 1993), the preference of becoming over being, 
impermanence over permanence, future over present and past, because one can 
argue that those are still trapped in dualistic thinking and under the shadow of 
melancholy and fear that everything disappears and time flies away.    
 
Dōgen’s “Being-time” 
The Japanese Zen master Eihei Dōgen (永平道元 1200-1253 A.D.) proposed 
“uji” as “being-time,” explaining: 
 
“Being-time here means that time itself is being […] and being is time. 
Each moment is all being, is the entire world. Reflect now whether any being 
or any world is left out of the present moment. 
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Time is not separate from you, and as you are present, time does not 
go away. If time merely flies away, you would be separated from time. The 
reason you do not clearly understand being-time is that you think of time as 
only passing [...] and do not understand that time ever arrives [...]. People only 
see time’s coming and going, and do not thoroughly understand that being-
time abides in each moment.” 
(Tanahashi 1985:76-80 in Loy 1992)  
 
Dōgen’s being-time echoes Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao’s perspectives. Nāgārjuna 
stated that time is dependent upon existence and that time does not exist. Sengzhao 
rejected that time is passing away and that things move in the flow of time. Dōgen’s 
assertion “when time never arrives” can be traced to Nāgārjuna’s discussion in 
chapter one of the Middle-Way Book. Chan paraphrased Nāgārjuna words, “From 
one's own point of view, one knows that a thing has gone away, but what is [thought 
to have] gone does not arrive anywhere” (Chan 1963:345).  
That “time never arrives” suggests that time is just one ordering of the 
temporal experience and one mental construction that makes one feel driven by 
expectations of the future or memories of the past. The dualistic relation between 
what was gone and what will come is dispersed. The separation between the 
observer and the observed is also dissolved. Time is not an object to be objectified 
by the observer. Each thing and event has its own rhythm and way of realising its 
own temporality without requiring an observer to trigger its being and becoming. 
Time is within each sentient being, rather than each sentient being traveling ‘in’ time. 
Time is neither a flow nor an empty canvas.  
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Being-In-Time and Being-Is-Time 
From Kongwu’s perspective, the ontology of time raises the questions of how 
time is conceptualised as time and for whom. Kongwu (空無) (śūnyatā, emptiness, 
nothingness) does not mean non-existence, non-being, or nihility, “but rather the lack 
of autonomous existence (nihsvabhava)” (Berger 2005). In the logic of Kongwu, time 
never arrives. Time does not have any ontological substance. Time does not exist, or 
it exists only when it is invoked in the everyday context within the communicative 
function and teleological operation. Time results from the observation of the events 
through the linguistic, social, and cultural conventions that are the documentation 
and indicators of the events. However, we mistake the indicators as the real, so we 
have mis-considered time as something real with a constant presence.  
Can time exist without events? For Nāgārjuna, it cannot. Time results from the 
network of relations and the observations that we make to describe the changes. 
Nāgārjuna concluded that time is dependent upon phenomena. Time does not exist 
without an existence. However, according to dependent-origination, everything is not 
autonomous and without the independent entity, so an existence is nonexistence. 
“Whence can there be time?” (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:279). Nāgārjuna did 
not reject temporal phenomena; he rejected only the dualistic observation and 
conceptualisation that make time the absolute entity. Things cannot take place in 
time, that is, an absolute objectified time. Our observation forces the things having 
the quality of the past, present, and future and other essences that constitute the 
condition of being.  
The perspective that the event is time, replaces the perspective that an event 
takes place in time. One can argue that ‘becoming,’ rather than being, is more 
suitable to describe events and changes. Yet for Kongwu, if becoming exists, then it 
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implies the stages of becoming, already-became, is-becoming, and not-yet-become. 
Even ‘change’ is imposed by the observer’s interaction and relative point of view, as 
what Sengzhao suggested in “The Immobility of Things.” We need to create one 
standard position as the ideal spatio-temproal limit, such as here and now for 
measurement, so that we can prefer becoming over being and differentiate present 
from past. The preference and discrimination implied a perspective from an 
anthropocentric observation. The argument of becoming falls into the same problem 
of claiming the reality of time and segregating time into past, present, and future. 
Grosz rethinks “the ‘nature’ of time”(1999:15-6). She calls for a temporality of 
becoming (Grosz 1999:1-28). As Grosz suggested, by rethinking the nature of time 
and the three concepts of past, present and future, we can rethink the issues of 
“development, origin, and identity”(Grosz 1999:18). She warns that the past is 
associated with “reminiscence, melancholy, or nostalgia” and the present is 
associated with "the retrievability of the past and the predictability of future" (Grosz 
1999:18). Yet, she prioritises the future. In her argument, the future links to chance, 
indeterminacy, and unpredictability that produce the newness.  
Kongwu challenges the ontology of time. However, rather than proposing a 
future oriented temporality (Grosz 1999:4), Kongwu suggests a ‘temporality of non-
time.’ The transformation comes from when time never arrives. Even though such 
temporality is often expressed in the phrase, the return to the present, we still need 
to rethink the concept of present, particularly the possible obsession with the 
present. Yet, Kongwu would warn the danger of promoting future over past and 
present, becoming over being, for example a future oriented temporality, proposed 
by Grosz (1999: 15). The concept of future still needs the concept of past and 
present to be possible.  
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Whether the linguistic expression of ‘return to the present’ or ‘a future oriented 
temporality’ is more useful to facilitate practice and mobilise transformation is 
arguable. If indeterminacy and unpredictability are the keys to the type of potentiality 
that Grosz seeks, can we introduce indeterminacy without the obsession of the 
present, or a future hope? Kongwu rethinks the ‘nature’ of time and introduces 
indeterminacy by suggesting the attitude of ‘when time never arrives’, a temporality 
of non-time. Kongwu’s attitude reveals the very different assumption from Grosz’s 
future oriented temporality, even though both embrace indeterminacy and reject the 
causality and determinism.  
 
 Before reconsidering the ‘present,’ as my practice does, I analyse how John 
Cage reflected how sounds become the form of music, and reconsidered time and 
measurement by integrating the Kongwu perspective. By using the case study of 
John Cage and my performance practice, we become aware of the very different 
assumption of transformation and indeterminacy embedded in the concept of 
Kongwu. We investigate a possibility of embracing indeterminacy without obsession 
of the present, or future hope.   
 
2.2 Analysing John Cage’s Investigation of Time from the Kongwu Perspective  
 
The ‘silence piece’, the most famous work by John Cage (1912-1992), forces us to 
confront what music ‘is’, and the concept of ‘time’. The first performance of 4’33” was 
at Woodstock, New York, on August 29, 1952. The pianist David Tudor walked to the 
piano, sat down, and set up a timer on the stage. He performed the three silent 
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movements, raising and lowering the keyboard lid three times in different lengths 
(Tomkins 1965: 119). He read the score and turned the pages attentively. He 
finished the performance by raising the keyboard lid, and standing up to “receive 
applause” (Gann 2010: 1-3). For Cage, “silence” does not mean ‘no sounds’, but the 
sounds “that are not notated appeared in the written music as silence, opening the 
doors of music to the sounds that happen to be in the environment” (Cage 1961:7-8).  
In 1951, Cage expected to hear ‘no sound’, when he entered an anechoic chamber 
in Harvard University.  
 
I entered one at Harvard University several years ago and heard two sounds, 
one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he 
informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low 
one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And they will 
continue following my death. One need not fear about the future of music. 
(Cage 1961:8) 
 
Cage could not find ‘pure silence’ but heard two sounds that were made without his 
intention. The experience suggests the impossibility to obtain a ‘pure silence’. Cage’s 
silence does not mean the absence of sounds. Listening to silence does not pursue 
the ‘being’ of silence, but practices a different patterning of perception.     
John Cage’s notion of time echoes Kongwu. Cage aims to listen to sounds 
without using musical conventions in 4’33”. Then, he expands the operation of 
silence by abandoning the measurement of time in 0’00”. Suggested by Higgins, 
John Cage’s music can be viewed as an example of “intermedia” because he 
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transports Zen philosophy to music, which blurs the boundary between the medium 
of philosophy and art (Higgins [1965] 2001:50). Cage sets up the conditions to 
develop his method as a way to embody these philosophical debates. He transforms 
the logic of how Kongwu reconsiders the perception of time into music. 
During his earlier phase, Cage said, the “aspect of sound that interests me the 
most” is “time” (Cage in Kostelanetz 2003:74). He shifted his notions of time from 
musical time to clock time in 4’33”. However, in his second silence piece, 0’00” (4’33” 
No. 2), Cage dismissed clock time, and proposed that the event is time. Cage 
changed to the view that “time is abandoned” (Cage in Kostelanetz 2003:74). Cage 
used Christian Wolff’s notion of “zero time” that occurs “when we don’t measure it” to 
disorder time (Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:209). This notion echoes the situation 
‘when time never arrives’ from the Kongwu perspective.  
Cage questioned the problem of measurement in music. As a result, he 
shifted his attitude towards time. The underlying principle that three pieces, 0’00”, 
Variations III, and Variations IV, share is “no measurements of time, no use of the 
stopwatch” (Cage in Kostelanetz 2003:74). The rejection of any measurement of 
time comes from the questioning of the measurability that is based on the 
assumption that time can be objectified, manipulated, and separated from the 
observer. The event itself as time leads to Cage’s redefinition of music as any 
“temporal act” that Robert Ashley observed, and not only with “the presence of 
sound” but also the “presence of people” (in Cage 1962b:52). By redefining music in 
this way, Cage’s compositional strategies blur the boundaries of music and theatre, 
and expand the horizons for intermedia practice.    
Cage revised his concept of time between 4’33” and 0’00”(4’33” No.2) by 
making the measurement of time indeterminate. Listening to silence exposes the 
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convention and language of music itself. To give up the measurement of time in 
music raises a question whether his approach to composition, performance and 
listening is still musical.  
 
From Musical Time to Clock Time in 4’33” 
 In 4’33”, Cage rejected the logic of form that can be found in Western music. 
In his lecture “The Future of Music: Credo,” which he gave in 1937, Cage said, “the 
principle of form will be our only constant connection with the past” (Cage 1961:5). 
The principle of form implies a history and a tradition that accumulates from the past. 
The principle of form suggests language and convention, meaning the broader 
meaning of language, not just linguistic language. Music is a system that decides 
what is excluded and included. Musical time results from the selection of that which 
is outside and which is inside this musical representational system. For example, 
musical languages are constructed by harmony and metric measurement, etc. 
Language itself suggests intentionality and teleological direction. Cage employed 
silence for the “demilitarization of language” (Cage 1979:184). To reject musical time 
and to return to clock time, Cage used clock time as the frame and container for his 
music to take place. Cage did not try to reproduce the musical contents that were 
always already in the representational system, more specifically carrying the 
particular intentionality in the performance. 
Clock time has helped to construct modern time and then eventually the 
global time that is currently the universal measurable time. In “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin criticises clock time for its implication of 
progression (Lim 2009:10; May and Thrift 2001:34). The linear version of history was 
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constructed in a site with the illusion of “empty, homogeneous time” (Benjamin 
1999:252). 
 
The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from 
the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time. A critique 
of the concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the 
concept of progress itself.             
(Benjamin 1999:252)  
 
To break from the linear version of history, Benjamin, instead of assuming the 
temporality of constant moving, proposed a position of standstill and developed “the 
notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has 
come to a stop” (Benjamin 1999:254). This position of standstill is similar to 
Kongwu’s concept of non-time that presumes time never arrives. Thompson 
examined “the time-measurement as a means of labour exploitation” (Thompson 
1967:80). The notation of time would be described as “task-orientation” (Thompson 
1967:60). Thompson located clock time in industrial capitalism and in the need of 
“the synchronisation of labour” (Thompson 1967:80). According to Thompson (1967), 
the precise measurement of clock time makes labour time more easily manageable 
and transferrable into money. This may be why modernity is obsessed with speed 
and unstoppable flow. Clock time, as a naturalised empty time, produced an illusion 
of ‘openness’ that everything can be included and happen in a certain period of time. 
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From Clock Time to Zero Time in 0’00”  
Cage composed 0’00” (4’33” No. 2) in 1962. The score is one sentence: “in a 
situation provided with maximum amplification (no feedback), perform a disciplined 
action” (Cage 1962a; Pritchett 1996:138). The first performance was Cage writing 
that sentence (Pritchett 1996:138). After the first performance in Tokyo, as Pritchett 
noted, Cage added “four qualifications to the score: "the performer should allow 
any interruptions of the action; the action should fulfil an obligation to others; the 
same action should not be used in more than one performance, and should not be 
the performance of a musical composition; and finally, the performer should pay no 
attention to the situation he finds himself in, whether electronic, musical, or 
theatrical.” (Pritchett 1996:138). 
Even in 4’33”, Cage still worked under the assumptions that “empty, 
homogeneous time” (Benjamin 1999: 252) is possible and that time itself has a 
discrete mode of being, self-essence, and particular quality and substance. Time 
was still something that was already there with a constant presence. The traditional 
musical significance system and Cage’s 4’33” both assume time is a constant 
presence that requires some measurements and markers to determine the duration 
and time-length. However, the time-length in 0’00” (4’33” No. 2) shifts to be zero to 
propose that time cannot have the constant presence and that no precise and 
absolute measurement can be possible. Zero-time rejected the time measured by 
the clock and being as such. In an interview with Roger Reynolds, Cage said,  
 
if music is conceived as an object, then it has a beginning, middle, and end, 
and one can feel rather confident when he makes measurements of the time. 
But when it [music] is process, those measurements become less meaningful, 
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and the process itself, involving if it happened to, the idea of Zero Time (that 
is to say no time at all), becomes mysterious and therefore eminently useful.  
(Cage 1962b:48) 
 
When time cannot be objectified as an object, time becomes process itself. The 
gesture rejects the assumption that time is measurable and moves toward the 
exploration of what happens when time never comes and what happens when time 
cannot be a prior to observe the world and to define reality.  
Cage subverted not only the concept of musical time but also the hegemony 
of clock time in 0’00” (4’33” No. 2). Cage removed the fixed pitch and melody created 
by the composer and revealed the melody from the environmental sounds in 4’33”. 
Christian Wolff “was the first to use zero time in his compositions, concurrently with 
clock time”(Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:209 footnote1). Cage used Christian 
Wolff’s expression of “zero time” to describe how his concept of time is the event 
itself in 0’00” (Cage and Charles 1981:209). In 0’00” (4’33” No. 2), he explored 
experiences in which “we don’t notice the passage of time, when we don’t measure 
it” (Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:209). Even though 4’33” breaks down musical 
time, the music still has a beginning, middle, and end that is still an “object” 
according to Cage’s own definition in which “one can still feel rather confident when 
he makes the measurement of time” (Cage 1962b:48). Christian Wolff suggested a 
possible musical composition in “zero time” that dissolves the time length so that it 
cannot be measured by clock time: 
 
Moves intersecting and voices overlapping can obscure structural outlines 
and produce meetings or events that are disengaged from them to become 
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simply themselves. Then, a structure that seems closed by a square of time 
lengths may also be dissolved by including a zero in the sequence of the time 
lengths’ proportions (e.g. 2 ¼, 1,0,2…): the zero I take to mean no time at all, 
that is, no measurable time, that is, any time at all.     
(Wolff 1965:29)  
 
Cage’s 0’00”, which is equivalent to Christian Wolff’s concept of zero time, subverts 
the concept of clock time. ‘Real’ time is not necessarily clock time. Cage liberates 
time from clock time as the absolute measurement used in the everyday context. In 
0’00”, time never arrives, to use Dōgen’s expression.  
The score of 0’00” (4’33” No. 2) includes one sentence: “In a situation 
provided with maximum amplification (no feedback), perform a disciplined action” 
(Cage 1962a). The amplification could be understood as a disciplined action without 
any electronic device, such an act of listening (Kaye 1996:16). When one’s attention 
is concentrated and in a meditative consciousness, the emptied psychosomatic state 
can amplify the sensations within oneself and the information from the environment. 
The discipline refers to the capacity to control one’s “likes and dislikes with 
something as strict as sitting cross-legged” (Cage in Kaye 1996:22). Without one’s 
taste acting as a filter, the quantity of sensations and perceptions can be maximised 
by the concentration of awareness. The goal of the silence pieces is to make a shift 
“from intention towards non-intention” (Cage in Kaye 1996:13). The goal of non-
intention suggests a non-teleological organisation, which is how the logic of Kongwu 
conceptualises reality and how quantum mechanics theorises the law of physics. 
From intention to non-intention the dualistic ordering of experiences is dissolving.   
The Kongwu perspective might interpret 0’00” as rejecting the concept of 
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duration that has been considered an intrinsic characteristic of sound. Rejecting the 
concept of duration suggests a form of presence that has no objectification of time. 
Kongwu provides a way to analyse the process of how the concept of time is 
constructed. To reconsider the concept of time without replacing it with another 
continuity, Kongwu suggests the primacy of experiencing without any selective 
perspectives. In another expression, no ‘time’ exists in the sense that the event and 
experience is time, so time should not be taken as real within itself or as such. 
Kongwu points to the understanding of how we construct the illusion of continuity 
with the various habitual ordering of experiences, helping us to realise the non-time 
of ‘time’. Thus 0’00” introduces more deeply the specific worldview of Kongwu and 
investigates ways to overcome duality. Kongwu provides an approach for 
challenging the fundamental assumption of time, and offers a different sensibility of 
time for performance practice, becoming one platform for the encounter of different 
disciplines, such as science, spirituality, and arts.  
 
Music as Any Temporal Act    
By developing Zero Time, ‘time’ becomes indeterminate. Cage has introduced 
indeterminacy into music through the chance operation, for example using the 
imperfection on the paper, Tarot Card, and I Ching for the decision-making process. 
Through using the chance operation and exploring indeterminacy, Cage not only 
questions the concept of ‘time’ as a constructed continuity, but also removes the 
composer’s subjectivity and agency to determine the organisation of sounds 
(Bernstein 2002:210). Cage seeks a composition “devoid of the composer’s 
personality and intent”(Bernstein 2002: 210). Cage commented on the musician 
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Edgard Varese’s concept of music as “organized sounds”, and questioned the 
continuity that the composer often aimed to produce.  
 
For those who are interested in sounds just as they are, apart from 
psychology about them, one must look further for Varese's present relevance. 
This is not found in the character of his imagination, which has to do with 
him— not with sound itself. Nor is his use of tape relevant, for in Deserts he 
attempts to make tape sound like the orchestra and vice versa, showing again 
a lack of interest in the natural differences of sounds, preferring to give them 
all his unifying signature. In this respect his need for continuity does not 
correspond to the present need for discontinuity (discontinuity has the effect 
of divorcing sounds from the burden of psychological intentions). Though 
Varese was the first to write directly for instrumental ensembles (giving up the 
piano sketch and its orchestral coloration), his way of doing this was 
controlled by his imagination to the point of exploiting the sounds for his own 
purposes. 
(Cage 1958 in Cage 1961:83-4)⁠ 
 
For Cage, Varese is more interested in ‘organized’, not ‘sounds’. Varese organized 
sounds through the mediation of his imagination. As the result, sounds were given a 
“unifying signature” (Cage 1958 in Cage 1961:83-4)⁠. Varese’s composition needs 
continuity. Yet for Cage, composition has to correspond to the need for 
“discontinuity”, and “divorcing sounds from the burden of psychological intentions” 
(Cage 1958 in Cage 1961:83), which is the composer's ego.  
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When one listens to sounds, if one listen through past accumulation, meaning 
musical grammar, concepts, and individual psychological histories, one organised 
sounds into continuity according to the accumulation of past experiences. For 
example, Varese “attempts to make tape sound like the orchestra” (Cage 1958 in 
Cage 1961:83). The continuity comes from a particular way of perceiving through 
past accumulation, which Cage aims to dissolve by using chance operation and 
developing the capacity to listen to ‘silence’, any environmental sound without 
selection. When one cannot claim the continuity of sounds, one cannot create a 
signature: the artist’s ego. It is in this sense that sound cannot be conceived as an 
object, nor can time. This attitude towards music and time acknowledges how the 
enclosed system of language and the self as the referencing point to measure 
constructs our way of experiencing.  
By introducing indeterminacy, Cage expanded the definition of music. For 
Cage, music is any “temporal act” (Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:209). Through 
absorbing Daoism and Buddhism, Cage had revised the notion of time, and 
embraced ‘time without measurement’, as measurement refers to teleological 
function. Cage rejected the measurement of time as the parallel to rejecting the 
mental ordering of events. Consequently, Cage revised the definition of music.  
For Cage, music cannot be an object, nor can time. His definition of music 
does not build upon the various measurements of time, but removes the 
anthropocentric construction of time. As Robert Ashley suggested, “theatre” 
becomes a “transitional” definition for the expansion of music “to condition people to 
other possibilities” (in Cage 1962b: 52). The holistic sensory engagement becomes 
the redefinition of music as, to rephrase Robert Ashley’s comment, “any kind of 
temporal act whatsoever” (Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:209). Cage revised his 
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definition of music according to the shifts of his attitudes on time and measurement. 
Cage’s performing strategy shifted to seek ways to compose music without the 
measurement of time. Such an attitude is embodied in Cage’s notation, the Fluxus-
like action scores in 0’00” (1962), and Songbooks (1970). Cage’s revision of time 
expands music into intermedial practice, while simultaneously fostering the 
expansion of the definition of ‘theatre.’  
Cage borrowed the expression of “zero time” from Christian Wolff. Zero time 
means  “when we don’t notice the passage of time, when we don’t measure it” (Cage 
in Cage and Charles 1981:209). After the first performance of 4’33”, Cage revised it 
several times, keeping the three structures of composition, but making the length of 
time indeterminate. 0’00”, as the second piece of 4’33”, rejects any measurement of 
time. Cage’s revision of time echoed Kongwu’s notion of non-time or when time 
never arrives in the sense that time is a mental construction and a result of a static 
referential point that decides which comes before and after.  
Cage makes the clear distinction between 4’33” and 0’00”: 
 
The first one, 4’33”, involved one or several musicians who made no sound. 
The second one, 0’00”, indicates that an obligation towards others must be 
fulfilled, in a partial or complete manner, by a single person. The third one 
involves gathering together two or more people who are playing a game in an 
amplified context. A bridge or chess match, or any game at all can become a 
distinct – another essentially silence – musical work.  
 (Cage in Cage and Charles 1981:210) 
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Some of the compositions in Song Books (Cage 1970), which are Fluxus-like action 
scores and similar to Cage’s third silence piece, expands music into intermedia 
practice. In Song Books (Solos for Voice 3-92), Cage used chance operation to 
generate the action sequences.  
 
To prepare for a performance, the actor will make a numbered list of verbs 
(actions) and/or nouns (things) not to exceed 64 with which he or she is willing 
to be involved and which are theatrically feasible (those may include stage 
properties, clothes, etc.; actions may be “real” or mimed, etc.).  
(Cage 1970)  
 
The composition becomes more action-oriented and emphases “the presence 
of people” more than “the presence of sound” (Ashely in Cage 1962b:51). Cage 
dismissed his notion of time in 4’33” and expanded the operation of silence by 
creating 0’00” without any indication of time length. For Cage, silence is not no-
sounds, but “ambient noise”(Cage 1958 in Cage 1961: 80). To introduce 
indeterminacy, music becomes not “organized sounds”, but “any temporal act”. Zero 
time means giving up any measurement of time. By revising the notion of time and 
the definition of music in this way, Cage challenges the assumption of the observer-
observed, and the belief that the observer can measure the observed and have the 
knowledge of the thing as such. This shift leads to redefinitions of music as any 
temporal act, blurs boundaries between music and theatre, introduces 
indeterminacy, and expands the horizons for intermedia practices. 
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2.3 A Participatory Universe 
 
The Newtonian worldview believes time exists before one notices it, and proposes a 
deterministic perspective. 
 
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, 
without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is 
called duration. Relative, apparent, and common time is any sensible and 
external measure (precise or imprecise) of duration by means of motion; such 
a measure - for example, an hour, a day, a month, a year - is commonly used 
instead of true time. 
(Newton 1729:6)  
 
Newton considered time as a physical substance and an independent existence. 
Newton’s time is independent of an observer’s motion and position. One can predict 
the future based on enough knowledge of the present. However, Einstein’s special 
relativity (1905) introduces frames of references, and disputes the notion of absolute 
time. Einstein demolished the concept of absolute time and space, and pointed out, 
“Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live” 
(in Forsee 1963:81). Einstein told Heisenberg, “It is the theory which decides what 
we can observe” (in Mehra 1987:495). Based on this, Heisenberg developed the 
uncertainty principle and rejected the separation of observer from the observed.  
 
In the microscopic world of quantum mechanics, the system is probabilistic, in 
contrast with what we would find in an everyday context. The role of the observer 
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determines the state of the observed. Moreover, the selected measuring apparatus 
interferes with the state of the object under measurement. Heisenberg stated, “The 
more accurately is the position determined, the more uncertain is the momentum and 
vice versa” (in Mehra 1987:495). The simultaneous measurement of both 
parameters is impossible. Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty emphasized the 
problem of observer. For example, an object can exhibit both wave and particle 
properties, which is contrary to the perspective of classical physics. While 
microscopic phenomena are probabilistic and governed by quantum mechanics, the 
observer is a macroscopic phenomenon and governed by Newtonian mechanics 
(Heisenberg 1958a:88). To understand the contradiction and transition between the 
micro and macroscopic world has provoked the different interpretations of quantum 
mechanics and the philosophical implications.   
In Einstein’s relativity theory (special relativity, 1905), the measurements in 
different inertial frames of reference are dependent on the relative velocity between 
the observer and the observed object. Yet, the theory still operates on an absolute 
measurement of events (Clifton 2005:843). This space-time union preserves an 
independent reality (Minkowski in Clifton 2005:843). At the fifth Solvay Conference in 
Brussels, 1927 (Mehra 1987:499), Einstein responded to the theoretical aspects and 
formulation of quantum mechanics with an emphasis on “discontinuity” and 
“acausality” (an interpretation shared by Bohr and Heisenberg) in a letter to Bohr that 
stated, “I, at any rate, am convinced that He is not playing at dice” (letter from 
Einstein to Bohr, December 4, 1926; Refe. 23, pp. 90, 91 in Mehra 1987:501). 
According to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Bohr’s complementarity 
principle, indeterminacy is inherent in nature itself. An absolute measurement is 
impossible because of the disturbance caused by the observation. Thus, absolute 
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objectivity comes into question in quantum mechanics. That is where Einstein held a 
fundamentally different belief from Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s. Regardless the 
difference, they all question the concept of absolute time.  
 
Observers as Participants   
Christian Wolff proposed zero time, and Cage advanced zero time to the 
action itself, transforming music into intermedia performances. As Blom suggested, 
George Brecht reworked Cage’s zero time (Blom 1998:68). Inspired by quantum 
mechanism, Brecht developed the event score, and further blurred the distinction 
between the static object and the event. (Blom 1998:68). Brecht identified the 
uncertainty principle and relativity as two important references in Cage’s practices 
(Brecht 1991:64 in Kaye 2006:59). Being a professional chemist and an influential 
Fluxus artist, Brecht initiated the event score and engaged in Chan/Zen Buddhism 
and Daoism. Brecht shared the interest of “spiritual virtuosity” (Hansen 1970:122) 
with Cage as well as “the various theories of impersonality, anonymity and the life of 
pieces outside of their perceivers, makers, or anyone else” (Hansen 1970:124). In 
his diary, Brecht remarked that Cage’s classes in New Musical Composition at the 
New School are evidence that the revised worldview of quantum mechanics has 
influenced the new aesthetics.  
 
Uncertainty Principle 
Probability  
Observer-Observed 
Paradox as a reflection of inability to imagine a simple model of the universe. 
(Brecht 1991:65 in Kaye 2006:59) 
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In a similar way, Cage gave up the measurement of time. He acknowledged 
the unmeasurabiltiy of the real world, which contains so many paradoxes, when we 
aim to find single interpretations and measurements to define the world. In his 
discussion of the concept of nature, Heisenberg also mentioned a worldview that is 
represented in the interrelation between art and science (Heisenberg 1958b:95-6). In 
quantum physics, Heisenberg explained the engagement of measurement in the 
construction of ‘objectivity.’ In the principle of indeterminacy, he suggested that 
without measurement, all probability would still be endless potentials. The act of 
measurement turns potentials into reality. Both Brecht’s event scores and Cage’s 
silence would agree that without measurement, there is no time. 
The problem of the observer in quantum mechanics has consciously and 
unconsciously transferred into the artistic practices, and has hence prevented the 
audience and viewer from being the beholders. The ideal observer, which is 
independent from the observed object, is not valid anymore. Bohr stated, “No 
elementary phenomenon until it is a registered phenomenon” (in Wheeler 1996:290). 
“Registered” is the key word that Bohr used, which means “A phenomenon is not yet 
a phenomenon until it has been brought to a close by an irreversible act of 
amplification” (in Wheeler 1996:120) and is thus “communicable in plain language” 
(in Wheeler 1996:290). “The act of amplification” is the act of measurement 
governed by the classical physics in the macroscopic world, where the observer 
uses instruments to “amplify the interaction between some particle (or particles)” 
(Fagg 2003:55). As mentioned earlier, Cage used “amplification” in the score of 
0’00”, which could refer to the act of listening. In science, amplification pointed to the 
issues, such as the transition between the micro and macroscopic worlds and the 
boundary between the observers and the observed (Fagg 2003:55). John Wheeler 
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disputed that nature is a machine (1996:120), but proposes the concept of a 
“participatory universe” (1996:291) in which “the observer is participator” (1996:42). 
In art, George Brecht was one of the earliest artists to generate “participatory” art 
(Brecht and Robinson 2005:36). John Cage emphasised the presence of listeners 
and how their attention brings the sounds into presence. Cage and Brecht shared an 
interest in the intersection between spirituality, art, and science. In this context, 
Kongwu and its relation to performance suggest the desire to understand the world 
and nature differently.  
Relativity links to the “interactivity” (Finkelstein 2004:365) that unfolds in 
Brecht’s participatory art and Wheeler’s participatory universe in science. David 
Bohm considered relativity as “a relational approach to physics” (Bohm 1996:vii) and 
as the interdependence of the observer and the observed. The observer always 
already engages with the world.  Interactivity is not limited to the actual physical 
contact but also includes mental and perceptual interactions. When artwork needs 
the viewer to complete it (as Duchamp’s), and the viewer cannot see the whole entity 
of the art in one pass (as Allan Kaprow’s Happenings and John Cage’s theatre-like 
compositions), the revised worldview challenges the authorship and the artwork’s 
entity. 
 
2.4 How We Experience the ‘Present’ through the ‘Past’: One Street, Three 
Persons, Different Descriptions, and Different Memories  
 
John Cage developed silence to release sounds from the musical language so that 
the listener can listen without past accumulation. Past accumulation means a 
collection of past experiences, language, concepts, personal histories, cultural 
98 
backgrounds, and social conventions as the accumulation of ‘already-there’, which 
determines a particular way of perceiving.  If one listens through the musical system, 
one listens to sound through dualistic thinking. Consequently, some sounds can be 
more important and more interesting than the others; some can be musical, and the 
others are non-musical. The musical system, as a conventional language, orders 
sounds into a specific form. Then, sound becomes music. Why sound is ordered in 
this way and not another is because of the past accumulation of musical convention 
and personal preference. John Cage used silence to give up dualistic listening, so 
the listener does not match sounds to the musical convention as something from the 
past. The past accumulation that is the listener’s social and cultural context and 
personal taste causes the person to listen to music through value judgment. To 
practice nondual listening, one must listen to sounds without the past.  
 My research practice, entitled One Street, Three Persons, Different 
Descriptions, and Different Memories, explored the nondual experience from the 
Kongwu perspective, but took the reverse direction, mimicking the habit of 
differentiating that we use numerous times every day. By including two action tasks 
with the installation, my work exposed the way we experience through dualistic 
discrimination according to the past and the way we feel events happening in the 
train of the past, present, and future. Task One is an example of something that we 
do every day – walking on the street – and helps to expose the mechanism of how 
we experience the ‘present’ through the ‘past’.  
 
Task One  
Three persons walk from point A to point B. 
Person One uses a video to capture what one experiences during the walk.   
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Person Two uses words to capture what one experiences during the walk.   
Person Three captures the stream of thought with spoken words during the 
walk.   
 
Three persons as three experiencers observed the event of the experience of 
walking on a street. In Task One, they were capturing the ‘present’ experience 
through different means (spoken words, written words, and visual language) while 
they were walking. As a result, they generated three descriptions of the ‘present’.  
 From the Kongwu perspective, what we experience often results from that we 
experience with dualistic discrimination. The differentiating can work because one 
references to the accumulation from the past. We often identify with the collection of 
past accumulation as the ‘self.’ Each experiencer has unique, personal trajectories 
that are an accumulation from the past and that are conditioned by education and 
the social, cultural, and historical context. The self is akin to the observing tool. 
Personal preference determines what is important, interesting, not important, and 
boring. We ignore what is boring and pay attention to what is interesting. Sometimes, 
something is more noticeable simply because it is physically closer to us. We take 
the self as the referencing point so that we can describe the experience. Through the 
self and dualistic ordering, we experience the result of the selection.  
 We often take the result of selective seeing as the thing in itself. Scientists 
have far more precise measurements for observing and far more precise language to 
indicate the observed result than the measurements and language of quotidian life. 
Nevertheless, Heisenberg asked us to reconsider the tendency that we take the 
indicators as the thing in itself.  
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Science no longer is in the position of observer of nature, but rather 
recognizes itself as part of the interplay between man and nature.  
(Heisenberg 1958b:107)   
 
In science, also, the object of research is no longer nature in itself but rather 
nature exposed to man's questioning, and to this extent man here also meets 
himself.   
(Heisenberg 1958b: 105)  
 
Heisenberg interpreted the philosophical implication of the uncertainty principle and 
suggested that we cannot take the result of our observations as solid evidence of 
what nature ‘is’. Nature can be many potentials, but our measurement dictates how 
we see the nature (Heisenberg 1958b: 105). In other words, we take the result of our 
“questioning” as the singular definition of what nature is (Heisenberg 1958b:105). 
Then, our questioning comes from the accumulation from the past, for example, the 
conventions of scientific language. Even scientific language is working within the 
scientists’ collective experiences, because the accumulation from the past enables 
scientists to build their knowledge. What is exposed to our question implies that 
which is representable by the scientific language. What is representable is what 
nature ‘is’. 
 Language and the accumulation from the past act as the mediation when we 
encounter the world. John Cage raised a similar concern in music. He rephrased the 
words from his father, a scientist and inventor, “measurement measures the 
measuring means” (Cage 1969:7), and these words consider the mediation of 
differentiation and the measurement. To transfer this reflection from science to art, 
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on science, he used silence to discourage listening through musical conventions. If 
the listener does not listen to sounds by referencing the past, the present sounds 
cannot become the form of music. Cage used silence to disengage the dualistic 
ordering of sounds to open up the possibility of experience.   
As discussed in Chapter One, we use language to describe and indicate our 
experience, but in turn our experience is governed by language. We can expand the 
discussion on language, particularly the subject-object dichotomy and the dualistic 
pairs that makes language able to function, to understand our experience of ‘time’ 
and the production of 'now'. The photo can help to explain the mechanism that we 
use to describe events in everyday life and demonstrate the insight from the Zen 
proverb ‘The Finger is Not the Moon’ discussed in Chapter One. When we use the 
camera to take a photo of the street, we are sure that the photo is an indicator that is 
different from the street. The photo is a product of a particular way of seeing. We see 
through the camera’s eye from a fixed perspective. The photo has worked with the 
assumption that the subject and object are divided into two ends. The photo pointed 
to something not itself. Through the direction of seeing, the subject had the sense of 
connection with the object. The photo represents a relation that we built between the 
subject and the object. The photo is about the thing. Through the relation, we come 
to understand what the thing ‘is’. However, when we experience everyday life, we 
blend the description and the things together, and no longer differentiate them, 
particularly how language triggers our emotions and feelings and conducts our 
actions. In other words, we take the relation between subject and object as the 
‘being’ of the event. We use language as the tool, but, in the end, we experience life 
in a way that is governed by language. Language triggers the feelings and the 
values with which we associate, and seduces our emotional investment. We live in a 
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habitual pattern that we build with language and in the effect of the description. What 
we experience is not the event in itself, but rather circulates back to ourselves: the 
effect that language, as an enclosed system, causes. 
 
2.1 I-Lien Ho, One Street, Three Persons, Different Descriptions, and 
Different Memories, a snapshot from the video documentation for the 
installation 
 
  In the everyday context, our self and language as past accumulations are 
equivalent to measurements that are not even as precise as those in science. What 
we can experience is not the thing in itself, but rather events that are exposed to our 
awareness. Then, we describe the selective results with language. What our ordinary 
language can be represented as is what the event is. Therefore, we assume that our 
present experience is what the 'present' truly is. To this extent, we meet the 
observing tools: the self and the mechanism of language. When we experience an 
event, we often experience the result of what has been exposed to our attention and 
then registered in our memory. What we experience is actually the mechanism of the 
differentiation, a movement back and forth referencing the past accumulation.  
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 In the installation, the visitors saw three versions of the ‘present’. That present 
can be the present that arose because of its representability and observability, 
framed by the experiencer’s self: the collection of the past. The mechanism of 
differentiation dictated what could be included and what could not. In the separate 
room, the visitors listened to Person Three’s voice, which captured the stream of 
thoughts during the walk. When the visitors went up and down the stairs, they saw 
the words on the wall, and they walked alongside the written words that captured the 
version of present that Person Two experienced. Then, Person One captured what 
was visible in the moment with video footage. The visitors encountered the three 
versions in different rooms, but also watched the juxtaposition of these three 
descriptions. I edited the three narratives into one video. By watching the narratives 
co-existing in one video, we could see that the ‘present’ is what exposed to our 
selective experiencing. By doing so, we see how the present becomes the ‘present’ 
through the past and the self as the referencing point. Many events happening 
simultaneously on the street, yet we experience through the past and through the 
self, so we experience the result of what we think is the ‘present.’ We make many 
events become the event. We make limitless potentials become the singular being.  
 
2.2 Right: the juxtaposition of the three descriptions in the video. 2.3 Left: 
Person Three voiced a stream of thoughts. I-Lien Ho, One Street, Three 
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Persons, Different Descriptions, and Different Memories 
 
 The juxtaposition of the three descriptions reveals that the concepts of past 
and present need each other to operate. Discussed previously, Sengzhao exposed 
the fallacy of language, and revealed how being and nonbeing feed each other in 
“The Immobility of Things”. To follow his logic, without the concept of past, we could 
not differentiate the stages of events and experience the ‘present’. Derrida critiqued 
the metaphysics of presence and perception in Edmund Husserl and wrote, “the 
presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is 
continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary 
memory and expectation (retention and protention)” (Derrida 1973:64). The ‘present’ 
needs ‘non-present’ to create continuity in order to have ‘presence’. To follow 
Sengzhao’s logic and Derrida’s critique, without the ‘past’, the presence of ‘present’ 
and ‘future’ cannot be possible. For Sengzhao, we can have neither the view that 
things are ‘changing’ nor the view that things are ‘non-changing’. This inability 
complicates how the present becomes the present and compels us to reconsider the 
assumption that we generate the experience of the present.  
   
 
2.4 I-Lien Ho, ‘Time is Language’ in One Street, Three Persons, Different 
Descriptions, and Different Memories 
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The statement ‘Time is Language’ refers to habitual selection, and expands 
Kongwu’s attitude toward language in Chapter One. The acts of observation and 
selective attention transform potentials into reality. Selective attention means a 
particularly way of perceiving (seeing, listening, sensing, etc.) conditioned by social, 
cultural, historical backgrounds as well as limited by the past experiences, language, 
social agreement. Past accumulation means a collection of past experiences, 
language, concepts as the accumulation of ‘already-there’, which determines a 
particular way of perceiving. Language turns the potential into a reality. Language 
creates an illusion of the continuity that is called ‘time’. The present is a temporality 
resulting from dualistic ordering. I use the performance to mimic the habitual pattern 
of experience to expose the fallacy of language. The present we think exists is only 
one of many potentials. When we experience ‘the present’, we experience the 
habitual pattern of a perception governed by past accumulation. This habitual 
perception creates the present, rather the present ‘as such’, implied by the label of 
‘present’. In this sense, the way we experience the ‘present’ is through our habit of 
making the present become the past.   
 
 In Task Two, we look further at how the past becomes the past that we think it 
is. 
 
Task Two 
After months, the three persons recalled the memories of the walk and 
described whatever they remembered. 
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Over the course of these months, what used to be the ‘present’ became traces in the 
form of memory. What the experience had paid attention to during the walk became 
the registers in the form of memory. The past in the form of a memory was the result 
of what we selected to experience. Our memory registered the selective result. If we 
experience without selection, we could not have the past. The memory could not be 
documented; instead, it would be traceless. We could not have the past as the 
reference point for personal preference. Consequently, without the past, we could 
not experience the present that we think exists, nor make the division among past, 
present, and future to order our experiences.  
 
 
2.5 I-Lien Ho, One Street, Three Persons, Different Descriptions, and 
Different Memories, the snapshot of the installation of Task Two from the 
video documentation 
  
In this installation, the three TVs stood in for the three experiencers. The 
videos show each of them recalling their memories. The co-existence of the three 
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memories exposed the processes of how we accumulate experiences and how we 
perceive our experiences as reality. In the three videos, the past accumulation was 
represented in two forms. One is in the form of memory; the other is in the form of 
documentation by video, voice, and word through which they captured the ‘present’ 
in Task One. The three people’s memories not only co-exist to implicate the ‘real’ 
that they remembered but also complicated the supposedly ‘present’ as the result of 
experiencing with differentiation and through past accumulation. We see the past 
accumulation expanding to repeat the interference and to determine how we 
experience and what we can experience. This looping effect causes us to feel the 
trains of past, present, and future and events happening in a sequence. For 
example, the ‘present’ circulates to be part of the past accumulation. The present 
became the past for the future. The memory inscribed the result of experiencing with 
selection. Through the accumulation, we will experience the ‘present’ in the future. 
As a result, we give the past with the persistent presence to cause the illusion of 
continuity. The different versions of the real and present as a paradox reflect the 
following process: we used the results of our dualistic experience to solidify multiple 
potentials into the probability that we identify with the real.  
 The two installations expose the habits that we use to experience the ‘present’ 
through the past and to contemplate the unreality of the real, the truth of non-truth, 
and the temporality of non-time. The statement, Time is Language refers to the 
enclosed loop of language and measurement. Through language, we use the 
dualistic ordering of things to make multiple potentials into the single flow of 
narrative. To follow the philosophical implication of the uncertainty principle that 
Heisenberg considered, science has a more precise observation and language 
system than does our everyday ordinary observation. Nevertheless, even the far 
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more precise way of observing comes with the problem of selective seeing to be the 
thing in itself. In our everyday experiences, how we can take the results of our 
selective seeing as the grounds for the real?  
      To unsettle how we experience the ‘present’ through the past provides a way to 
the nondual experience. The labels and the act of naming trigger our emotional 
association, and bring us into the chain effect, creating the ‘real’ situation for us. For 
example, one fears losing time, desires to control time to prolong a pleasant 
experience, and feels melancholy at the thought of fleeting events. To understand 
the mechanism that causes the looping effect, we can disrupt the emotional 
association without being trapped in the binary judgment.  
 
 For John Cage, sounds have many potentials, and the reason we listen to 
sounds only as music is because we listen through the language of the musical 
system. If one does not listen through the past convention, sounds cannot be 
contained in the musical form. When we listen through musical grammar, we make 
the present sound become past: the operation of musical language. Cage’s silence 
aims to release sounds from being governed by musical language. Sounds are 
neither important nor non-important for us. When one accepts “equally what one 
likes and dislikes” (Cage 1961: 133), sounds “come into being of themselves,” and 
then “sounds should be just sound” (Cage 1961: 70). When one does not listen 
through the past accumulation, one listens without “likes and dislikes” (Cage in Cage 
and Reynolds 1979: 581; Cage 1961: 133), which is nondual listening. 
 Similarly, the street upon which the three people walked has many potentials. 
Many events happen simultaneously on any street. Yet why we can experience the 
street as only the street results from our ordering of experiences contained in the 
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description and then documented in the memory. It is because we experience 
through the self: the accumulation from the past. The self accumulates the behaviour 
codes, personal tastes, and the social and cultural conventions. When we 
experience in this manner, we make ‘present’ become ‘past’. We experience with the 
selection, and then we accumulate traces in the memory for the ‘future’ experience 
through differentiating and judging. Memory becomes the registers of the selective 
result. Then, we identify with the selective result. The past accumulation causes the 
next selection. This is a looping effect.  
 To experience from the perspective of Kongwu, we have to stop the dualistic 
experiencing. Cage’s silence suggests a listening without the past accumulation, 
meaning listening without “value judgements” (Cage 1961:59). My work reconsidered 
how we experience the present and what makes us feel the trains of the past, 
present, and future and events happening in a succession. By using multiple 
descriptions and memories, my work exposes the language fallacy that causes the 
emotion of something passing away and thus produces the habit that we experience 
through the dualistic differentiation. If we understand how the past accumulation 
governs how we experience the present and causes the illusion of continuity, we can 
move away from dualistic differentiation to the nondual experience. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Kongwu holds that the concept of time results from what we experience through 
dualistic differentiation. Cage used silence to encourage nondual listening without 
the past accumulation that is the musical language system. The research practice, 
One Street, Three Persons, Different Descriptions, and Different Memories exposed 
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the process that we experience through the past and through dualistic differentiation. 
We identify with the accumulation from the past as the entity called the self. Through 
the self, we experience with selection. This is how we experience the ‘present’. 
Therefore, without a concept of the past, we could not distinguish the past from the 
present. We would just experience without using the concepts of past, present, and 
future to describe and to make connections to the world. In this sense, when we 
experience nondualistically, time never arrives.  
 Even though the Kongwu perspective and quantum mechanics use different 
approaches to explore nature and truth, they share a scepticism of reality. To 
contemplate the paradox in quantum mechanics, we must understand the unreality 
of the reality and the relativity of time implied by the logic of Kongwu. To point out the 
parallel of the shift in the concept of nature in quantum mechanics, and the art 
criticism concerning authorship and the entity of artwork offers the understanding of 
the relationship between the observer and the observed that is crucial to shaping 
reality. Kongwu suggests an understanding that the ‘truth,’ such as the concept of 
time, is conventional only and useful in everyday communication. One becomes 
aware that time is a result of building the relationship between subject and object 
and is therefore not as real as it seems.  
Kongwu suggests a temporality of non-time that is different from the “future 
oriented temporality” that Grosz(1999) proposed to mobilise transformation. Even 
though Kongwu emphasised the impermanence and the here and now in the 
operation of linguistic labels, Kongwu warned against being trapped in dualistic 
thinking, for example, preferring becoming over being, event over object, movement 
over stillness, and future over present and past. The different frameworks provoke 
further discussion on whether the transformation can come from the apparent inertia 
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that is neither coming nor going, when time never arrives. 
 One can link the distrust of language to theories such as John R. Searle’s 
language as “social contract” that creates a social and political reality (Searle 2008). 
One can reconsider how language seduces our emotional investment and how we 
live in the effect of the description on the level of feeling. We use language as a tool, 
but, in the end, our experience is governed by language. Kongwu is not a theory for 
mental exercise, yet Kongwu fosters a practice concerning the ordinary perception 
on the experiential and emotional level. Kongwu seeks ways to conduct one’s 
desires and longing. Concerning the human’s living conditions and engagement is 
what I mean by spirituality. Articulating the interactivity of the observer and the 
observed provides a reflection on how we perceive the world, engage with dualistic 
ordering, and invest our emotions that give power to representation and language. 
When language has power, the narrative is the reality that one takes as the real. This 
is the habit that we have used to construct the architecture of reality and to swim in 
the stream of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
3. When the Identification is suspended: Responding to Marina 
Abramović’s Version of ‘No-thinking Mind’ through ... is Present 
 
Introduction  
 
The concepts of ‘no-thinking mind’ or ‘no mind’ have often been used to describe the 
rather mysterious meditative experience. The specific mode of consciousness has 
other labels such as ‘pure’ consciousness, “conceptually unstructured awareness” 
(Wallace 2000: 19), or ‘perceiving emptiness directly’ and ‘a direct perception’ in the 
translation of Tibetan Buddhism. The genealogy of exploring no-thinking mind 
through performance has been present in theatre actor training, body arts, and 
conceptual performances, particularly John Cage’s engagement with Zen’s and 
Suzuki’s teaching, and some Fluxus artists' event scores to activate the 
attentiveness in the everyday act. By incorporating the various non-Western 
techniques of consciousness, Marina Abramović has not only explored the 
meditative mind in her artist’s body, but also created the Cleaning the House 
Workshop for the student’s body (Abramović 2004; Kaplan 1999: 18-20), and The 
Abramović Method which aims to empower the public and facilitate their own 
meditative transformation (Abramović 2001; Viola and Sileo 2012). Through the 
training of emptying and calming the mind, she constructed the space of ‘suchness’ 
to seek the possibility of experience. The raised questions here are what her ’no-
thinking mind’ referred to, and what kind of transformation ‘meditation’ offered. The 
question of how the experience of being present contributes to the identity of the 
subject in her version of the meditative mind, leads to the analysis of The Artist is 
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Present, Nightsea Crossing/Conjunction and the frame of narrative in context, to 
understand why she emphasizes the experience of being here and now.   
Kongwu questioned whether the identity of self as a constructed continuity 
would still be possible if one does not experience through habit—identifying with the 
content of experience. By using Nāgārjuna’s examination of the identity, I analyse 
Abramović’s version of being present, particularly examining the relationship 
between the process of experience and the identity of self. I compare the underlying 
logic of ‘being here and now’ in Abramović’s no-thinking mind, and the utilisation of 
the meditation in Kongwu. By analysing her frame of narrative, I investigate how her 
version of being here and now needs the identity, and the frame of narrative, as the 
underlying logic shaping her version of being here and now: the issue of existence 
and time. 
The research through practice articulates the kind of relationship between self 
and experience suggested by Kongwu. The research performance … is Present 
provides a critique of Marina Abramović’s version of no-thinking mind and offers a 
different definition of the meditative mind: a process that when identification is 
suspended, the identity ceases to exist. By using the exchange between the ‘real’ 
performer and the performer inside the TV, the performance … is Present explores 
how one does not identify with the content in the TV, and how simultaneously the 
identity of the performer is dissolved. The different versions of ‘being here and now’ 
and the meditative mind, reflect the making of the illusion of continuity, such as the 
self in different genres of performance and life. 
⁠ 
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3.1 Suspending the Identification through Meditation: Comparing Abramović’s 
No-thinking Mind and Kongwu’s Logic 
 
The specific mode of perception is the motif going through Abramović’s work. The 
artist has explored how to study and transfer this state of mind through the means of 
performance. In the early works Freeing the Voice (1976), Freeing the Memory 
(1976), and Freeing the Body (1976), she exhausted the body tools for expression 
as a way to empty out. Even though the early works were often associated with self-
torture and shocking effect, the meditative mind is what, she considered, had gone 
through the development of performance. She saw pain, “as a good door to cross 
into another state of consciousness” (in Kaplan 1999: 13).   
 
When I began my performances in Yugoslavia and pushed my body very 
hard, I started to experience different states of mind, I didn’t know what they 
were, because I didn’t have any relation to meditation or spirituality at that 
time, and I was not interested either. I was just an artist doing her work. But 
the work became more and more difficult and my body became so much more 
demanding on my will power and my power of concentration that I actually 
started to reach, through my performances, meditative states. I was not aware 
of it at that time. Much later when I met spiritual people, I realised that I was 
experiencing meditation.  
(Abramović in Wijers and Pijnappel 1990: 60) 
 
The trance-like presence seen in Rhythm 0 (1979) became her signature, and 
facilitated the relationship between the performer and the visitor in The Artist is 
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Present (2010). Her existence appeared like an empty canvas and the performance 
instruction framed a zone of possibility. The spectators turned into the co-performers 
and projected their personal emotional response onto her in the environment.  
But what does Abramović mean by “meditative states” and what effect does 
the emptying-out create? She explicitly mentioned the interest on the concept of 
suchness in Tibetan Buddhism. To facilitate the experience of emptiness, she not 
only created the performances, but the workshop The Abramović Method for the 
public (Abramović 2001; Viola and Sileo 2012) and Cleaning the House for the 
young artists (Abramović 2004; Kaplan 1999: 18-20). I will examine what kind of 
relationship exists between the process of experience and the identity of subject in 
The Artist is Present, and what kind of relationship exists between self and other that 
she established in her version of ‘being here and now’, through Nightsea 
Crossing/Conjunction and the frame of narrative. Then, I will compare her version of 
meditative mind to Kongwu’s logic.  
 
The Experience and the Identity in The Artist is Present    
Abramović, drawing from Nightsea Crossing (1981-1987), created The Artist 
is Present (2010). Nightsea Crossing was the first performance drawing of 
experiences found in nature. Living in the desert with Australia Aborigines changed 
Abramović and Ulay’s works. According to Abramović, the desert was so hot that 
“[p]hysically”, movement was impossible; “only our minds were functioning” 
(Abramović in Kaye 1996:185). “Doing nothing” in the desert revealed to Abramović 
“the whole other part of the mind” and reinforced that “one actually experiences” the 
big philosophical ideas “in your body and mind” (Wijers 1990:61). To transmit their 
experiences in the desert to the public through contemporary art, each of Abramović 
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and Ulay “chose six colours”, wore “one for each occasion” (Abramović in Wijers 
1990:61) and sat motionless, “facing each other for seven hours a day” (Abramović 
in Wijers 1990:61), beginning before the museum opened and finishing after the 
museum closed, so the public would see neither beginning nor ending, but, rather, 
only two people sitting with “an impression of timelessness” (Abramović in Wijers 
1990:61). They gave it the title Nightsea Crossing, with “Nightsea” serving as a 
metaphor “for our subconscious” (Abramović in Wijers 1990:61). When it appears 
that nothing is happening with the external visual form, the inner process of 
perception is on-going. When the public does not know the instructions given to the 
performers, they are “always waiting for something to happen. But when they finally 
come to realize that that’s the reality of the thing, they start making contact with the 
piece itself” (Abramović in Kaye 1996:184). 
Instead of pairing with the other performer in The Artist is Present, the other 
empty chair invited any stranger to sit silently for whatever chosen duration, and to 
obtain the one-to-one energy dialogue with the artist in their mutual gaze and 
silence. There was a live-feed stream of the performance on MOMA website during 
the three-month performance. She created a rather theatrical space by framing the 
atrium with four cinema lighting and tapes, and made herself like an empty canvas 
with the signature trance-like presence. Visitors splashed their own anticipation, 
experiences, memories, and personal histories onto her.  
Abramović said that the performance was about to “create a space of 
suchness” (Abramović 2011: n.p.) for the public to experience what she had 
experienced: the “no-thinking mind” (Abramović́ 2011: n.p.). Abramović explained 
that suchness is the Tibetan term for emptiness. 
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Suchness is empty mind, but it's not empty mind just empty mind. It's actually 
suchness is the fullness of empty mind, which is kind of contradiction of the 
term. But this is the idea that you really are not, you know, in the past or not in 
the future. You're just at the moment, in the space. This changes everything in 
your life if you get into that. 
(Abramović 2013: n.p.) 
 
“Form is emptiness, emptiness is form” comes from Heart Sutra (in Hanh 1988:1), 
and articulates the Buddhist concept of Two Truths. Ulay and Abramović for the first 
time made reference to the concept in the catalogue Modus Vivendi: Ulay & Marina 
Abramović, 1980-1985. They reprinted the article “Emptiness, the Two Truths” in 
which the Dalai Lama explains the concept of emptiness in an interview with John F. 
Avedon (1980) (Abbemuseum and Kunstverein 1985:75-7 and Abramović, 
Abramović, and Bern 1998:272). Since that time, the verse “Form is emptiness; 
emptiness is form” has been flowering as the underlying theme. As Abramović́ 
explicitly interpreted the concept of suchness through the means of performance and 
gave the title, as The Artist is Present, I investigate her version of no-thinking mind 
through Nāgārjuna’s perspective to advance the understanding of the relationship 
between the experience of being present and the identity of the subject.   
Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mahayana Buddhism, coined the concept of 
śūnyatā, from which the translation of suchness and emptiness come from. In 
Chapter Eighteen of his book, The Book of Middle Way, Nāgārjuna investigated the 
self and identity through the logic of śūnyatā. He challenged the realness of an 
inherent entity. That the self can be free from suffering and can be transformed 
“must be thought of as an inherently real entity” (Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 245). 
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If the self were the aggregates,  
It would have arising and ceasing (as properties). 
If it were different from the aggregates, 
It would not have the characteristics of the aggregates. 
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 245) 
 
Aggregates can refer to whatever kind of experiences one is having. In Buddhist text, 
the human’s personality is analysed by the five aggregates: “physical body, 
sensation, perception, dispositions, and consciousness or cognition” (Nāgārjuna and 
Garfield 1995: 245). As Garfield noted, the aggregates should not be taken as the 
metaphysical categories, but only the useful communication in the meditation 
practice to help the practitioner “to attend his/her experience” (Nāgārjuna and 
Garfield 1995: 245-6).  
 
Nāgārjuna raised the question of self and its relationship to experiences; 
whether the self is separate from the experiences (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:361-
367; Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:263-4). If the self is the process of 
experience, the experience is arising and ceasing. The self is constantly changing. It 
cannot have continual presence as the concept of identity suggests (Nāgārjuna and 
Han 1997:367-73). The identity means something that has an intrinsic quality 
different from others, and independently exists. If the self were different from the 
process of experience, it would not have any characteristics of the experience. So 
whatever ‘I’ experience has nothing to do with ‘me’ (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 
1991:264-6). Yet in our everyday experience, that we can have the identity of self is 
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built on the memories that are the traces of experience. Whatever kind of sensory 
experiences is how ‘I’ comes to know the ‘self’. If one takes the latter position, the 
relationship between experience and identity become unimaginable according to 
experience. One proposes that the self is something outside of experience. We know 
things through sense experience (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:264). So if the 
self is different from experience, then it is “unknowable” (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 
1991:264).  
 
If there were no self, 
Where would the self's (properties) be? 
From the pacification of the self and what belongs to it,  
One abstains from grasping onto "I" and "mine”. 
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 247) 
 
No self refers to the fact that the independent identity of self does not exist, neither a 
permanent entity. It does not mean to say that experiences do not exist. But the 
process that making ‘something’ belongs to the self, and the making of “one’s own” 
does not exist (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991:265). The concept of self has the 
presupposition that its properties exist, and “they must exist somewhere” (Nāgārjuna 
and Garfield 1995: 247). When one refers to the identity of self, intuitively one is 
trying to localise where the properties and entity exist. So if there were no self, the 
intuitive desires to localise the self by grasping experiences as ‘my’ experience 
ceases to exist.   
 
One who does not grasp onto “I” and “mine,”  
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That one does not exist. 
One who does not grasp onto “I” and “mine,”  
He does not perceive.  
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 247) 
 
When one is experiencing, one does not identify with the contents of experience as 
‘my’ experience, as the properties of self. The self is not present. When one does not 
grasp experiences as the evidence of ‘I’, one realises that the process of experience 
is changing. Because the process of experience is lack of inherent existence, one 
cannot possess experience. 
One has to understand Nāgārjuna’s words in the context of the practice of 
meditation. The self, who is doing the spiritual transformation, experiencing the 
emptiness of self, and getting rid of concepts is not available. Meditation has the 
purpose to free from suffering, and to understand the world without grasping, and 
without tagging experience with ‘my’ or ‘I’. Even when one is practicing meditation to 
empty and transform the self, Nāgārjuna points out that “someone who is assumed 
to have gotten rid of egoism and pride is also not available” (Nāgārjuna and 
Kalupahana 1991: 265). One has to understand that not only the common sense self 
that results from one identifying with the experiences is not available. The self that 
results from the meditative transformation is still a mental fabrication. If the 
identification with experience and the grasping onto ‘I’ still operate, the experience of 
meditation for the purpose of spiritual transformation could strengthen the 
experience of self. The very experience of sitting in silence could also enhance the 
assumption that ‘someone’ is out here. 
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When views of "I" and "mine" are extinguished,  
Whether with respect to the internal or external,  
The appropriator ceases. 
This having ceased, birth ceases. 
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 248) 
 
When one stops taking the experiences that “belongs to the self” (Nāgārjuna and 
Kalupahana 1991:266), the act of appropriating experiences as the self, ceases. In 
other words, the experiencer ceases to exist. The problem is not about the contents 
of the experiences, but the identification: the habit that one appropriates internal or 
external experiences as the evidence of the self.   
 
That there is a self has been taught,  
And the doctrine of no-self, 
By the buddhas, as well as the  
Doctrine of neither self nor nonself. 
 
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 249) 
 
Even though for Nāgārjuna, the self is a product of the mental fabrication and 
reification of the sensory experience, Nāgārjuna does not deny that there is the 
embodied experience. The doctrine of self refers to the self that is a useful fiction for 
everyday communication and conventional reality. But the felt experiences cannot be 
taken as evidence to speculate on the existence of the self. Neither can a thing 
called ‘nonself’ be found (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:382). Nonself is useful for 
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communication and dependent on the doctrine of self to operate (Nāgārjuna and Han 
1997: 380-5).      
   
What language expresses is nonexistent.  
The sphere of thought is nonexistent.  
Unarisen and unceased, like nirvana 
Is the nature of things. 
(Nāgārjuna and Garfield 1995: 249) 
 
No actual independent entities exist out there if one follows the direction of language 
and tries to locate what is being referred to. Language has the function of naming, 
recording, and indicating. Naming creates the description of experiences. Language 
is not the problem, but “the use of language” (Nāgārjuna and Kalupahana 1991: 
268), if one takes the indicators as the evidence of things existing out there.  
 
Everything that can be experienced has been taken as the source of the self 
in communication and conventional reality. In other words, if one looks for the 
properties of self and locates what the self is, one only finds experiences. Nonself 
does not refer to that, the experience of nonself can be found out there, but the 
identification and the conceptualisation of experiences cease to operate. When one 
attempted to differentiate and describe experiences as arising and disappearing, one 
still engages identification and conceptualisation.  
 
After challenging the concept of self, Nāgārjuna moved one step further to 
avoid the possibility that nonself becomes the dogma as an objective goal to reach. 
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By identifying Nirvana with Samara, self with nonself (Nāgārjuna and Han 1997:386-
90), Nāgārjuna recognised the habitual use of languages, aiming to stop any 
metaphysical speculation and habit of appropriating experiences as the properties of 
self. The habit of appropriating experiences makes the autonomous identity such as 
the identity of self, and other references for the value judgment. When one takes the 
result of experiencing as the identity of the experienced object, one creates the 
essentialised unity. To essentialise, self operates the exact habit to essentialise Dao. 
Zhuangzi employs the similar strategy to identify Dao with non-Dao through telling a 
story.  
 
Dong-guo Zi asked Zhuangzi,  
“Where can the so-called Dao be found?”  
“Everywhere”, Zhuangzi answered.     
“Specify where”  
“It is in this ant.” 
“How can it be so low?” 
“It is in this rice grass.” 
“How come it becomes even lower?” 
“In the brick.” 
“Why does it become lower and lower?” 
“It is in that excrement.”     
Dong-guo Zi gave no reply.                        
 (Trans from Chen 1999: 593-4) 
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The distrust of language and thinking applies to Dao, the supposed ‘ultimate reality’ 
and ‘transcendence’. Even though Dao occupies the central position in the whole 
discursive system of Daoism, Dao is still only a name, similar to other words ‘not-
Dao’, for lack of any absolute and higher essence. By saying this, Zhuangzi used the 
inherently dualistic quality of language to disrupt the expectations of Dao as 
something holy and sacred. He also disrupted any desire of having Dao as 
something to achieve. He made secular as sacred. This logic is also the reason for 
the expression: “when one says ‘Dao’, it is not ‘Dao’.” One dissolves the duality of 
transcendence and everyday through the meditation.  
Nāgārjuna challenged the concept of self not only in everyday communication, 
but also in the spiritual practice for transformation. Even the spiritual practitioner 
gave up concepts, and knew that ‘I’ am habitually thinking through concepts and 
creating an entry as the self and as the entity of the thing. Yet, he warned that if one 
is feeling that ‘I’ am getting rid of the habits, and ‘I’ am not in the past, and future, but 
here and now, then there is still a self to create the illusion of continuity which is 
looping back to enhance the sense of self, and to make the spiritual experiences as 
the evidence of self. He suggests that the ‘self’, which understands what emptiness 
means, and gets rid of ego, self-concepts, and habits, is not even available. Not 
even the identity of self that is here and now and fully present is available. Not even 
the self to be transformed is available. 
  
Zhuangzi and Nāgārjuna went through the process to challenge the habitual 
pattern of experiences and the common sense concepts, but they did not come to 
the other conclusion, and proposed the other point of view as the relative to what 
they challenged. Zhuangzi expressed the nondual perception by playing the labels of 
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‘A’ and ‘not-A’ in the discursive systems such as Dao and Emptiness. For Zhuangzi, 
Dao is not Dao. For Nāgārjuna, Nirvana is Samara; self is non-self. The result is a 
“loop” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), a circulation that these linguistic 
naming are co-arising, co-depending for the specific operation in the communication. 
This looping effect implies that what we see is the product of the functioning of 
experiencing, which we have taken as the being existing independently. This habit is 
not exclusive to the conventional reality, but also to ‘the ultimate reality’, if one is 
identifying with it. Nāgārjuna challenged the danger that one takes the meditative 
experience in the name of emptiness and non-self to increase the sense of self. 
Zhuangzi challenges that one takes Dao as the preferred value over not-Dao.  
Based on how Nāgārjuna and Zhuangzi highlighted the danger that one 
prefers the meditative experience over the non-meditative experience and how 
meditation enhances the identity of self, I argue that from the performance entitled 
The Artist is Present, Abramović’s version of the meditative mind seduces the 
identification; the identity is necessary to make the experience of being here and 
now possible. The title of The Artist is Present implicitly describes the experience 
that one uses in the meditative experiences as a way to speculate on the existence 
of self, and establish the presence of self. The performance indicates that the 
experience of ‘being here and now’ strengthens the experience of self. As the title of 
the performance implies, the experience of the endurance, silence, and stillness is 
where the self can be discovered. The experience generated from the exact 
performance structure, suggests that there is an identity of self (the appropriator) to 
be found; and when one cultivates the no-thinking mind, one can locate the identity. 
The very experience of the meditative mind grants the security of the identity, and 
helps to grasp the experiences as properties of self in The Artist is Present.  
126 
 
By using Nāgārjuna’s examination of self, the analysis of The Artist is Present 
raised the issue on the process of experience and identity of subject in her 
construction of “suchness”. To further understand why she emphasises the 
experience of ‘being here and now’, the context in which she developed Nightsea 
Crossing/Conjunction can help to investigate Abramović’s system of narrative: how 
she set up the Other by using the categories of “Nature” and “East”; and how the 
narrative shaped the possibility of experience, particularly the experience of 
presence and temporality. 
 
Presence and the Other in Abramović’s Frame of Narrative 
 By using the meditation, Abramović created the effect of ‘being here and now’ 
that strengthens the experience of self. If this is the case, Abramović’s version of 
emptiness is very different from the attitudes of Nāgārjuna and Zhuangzi. The frame 
of meaning that Abramović has constructed can investigate why she pursued the 
concept of being here and now, and emphasised the experience of the meditative 
mind. I look at how she sets up the other to position the self and through which she 
establishes what she means by ‘being here and now’. This is the context to 
understand the effect and the space of suchness she created by using ‘meditation’.  
 
When in 1975 Ulay and Abramović began to collaborate on the relational work 
series (1976-1979), they identified with the other person, becoming the other person 
in Talking About Similarity (1976), crashing “two artists egos” (Abramović in Kaplan 
1999: 17). The result created “a hermaphroditic state of being” that they called “the 
death of self” (Abramović in Kaplan 1999: 17). The series, That Self, included Point 
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of Contact, The Other: Resting Energy, Nature of Mind, and Timeless Point of View 
(all in 1980). Through the exploration of self and other, That Self was neither herself, 
nor himself (Abramović in Biesenbach 2010: 94), but a synergy of the female and 
male energy. That Self was the “third existence” independent of them, carried “Vital 
Energy” (Abramović and Ulay 1980: n.p.), and generated the energy field. It is 
exactly that through abandoning the “dualism” (Iles 1998: 194), the individual selves 
dissolve into the bigger one and the experience of That Self becomes the other 
unified self. 
When they feel the exhaustion that they have explored all the possibility of 
performance through the “tough, physical performing elements” (Abramović in 
Kaplan 1999: 12), they go beyond the relation within two artists’ egos and look for 
answers in nature. Nightsea Crossing/ Conjunction (1981-1987/1983) was the first 
performance by Abramović and Ulay to draw on contact with the other. In 
Conjunction (1983), Abramović and Ulay invited the Tibetan monk Ngawang Soepa 
Lueyar and the Australian Aborigine Watuma Tarrur Tjungarrayi to sit with them in 
Amsterdam (Wijers and Pijnappel, 1990:62). 
  
The physical part was explored, but there were a huge mental area that had 
not yet been touched. But we didn’t know how to proceed with the work. The 
only thing we knew was the best answer we could look for was in nature.  
(Abramović in Kaplan 1999: 12) 
 
Living in the desert with the Australian Aborigine, the environment was too hot. 
“Physically”, one cannot move, but “only our minds were functioning” (Abramović in 
Kaye 1996: 185). The experience of “nature” is potent enough to provide the answer 
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to seek the possibility of performance and explore the potentiality of mind. Abramović 
and Ulay shifted from their performance approach, from more “physical intervention” 
towards “contemplative exchange” (Iles 2003: 164). The inspiration in nature is 
connected to the exploration of presence. They provided the text concerning 
Nightsea Crossing.  
 
Presence.  
Being present, over long stretches of time,  
Until presence rises and falls, from  
Material to immaterial, from  
Form to formless, from  
Instrumental to mental, from  
Time to Timeless.  
  (Abramović and Ulay in Abramović, Abramović and Bern 1998: 258)  
 
By the category of nature, she implied not only the desert landscape, but also 
the Aboriginal people’s way of living. In this context, she draws inspiration from 
nature to consider the issue of presence and temporality. Abramović sets up the 
category of the other: 
 
The East is a source of spirituality and also of forgotten knowledge we no 
longer have. That, together with nature, is very inspiring for me. That is where 
I can reach art. Then I came to the West, where I can make my own mixture 
of things. 
(Abramović in Kaplan 1999: 19) 
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The artist defined that one specific quality of “a source of spiritualty” and “forgotten 
knowledge” is the non-Western technology of consciousness. 
 
When I was in Tibet, or when I lived among the Aborigines in Australia, or 
when I learnt some of the Sufi rites, I understood that these cultures have a 
long tradition of techniques of meditation which lead the body to a borderline 
state that allows us to make a mental leap to enter different dimensions of 
existence and to eliminate the fear of pain, death, or the limitations of the 
body. 
(in Dobrila and Abramović 1998: 18) 
 
Through the means of performance, one cultivates the meditative mind and explores 
the potentiality of mind that becomes the motif of her solo performances.  
 
How can a Western body have this experience, and how can an Eastern body 
push much farther into an area unknown for us? I am interested in this 
because for me, performance is a means of research to find mental and 
physical answers. 
(Abramović in Kaplan 1999: 8) 
 
She defines her function of being an artist as “bridging” (Abramović in Wijers and 
Kamphof 1990: 311) between the dualistic categories of East and West, human and 
non-human energy exchange, self and other, the performer and public, so the artist 
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can make the Eastern wisdom accessible, that is, “unknown” for the Western 
audience. 
Said’s Orientalism can be useful for reading the narrative in which Abramović 
produces the notion of ‘East’ and the identity of the artist (self) through performance.  
 
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident." 
Thus a very large mass of writers, among who are poet, novelists, 
philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have 
accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for 
elaborate accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, "mind," 
destiny, and so on.”   
(Said 2003:2-3) 
 
The artist as a bridge is a result of essentialising self and other. In Marina 
Abramović’s narrative, she has accepted the distinction of ‘East’ and ‘West’ 
concerning “mind”, the different attitude towards time and presence. The ‘East’ has 
become an empty marker and mirror which projected Abramović’s desire for ‘being 
here and now’ and pursue for ‘presence’. By using the critiques of intercultural 
performance, the artist as the subject went out of the West, sought the authenticity 
and beauty from the East as the passive object (Holledge and Tompkins 2000), and 
assumed clear-cut cultural boundaries (Chaudhuri 2002: 34), so the artist’s function 
as the bridge could be established. The artists had access to the East, and brought 
what they found out back to the privileged audience in the West (Holledge and 
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Tompkins 2000). East in this narrative never had the agency to transform, was 
determined by the Western artist as something timeless. She essentialised both East 
and West. Then, in the narrative East connected to nature, as something raw and 
authentic. By putting East and nature in the same category for operating, the artist 
defines what West is and what the artist is.  
In this setting-up, East is pure without corruption and preserves the ‘unknown’ 
wisdom for the West; West is corrupted, particularly on the notion of time.  
 
The performance [Nightsea Crossing/Conjunction] was about experiencing 
something we never experience in our Western culture, that is the ‘here and 
now’. All our lives we live either in the past or in the future. We are here just to 
run to the future. We never sit and reflect on the moment ‘now’, like this 
moment when I’m talking to you, now.   
(Abramović in Wijers and Kamphof 1990: 308) 
 
How she can make the critique on “our Western culture” is based on the assumption 
that East is virtuous, without corruption and a long tradition as timeless, unchanging 
and enduring. In her account of the experience, “we” is the West, “here and now” is 
the other. She both represents West and other. This particular experience of time, 
here and now becomes the source of the other. The experience of being here and 
now is unfamiliar to “we”: West. In other words, the more she made the specific kind 
of experience unfamiliar, the more the other became present. The making of the 
other, by taking ‘being here and now’, caused a looping effect that made “we” and 
“our western culture” become present. What is at stake is that she appropriates the 
experiences as the property of self and other. Given the treatment of experience, the 
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identity of self is necessary to “being here and now” (Abramović in Wijers and 
Kamphof 1990: 308).   
Tracking down how she embraced the other, the other never existed in the 
way that she used the indicators. ‘East’ refers back to the narrative system itself, not 
the ‘real’ East. As Said wrote,  
 
the phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a 
correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal 
consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient  […]  despite or 
beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a "real" Orient.  
(Said 2003:5) 
 
‘East’ is the product of the functioning of desiring and a constructed consistency. The 
subject constructed the relationship between self and other by using ideas and past 
experiences. The subject mistakes the relationship as the ‘being’ of object, and in 
turn enhances the sense of self. The discourse itself creates a consistency, an 
illusion of continuity: the identity of self (other). In Abramović’s narrative, the other 
has been emptied out. East and nature are empty markers. They indicate the 
subject’s own desires and projection. The other operates in a way to map out the 
trajectories of longing, and to mobilise marching toward that idealised homeland—
self. East becomes the empty canvas. The artist projects her utopia onto the other. 
Like in The Artist is Present, she makes the artist the empty canvas. Visitors attribute 
their personal stories and contexts onto her. Through establishing the relationship 
between self and other, the presence comes into being. In this approach, the artist 
133 
positions the self in the contemporary art context. East is one of many indicators that 
refer back to the desires of the subject. The other as the empty marker is useful to 
making the desires tangible. When things become more easily categorised, things 
are more graspable to enter the narrative.    
Abramović’s pursuit of ‘being here and now’ and the need of presence is 
associated with the need of the other to be the ‘real’ self and the need to establish 
the self as foundation for experiencing. Amelia Jones noted the striking parallel 
between “the desire for live art to deliver presence” and European modernist’s desire 
of authenticity, “found often among “primitive” cultures” (Jones 2011:21). According 
to Jones, “a belief in presence” articulated in Abramović’s narrative is “an artifact of 
European early-modern to modern belief systems, conditioned through European 
colonization of Africa and other parts of the world” (Jones 2011:21). The experience 
of ‘being here and now’ becomes the mythology that Abramović appropriated to 
create the timeless otherness. By doing so, the subject has the substance to exist 
independently with the full presence. The need of the other is how the identity of the 
subject can be present. Being here and now and meditation become the source of 
the other. The more unfamiliar the other is, the stronger the sense of self can be. 
Through the identity, being here and now can be possible. This is the underlying 
frame to understand the process of experience and the identity implied in The Artist 
is Present and Abramović’s no-thinking mind. The primacy of process and 
embodiment, particularly her version of being here and now becomes the way to set 
up the other, and secure a unified subject as the centre of experience. 
The pursuit of self-presence and ‘presentness’ has its history. The desire for 
‘presentness’ is not so unique to performance art. According to the philosopher 
Stanley Cavelle,  
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what painting wanted, in wanting connection with reality, was a sense of 
presentness—not exactly a conviction of the world's presence to us, but of our 
presence to it. … [O]ur subjectivity became what is present to us, individuality 
became isolation. The route to conviction in reality was through the 
acknowledgment of that endless presence of self. … Apart from the wish for 
selfhood (hence the always simultaneous granting of otherness as well), I do 
not understand the value of art. Apart from this wish and its achievement, art 
is exhibition. …To speak of our subjectivity as the route back to our conviction 
in reality is to speak of romanticism.  
(Cavelle 1979:22) 
 
As Bolter and Grusin noted, the desire of self-presence was remediated from 
painting into new electronic media (Bolter and Grusin 2000:234-5). Similarly, we 
could see how the desire of presentness was remediated from painting to 
performance art, particularly in the way that Abramović produces the theatricality of 
‘presence’ in the dynamic of closeness and distance.  
 
Paradoxically, in Abramović’s system of narrative, being here and now is the 
desire of presence: just being with you, for you. Presence is like a gift, a ‘something’ 
delivered to ‘someone’. One seeks the capacity for just being fully present and 
“making contact with” (Abramović in Kaye 1996: 184) each other. To fulfil the 
connection is deemed impossible because this version of self needs the other to be 
possible. Given the frame of narrative, meaning that the “Great Divide” (Latour 1993: 
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99), nature and East, make the modern subject possible, the zero-distance is 
impossible to reach. In the relation between self and other, the dynamic of closeness 
and distance, the theatricality of being here and now in The Artist is Present is 
performed. The more the volume of being here and now is amplified, the more 
present the self and simultaneously the other are. If one invested more effort to 
make the connection, one experiences more the impossibility of the closeness. The 
distance by default, and the longing for closeness, has linked to the labyrinth of 
memories and the sea of unconscious emotions. If one is determined to build the 
intimacy, one suffers. However, by overcoming the distance one achieved “the 
endless present of self” and in turn one can make the reality graspable again 
(Cavelle 1979:22). The more dedication that one commits to ‘being here and now’, 
the more the distance between the self and the other becomes.  
 
3.2 The Meditation and Being Here and Now in Kongwu  
 
Abramović’s ‘emptiness’ or ‘suchness’ has its route back to the need of having the 
authenticity. The meditative mind becomes an instrument to serve the historical 
constructs, particularly the belief system of presence and the need of presentness. In 
Abramović’s narrative, the experience of ‘meditation’ and ‘being here and now’ 
become the source of the other. Consequently, the identity of subject ‘has’ presence. 
But Kongwu developed meditation to suspend the identification, so the being here 
and now in Kongwu does not need the identity of subject and other. Abramović has 
constructed performances to experience ‘suchness’, particularly the experience of 
being here and now, for example in the performance The Artist is Present, the 
workshop Cleaning the House (Kaplan 1999: 18-20), and the installation-workshop 
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The Abramović Method for the public. Performance turns the attention toward the 
embodied experience. Meditation facilitates a way that one can attend the event of 
one’s process of experience and examines the treatment of experience. Given that 
she has interpreted ‘suchness’ through performance, by referencing the 
development of meditation within the context of Kongwu, I refine the different results 
of meditation, suggesting the alternative understanding of the relationship between 
experience and temporality.  
 
When she walked the Chinese wall, Abramović found the title ‘Boat emptying, 
stream entering’ that referred to “these special states of mind” (Abramović in Wijers 
and Kamphof 1990: 302). She did not know where the reference was from, but she 
said:  
 
The title was: ‘Boat emptying, stream entering’. It is a very poetic title. It looks 
like a puzzle, but it has a lot of meaning for me. The ‘boat emptying’ means: 
you should go to the open sea, and there is a boat, full of ballast. The boat is 
your body. In order to be free, to be able to develop yourself, to be able to get 
connected to the flow of nature, you must throw the ballast out of the boat into 
the sea. Then the boat, your body, takes you there naturally. I am working 
with minerals in different forms to show the way of emptying our boat. This is 
the message, how to empty the boat. Our boat is too far full. 
 (Abramović in Wijers and Kamphof 1990: 302) 
 
To locate the reference within its context can help to understand Abramović's way of 
working and investigate the different implications. The metaphor of emptying the 
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boat comes from Daoist text Zhuangzi. To experience 'emptying the boat’, Zhuangzi 
developed the meditation, ‘sitting in forgetfulness’ and ‘fasting of mind-heart’. 
Zhuangzi developed the contemplative practice: xinzhai (⼼心齋) and zuowang (坐忘). 
Xinzhai in translation is ‘fasting of mind-heart’. Zuowang is ‘sitting in forgetfulness’. 
The Daoist practice aims to realise the state of xugi (虛⼰己), ‘the emptied self’, and 
seeing everything as equal without personal preferences. The metaphor, emptying 
the boat refers to the specific way of perceiving that is free from the conceptual 
ordering, without duality.   
Zhuangzi created a fictional conversation in which Confucius (孔⼦子) described 
to his disciple Yan Hui (顏回), how to practice the fasting of mind-heart,  
 
Unify your attention. Rather than listening with the ear, listen with the mind-
heart. Rather than listen with the mind-heart, listen with qi. Listening stops at 
the ear, the mind-heart stops at the matching [phenomena and thoughts]. As 
for qi, it is empty, waiting to be aroused by other things. Only if you achieve 
the state of emptiness, Dao can gather. Emptiness is the fasting of mind-
heart.  
(Zhuangzi and Graham 1981: 68; Chen 1999:126-31) 
 
Yan Hui responds that he never succeeded reaching the state of forgetting the self 
before receiving the teaching of the fasting of mind-heart. After this, suddenly he 
feels the dissolve of the self. He asked, “Would that be emptiness?” (Zhuangzi and 
Graham 1981:69). The fasting of mind-heart aims to achieve the mode of perception. 
The assumed separation of self and other dissolves. In the specific mode of 
perception, the observer disengages with the goal-oriented activities, and dis-
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identifies with concepts. Ears can only listen to the external audible sounds. Mind-
heart means the conceptual process that orders the sensory experiences, when one 
senses the matching phenomena such as sounds. ‘Listening with qi’ could refer to 
the way of experiencing that is ‘pure' in the sense that one disengages with the 
habits of differentiation and mental construction. ‘Qi’ (energy) in this case refers to 
the specific mode of experience that is nondual. Instead of catching or framing things 
by the conceptual construction, one is in the state of waiting without expectation, and 
awareness without selection.  
To dissolve the self, Zhuangzi offers the other practice, zuowang (坐忘), 
translated as sitting in forgetfulness. In another fictional dialogue between Confucius 
(孔⼦子) and his disciple Yan Hui (顏回), Yan Hui reports his learning progress. This 
time the disciple Yan Hui teaches sitting in forgetfulness to Confucius.  
 
“I make progress”  
“How so?” said Confucius.  
“I have forgotten about rites and music.” 
“Good. But you still have far to go”  
Another day Yan Hui saw Confucius again.  
“I make progress.” 
“How so?” 
“I have forgotten about Goodwill and Duty.” 
“Good. But you still have far to go.” 
Another day he saw Confucius again.  
“I make progress.” 
“How so?” 
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“I just sit and forget.”  
Confucius was taken aback.  
“What do you mean, just sit and forget?”  
“I let organs and physical structures drop away, dismiss eyesight and hearing, 
part from body-form, expel intellectual, and go along with the universal 
thorough fare. This is what I mean by “just sit and forget”.                     
(Zhuangzi and Graham 1981: 92; Chen 1999:216-9) 
 
The fundamental Confucian ways of organising the relationship between the self and 
the world is li (禮), meaning the social rituals. Rites and music as the crucial forms 
embody social ritual. Goodwill and Duty as the Confucian core guideline of morality 
are the internalised social judgments. To use the fictional story that Yan Hui forgot 
about all Confucian ways of living, Zhuangzi criticises the dominance and artificiality 
of Confucian social values and conventions.  
 
Even though Zhuangzi and Confucianism share the organic worldview of the 
qi field and the ideal goal of creating harmony with qi, Zhuangzi disagreed with 
Confucian's approach (Yang 1993). Zhuangzi proposed the practice of sitting in 
forgetfulness that was driven by his deep distrust of language and conceptual 
differentiation. By abandoning the conceptual structuring of things, Zhuangzi 
diminished the dualistic ordering of things and personal preferences. Through sitting 
in forgetfulness, the self is dissolving and expanding by becoming not-self. Sitting in 
forgetfulness generated “bodiless embodiment” (Wu 1993:393). According to Wu, 
bodiless is not disembodiment. Bodiless refers to the forgetfulness of the self and 
identity, and the deep distrust of the communicative function imposed on body and 
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the construction of body by the artificial rules such as Confucianism’s principle of the 
body behaviours (禮 , li; social rituals). Bodiless embodiment is the movement 
towards “non-selfconsciousness” (Wu 1993: 413) through dissolving the conceptual 
ordering of experiences and the boundary of the observer subject and object. 
Bodiless embodiment suggests the experience of ‘embodiment without the identity of 
self’ (which I articulate further in my research performance). The dynamics of 
disengagement-engagement is embodied in the contemplative practice. The 
conceptual structure creates the separation between self and other that results in the 
violence of differentiation. In the fasting of one's mind-heart and sitting in 
forgetfulness, one disengages dualistic ordering as the way of making sense of the 
world. 
In the Buddhism meditation, Samatha and vipasyana are two gates of 
perception to observe the ‘theatre-like’ construction of the reality, and illusion of 
continuity such as the concept of self, and time. The Buddhist meditation was called 
Samatha-vipasyana in Pali, zhiguan in Chinese, ‘just sitting’, mindfulness and 
insightful meditation in English. Samatha in Pali, or zhi in Chinese, means cessation. 
Samatha, cessation, has two meanings, namely, breaking the habit and 
concentration. One stops the meaning making, conceptualisation and the 
mechanism of the conventional reality in which the fictional being is constructed, and 
the provisional positioning operates. One stops the wondering mind, rests one’s 
attention in one single point without distraction, and maintains the awareness to 
cultivate the capacity of concentration. Vipasyana in Pali or quan in Chinese, means 
observation without habit of the conceptual ordering and identification. Vipasyana, 
observation without habit, means to cut through the illusion, to penetrate the 
appearance of phenomena, leading to the manifestation of the ultimate reality that 
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refers to the nondual perception, awareness without judgement. The observer 
applies the power of one-pointed concentration to scrutinize the Buddhist principles 
of things such as form as emptiness (Muller 2007: n.p.). If for the long period of 
practice, one follows the psychosomatic methods to still the thoughts and 
differentiations, one can achieve the mode of perception that is “conceptually 
unmediated awareness“ (Wallace 2000: 114). The “conceptually unstructured 
awareness” (Wallace 2000: 117) is what Suzuki referred to as Satori, a state of pure 
consciousness and enlightenment that John Cage also quoted often in his lectures 
and writings. The psychosomatic activities are the core foundation to achieve 
nondual perception. 
Even though there are differences between the Zhuangzi’s and Buddhism 
tradition of practices, they share the distrust of language and conceptual thinking. 
They both see that language has a communicative function and constitutes the ‘first 
truth’, the ‘conventional reality' in Nāgārjuna's term. The operation of the 
conventional reality is based on the dualistic thinking and differentiation inherently in 
the mental conceptualisation and representation. The world constructed by names 
and conventions is provisional positioning without any absolute essence. The 
contention leads to a challenge of the realness of the common sense reality. The 
conventional reality has nothing wrong with its communicative function. However, it 
becomes a problem when one has the emotional investment and the feeling 
associated with the indicators. That is what attachment means. The chain of 
thoughts multiplies the emotional association and investment. Nevertheless, things 
never remain in the same condition as what thought and concept indicated. For 
example, when one says ‘now’, using the linguistic label to point to the things and 
situation, ‘now’ is already past. This is the root of suffering. The spiritual practice, 
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being free from suffering refers to experiencing the world by disengaging with the 
dualistic indicators. 
 
The problem that meditation aims to solve is the persistent habit that one 
identifies with, the result of the habitual way of experiencing, and engaging with 
conceptual differentiation and ordering. The reason that Kongwu considers it to be 
the problem is only because we have the tendency to create emotional association 
and to experience in a way mediated by the dualistic ordering. The tendency creates 
suffering if one cannot fulfil the direction of the desires driven by the chain effects. 
Meditation cultivates the nondual experience, not just on the level of the conventional 
reality. Through disrupting the habit, unlearning and relearning the specific mode of 
perception, one sees no hierarchy between the conventional and ultimate reality in 
Nāgārjuna’s term, and Dao and not-Dao. Meditation, grounded on the embodied 
experience cultivates the nonduality of transcendence and everyday. This is also 
why emptiness is form, and form is emptiness, the verse from Heart Sutra, and a 
motif that Abramović́ has constructed her version of suchness.  
Based on the analysis of time from Kongwu’s perspective discussed in the 
previous chapter, the language creates the illusion of continuity, that is called time. 
Past is only the memory that one recalls, and future is the expectation. In relation to 
past and future, present becomes. The present is the temporal indicator that one 
used to describe the relationship between the subject and the object. We take the 
relationship between object and subject as something real with self-existence. 
Naming the relationship by time and other associated labels triggered the associated 
feelings and emotions that have effect on the next actions, emotions and feelings, 
and simulates the sense of real.  
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The fundamental problem of time is the assumption that there is a subject, 
and on the other end, there is an object. If one is exploring what ‘being here and 
now’ means, according to Kongwu logic, there is not even ‘the self’ who is 
experiencing here and now. If saying ‘I am here and now’, there is still a relationship 
that one describes between the subject and the object. There is still a habit that one 
takes the relationship between the subject and the object, as something that 
substantially exists out there. 
 
When one is in the meditative mind, time ceases to exist, because one sees 
that time is an accumulation of concepts, experiences, values, and the personal 
conditions and contexts are being taken as a measurable entity (absolute time) in 
which events take place. Time is like the medium in which experiences take place. 
One sees how the illusion of continuity is being created. The version of ‘being here 
and now’ in Kongwu refers to this kind of counter-intuitive understanding. 
Furthermore, one understands that the illusion of continuity comes from the rooted 
problem—the assumption of the subject and object. Not only the concept of time, but 
also the concept of self is the illusion of continuity. The diverse use of meditation into 
performance raises the question: how far can we push the limit of language and its 
relationship to embodiment?   
 
For Kongwu, if there is a self who is experiencing ‘being here and now’, it is 
not ‘being here and now’, but living in the past and the future. The illusion of 
continuity remains to exist. How self becomes self, has the same mechanism as how 
time becomes time. If there is still an identity present, being here and now is a 
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consequence of experiencing from the assumed fixed position, and that one takes 
the description of the relationship between self and event as real.  
Abramović’s The Artist is Present implies that being here and now becomes 
the source for the identity of self. There is an operation of taking the accumulated 
experiences as the identity of self. Her ‘being here and now’, represents the result 
that the self, being the assumed referencing point establishes the relationship 
between the subject and object. The identification strengthens the experiences of 
self, and the separation of the fixed subject and object. The very experience of being 
here and now amplified the experience of self. In her version of ‘no-thinking mind’, 
there is a self who empties the thoughts. Her version of ‘being here and now’ 
enhances the self. If so, the effect is exactly what Nāgārjuna challenged when he 
examined the concept of self.   
 
 
3.3 Dis-identifying with the Description of Experiences: The Research 
Performance … is Present 
 
The performance … is Present articulates the effects of treating experience in 
relation to identity and maps a maps a trajectory of Kongwu’s incorporation into 
performance art, using Nāgārjuna’s and Zhuangzi’s principles. Consequently, my 
work critiques the implication of The Artist is Present. The research performance … 
is Present, by creating a dialogue between the ‘real’ performer and the Television 
(TV) performer, demonstrates how one does not identify with the content of the TV 
programming, and simultaneously how the identity of the performer is dissolved. The 
performance elaborates on the concept of the meditative mind from Kongwu’s 
145 
perspective. Using the circulation between two modes of the performer, … is Present 
reveals how the unified self is dispersed through a dynamic of identification and dis-
identification. In this way, … is Present undermines the production of the self that 
results from one’s identifying with the embodied experience, specifically ‘being here 
and now’. Given this dynamic, … is Present elaborates a process from The Artist is 
Present to … is Present. The subject is left to uncertainty. My work argues the 
impossibility to assembling a unified self by appropriating the meditative experience 
and cultivating being here and now via performance techniques. 
 
 
3.1 I-Lien Ho, …is Present, the snapshot from the video documentation 
 
In the beginning of the performance, the ‘real’ performer assumes the self has 
more real presence than the TV because of being with spectators in the flesh-to-
flesh condition. She attacks the TV performer by reason of the fact that the body is 
not ‘here’, in the same room with the spectators. The TV is just a machine playing 
content that is the result of some electronic transmission and so cannot be the 
performer. The ‘real’ performer claimed the singular ‘realness’ of being a performer, 
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and challenges the TV performer for not really being a performer at all, but an 
aggregation of those electronic lights and sounds. When the real performer 
challenges the ‘realness’ of the TV performer’s identity, the real performer also 
challenges the underlying assumption for building the realness of being a ‘real’ 
performer.   
 
  To examine what assumption the identity is established on, let us look at two 
ways of watching the TV. Watching with dis-identification with content is how the 
‘real’ performer attacks that the TV is not really a performer. If one does not identify 
with the content that the TV plays, the identity of TV performer does not come to the 
attention. The physicality of the TV becomes the foreground of attention. The 
received sounds and lights from the electronic transmission are never being 
appropriated into a unity. In this sense, the identity of the TV performer does not 
occur. What one experiences is the physicality of the TV set: a silver stand, a flat 
surface, a machine plugged into the socket, and flashing lights and sounds as the 
result of electronic signal transmission.    
The other way of watching is similar to how we watch TV everyday. If one 
identifies with the content that the TV plays, one perceives the electronic sounds and 
lights, as there is a performer inside the TV. The physicality and the electronic 
mechanism of TV are in the background of attention. As mentioned before, Zhuangzi 
discussed three ways of listening to explain ‘fasting of the mind-heart’. Listening with 
the mind-heart is a habit that one constantly matches the external audible sounds 
(the result of “listening with the ear”) and the thoughts. Fasting of the mind-heart 
means to stop the habit of matching phenomena and thoughts, and ordering the 
sensory experiences. “Listening with qi” as a metaphor, describes that one 
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experience without grasping the experiences as a unity, and stops any mental 
fabrication. When one watches TV, one matches the received sounds and lights, and 
the chains of concepts. Therefore, one identifies a performer being inside the TV. In 
this approach, the contents of experiences become the evidence of the identity of the 
performer inside the TV. Through interpretation, identification, and mental 
fabrication, the perceived sensory experiences become the identity of the TV 
performer.  
 
The TV performer does not simply mimic the contents that the ‘real’ performer 
performed in the opening of the performance, but mimickes the logic that the ‘real’ 
performer used to strengthen her experience of self. The ‘real’ performer dismissed 
the identity of the TV’s performer by dis-identifying with the content that the TV plays. 
But established the identity of a performer by identifying with the content that she 
plays as real. Given two treatments of experiences, the TV performer extends the 
two ways of watching the TV to undermine how the ‘real’ performer established the 
realness of being a performer.  
The reason that the ‘real’ performer asserted to being more real, is because 
she identifies with the scripted content that she plays, and takes the experience as 
evidence and the property of self. Nonetheless, the description of the experience is 
only the outcome that the subject describes, in the relationship between self and 
other. Then one mistakes the relationship between self and other as the source of 
the independent being. This is how the ‘realness’ of the ‘real’ performer is 
established. The TV performer exposed the assumption that the real performer used. 
The exact logic that the real performer used to challenge the identity of the TV 
performer undermines the promise of the ‘realness’ of being a performer. This way of 
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dismissing the identity of the TV performer can serve to dissolve the real performer’s 
identity. The contents that the TV plays are electronic lights and sounds. The 
contents that the ‘real’ performer plays are the scripted words, movements and 
whatever experiences happen there. In this way, how the realness of the ‘real’ 
performer’s being and identity is claimed, is not so different from the TV performer. 
Both of them are becoming real and not so real in the same degree. Without 
identifying with the contents, the identity of being cannot be determined. Without 
mental fabrication, matching experiences and thoughts, the identity of being cannot 
even exist. 
The identification refers to the fact that the receiver receives whatever 
sensory information, and initiates the intimate whispering between experiences and 
thoughts. One is naming the perceived experiences. The receiver is feeling the effect 
of the TV’s sounds and lights. The sounds are perceived as speech, matching the 
familiar words. Colour, light and shadow are organised as the familiar visual form, a 
human figure. The intimate whispering between thoughts and sensory experiences 
assembles a product: the identity of the performer. So, if the viewer is watching the 
TV with the mind-heart, the viewer creates the presence of the performer by 
matching thoughts and sensory experiences and identifying with the contents that 
the TV plays. When one treats the corporeal experiences with identification, one 
designs the aggregate of experiences, concepts, and values into the identity. 
This approach of using TV and video that is the electronic technology of 
representation, does not seduce the habitual way of perceiving, but suspend the 
identification, a habit taken for granted. The electronic technology does not point to 
the contents, but the functioning of experiencing. As McLuhan said, “the media is the 
message” (McLuhan 1967), suggesting that technology is the extension of the 
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human’s body and mind, we can also use technology the other way round, outside-in 
approach, to retrace steps to the inner logic of experience. Video as the external 
eyes helps to expand more in the third-person perspective. TV helps to see 
something far away in the distance. To reverse this logic, technology benefits to 
externalise the inner perceptual pattern for investigation. Meditation is a means of 
seeing from inside. Meditation shifted the attention from the contents of experiences 
to the functioning of experiencing, the processing itself. To make video work in this 
way, we can explore how experiences become the experiences we thought them to 
be, and how the process of experience becomes the experience of self. When the 
viewer is seeing, the act of seeing forces the experience to be the property of the 
entity. As the looping result, we can have the definite position and presence of 
something, appearing, something out there. The way of using the TV video, either 
live-feed or not here3, externalises the inner perceptual process, and the recycling 
logic between TV and the ‘real’ performer becomes an allegory of how we habitually 
experience the self, and how we can break away from the habit.  
The ‘real’ performer appropriated the experience: ‘being here and now’, 
sharing the same place, and the flesh-to-flesh communication with the spectator, and 
so asserted, “I am the performer, not you” to the TV performer. The TV performer 
                                                
3 I made this performance twice, one with live-feed, and the other with the recorded 
video. In this case, it does not matter whether it is live-feed or not, because what 
matters is the response to what happens when one encounters the circulation 
between the performers and the spectators, and how the viewers who carry the 
personal histories and contexts, treat the content of the experiences make the effect 
of the identity.  
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recycled the ‘real’ performer’s treatment of the contents that the TV plays and so dis-
identified with the contents that the ‘real’ performer performed. When the 
identification was suspended, the content of experiences could not be appropriated 
as the evidence of identity. The identities of the ‘real’ performer and the TV 
performer were negated by their conversation. The ‘real’ performer gradually dis-
identified with the content of experiences that she felt by exchanging gazes, 
occupying the same room with the spectators, acknowledging each other’s 
presence. One could not take the feeling of ‘more’ direct flesh-to-flesh 
communication as the stronger evidence of being more ‘real’. When the identities of 
two performers are dissolving, how can the spectator’s identity still exist?  
That a performer can be the performer is because of the content that one 
performs. Just like the ‘real’ performer can be a performer only because of the 
content, the scripted movements, and the performed interaction. The identity of 
being a spectator is only possible because of the contents of the performance. Being 
a performer and spectator function in a way to support the conventional roles of 
being watched, and watching, and to circulate the rules of the interaction and 
agreement. Then, in the circulation of being watched and watching, the identity of the 
performance, and artwork is established. When the identity of the performer is 
dissolving, how can the identity of the spectator still be possible? When one dis-
identifies with the contents that the performer plays, how can the identity of the 
performance work exist? How can one still take the contents of the experiences as 
something being contained in the performance, to identify the performance?   
The TV externalises the content and form of the experiences, and helps to 
articulate the habit of experiences, so stopping the habit can be possible. The habit 
of grasping, forces the contents of experiences to become the properties of 
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something appearing out there. The habit of matching experiences and thoughts, 
arranges the sensory experiences conceptually. The separation of object and 
subject, being the underlying assumption shapes how experiences become the 
experiences.  
 
The way of using video in … is Present is distinct from Abramović’s approach 
to video. Abramović said:  
 
“Until the 1980s I used the video purely as a means of documentation, a way 
of recording my performances. In 1983, Ulay and I went to Thailand and made 
a video called City of Angels where we took the role of directors and used 
color for the first time.” 
(Abramović in Biesenbach 2010: 95) 
 
City of Angel was the first work that they made for video and TV beyond the pure 
documentation. In the 1990s, the series of performances in which Abramović 
washed a skeleton with the brush and soap water was transformed into a five-
channel installation, Cleaning the Mirror I (1995). Each of five vertically stacked 
monitors played the fragmented part of the skeleton: the skull, ribs, pelvis, hands, 
and feet (Iles 1998: 194). In Balkan Baroque (1997), the artist performed the 
mourning of the war in Yugoslavia. The artist washed the bones for several hours 
with the metal brush. The three-channel video of Abramović’s father, mother and her 
lecture about catching rats, was projected on the wall, when she washed the bones 
and cleansed the shame. In short, the video typically served as the content provider 
device in her approach of using video.  
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In Abramović’s narrative, because the possibility of video is restricted to the 
function of documentation and representation, she considered that video was “the 
second-rated document”, “better than the photographs or slides, but could never 
replace the live presence” (Abramović in Biesenbach 2010: 95). Craving for “the live 
presence”, she did not exclude theatrical elements, but preferred “performance art” 
over “theatre”. She defined theatre as “a space of making belief” and “fake”(in the 
Marina Abramović Institute website). Abramović’s view on photographs and video as 
the secondary because of being less ‘real’ exemplify a “reductive binary opposition of 
the live and the mediatized” (Auslander 2008:3). For Abramović, ‘performance art’ 
and ‘physical body’ can promise the ‘liveness’ and immediacy that other arts and 
media cannot achieve. Abramović used performance art to establish a ground for the 
‘real’ and make connection with reality. The human body and performance art 
occupy the preferred value to stimulate the experience of presence and time.  
 My use of video does not have the agonistic dynamics between the ‘live’ 
(human body) and the ‘mediatized’ (video, photography) which operate in 
Abramović’s narrative. Auslander interrogated the perception of the “oppositional 
relationship between the live and the mediatized” (2008: 4). He deconstructed the 
assumed opposition between the live and mediatized, as “ontological differences” 
(2008:7), and argued the opposition between the live and mediatized as “determined 
by cultural and historical contingencies”(2008:11). My juxtaposition of the ‘physical’ 
and the mediated body unsettles the reductive opposition. The video and theatre that 
my research performance used are, in Abramović’s narrative, at the end of the 
corrupted, with the least value. Nonetheless, the habit of identification can happen 
with the use of video and body as the medium for artistic production. How one value 
is over the other is more interesting. The different approaches to video implied the 
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different treatments of experience to push the exploration of temporality and 
embodiment, causing the different versions of being here and now.   
The intermediality produced by the juxtaposition of the ‘real’ and the 
mediatized performer in … is Present introduces indeterminacy. This is different from 
Auslander’s view on intermediality. Auslander used the example of dance 
performance Pôles by Pps Danse of Montreal to suggest that in an intermedial 
performance, both the weak (the live “body) and strong medium (digital) “are 
assimilated to the dominant medium” (Auslander 2000: 9).  His view on putting the 
two different modes of ‘being’ together, shows that the weak media is incorporated 
into the strong media (Auslander 2000:5-11). However, my use of two different 
modes of ‘being’ resonates with Paik’s approach to media, particularly in Real 
Fish/Live Fish discussed in Chapter One. The co-presencing of two modes of ‘being’ 
questions the process of perceiving and the mechanism of identification that bring 
the ‘being’ of thing into presence. The intermediality creates ambivalence in the 
dynamic of different media and positions. The performance … is Present creates a 
unlocalisable situation in which one cannot decide ‘what’ the ‘presence’ could be, but 
acknowledges that the ‘being’ comes into presence as ‘the felt’ conditioned by the 
past experiences and the moment of encountering.  
This juxtaposition makes the representation reflect itself, and makes 
perception reflect its process of perceiving and functioning of transmission. The 
functioning of perceiving (humans) and of the transmission (the electronic video 
device) reminds each other’s ‘already-there’: the particular way of perceiving 
conditioned by the past experience and historical development. This approach to the 
intermedia connects to Paik’s attitude towards the ontology of music. In “New 
Ontology of Music” (Paik 1974: n.p), he shifts the question from what music is to 
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when music is, and aims to “develop[ed] and exploit[ed]” this question in his “post 
music”, which is his television experiment (Paik 1974: n.p). Paik expands John 
Cage’s indeterminacy in music to visual arts. Cage transfers Zen philosophy to 
music. Higgins suggested that Cage “explored the intermedia between music and 
philosophy (Higgins [1965] 2001:50). Even though Cage and Abramović both 
engage with Buddhism philosophy, they have the very distinct approach to process 
and self. As discussed in Chapter Two, Cage introduced indeterminacy by the 
chance operation to remove the artist’s ego-self. In The Artist is Present, Abramović 
exploited the ‘no-thinking mind’ to pursue the need for “presentness” and an “endless 
present of self” (Cavelle 1979:22) through the embodied process.  
In this particular context of performance practice, there is a “remediation” 
(Bolter and Grusin 2000) between different media, philosophy, music, video and 
theatre, which creates a network of “intermedia” (Higgins [1965] 2001). The 
intermedia imply the indeterminacy concerning the boundary (inside/outside, 
self/other). The intermediality in my performance does not support Auslander’s 
intermediality. He used the example of the juxtaposition of the live and the 
mediatized (Auslander 2000:5-11; 2008: 42-3) to suggest a more deterministic view. 
Both the strong medium and weak are “assimilated to the dominant medium” 
(Auslander 2000: 9). Even though my performance supports Auslander’s resistance 
of the ontological differences between the live and the mediatized, my performance 
suggests that the intermediality introduces the indeterminacy. 
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3.2 I-Lien Ho, … is Present, the snapshot from the video documentation 
 
Content, generated in the dialogue and the situation of the theatre is the device to 
trace the functioning of experience. To create the recycling of the identification and 
dis-identification suspends the habit that one speculates the identity as something 
out there with the definite presence and position. When the ‘real’ performer started 
the dis-identification with the contents, she still tried to localise where the self is. Yet 
she could not achieve. Wherever she localised the self, the TV performer responded 
with the exact opposite. The play of ‘A’ and ‘not-A’ in the conversation dissolved any 
certainty that the temporal and spatial markers can promise. The final line, “ …just 
here” suggests that the described relationship between self and environment by 
temporal or spatial concepts cannot be established because of any fixed reference, 
like the identity of self cannot be found. Any point of view is unsettled. The self 
cannot be placed as something out there. The figure of the ‘real’ performer is fading 
into darkness. The stage leaves the sounds of the breathing, and the empty screen 
of the TV. The content is emptied. What is left is just the process of transmission.  
156 
In “THE HUMAN NATURE OF THE BOT: a response to Philip Auslander” 
concerning the issue of liveness, Herbert Blau raised the question, whether a 
performance is “a specifically human activity” (2002:23). It is precisely that the bot 
can mimic “the specifically human activity” very well, so we receive the bot’s 
performance as ‘being lively”(Blau 2002:23). Blau observes that the notion of 
liveness shifts “from being alive to being lively” (Blau 2002:23). “Being alive” implies 
a quality that a performer has. “Being lively” implies a quality that audiences feel in 
and through performance. The shift “from being alive to being lively” suggests that a 
performer can be “dead or alive” (Blau 2002:23), a machine, a bot, or a genuine 
human being. In shifting “from the ontological to the temporal”, the notion of liveness 
means “a relationship of simultaneity”, that is, “an event in real time that can be 
watched as it occurs” (Blau 2002:23). From Kongwu perspective, whatever we define 
liveness as the ontological or temporal, what is shared between the two is a habit of 
identification.  
The identification forces the contents of experiences to become the properties 
of something appearing out there, which can be the identity of a performer or a 
performance. For example, the activities that a bot performs trigger our identification, 
an intimate whispering between the digital and visual information and our concepts 
of ‘being a human’ or ‘the activities that a human being does’. As the result, we feel 
that the bot’s performance is “being lively”. Because of the identification, we produce 
the ‘being’ of a performer and the identity of a performance for ourselves as the 
audiences. The debate between Auslander and Blau exposes a fundamental 
assumption, the separation of subject and object that makes the concept of liveness 
possible. The debate implies that liveness is a result of an anthropocentric ordering 
of events.  
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Through the habit of identification, we call a specific “relationship of 
simultaneity” (Blau 2002:23) as ‘liveness’ and attribute the felt relationship between 
the subject and object as the quality that a performer or a performance has. We 
force the specific relationship between the subject and object as the properties and 
‘being’ of the event. If we follow the logic of Kongwu, the presence is a product of a 
particular way of perceiving. The habit of identification produces the ‘presence’ of a 
performer and a performance for the perceiver. We often localise the ‘presence’ in a 
performer or a performance. The desire to localise the presence needs the temporal 
and spatial markers such as ‘here and now’, which implies a localisable self. If we 
dissolve the fundamental assumption of liveness, such as the separation of the 
subject and object, can the concept of liveness still be possible?   
The identification forces the entity to have the distinct characteristic. The 
identification is how the self brings the observed object, as well as the identity of the 
subject to have the presence. This logic, in fact, is how the TV performer attacks 
back at the real performer. As the ‘real’ performer denied the contents that the TV 
plays to dismiss the TV performer existing, the sense of being a performer could not 
even exist. The identification is how the subject and object become what one thinks 
them to be, and assigns the identity to the bundle of experiences. Drawing from 
bodiless embodiment, Wu’s interpretation of Zhuangzi, and Nāgārjuna’s examination 
of self, and following Zhuangzi’s logic of listening without the habit of matching 
experiences and thoughts, the line “… just here” that two performers repeated at the 
end suggested ‘embodiment without identity’, and ‘experience without the 
experiencer’. This is also why the performance is entitled … is Present, countering 
Abramović’s The Artist is Present by erasing the subject, The Artist.  
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Kongwu’s understanding of being here and now undermines any attempt to 
exploit the meditative experience to amplify the sense of self. Nāgārjuna’s 
examination of the self is useful to understanding the danger of using the meditative 
experience, in the name of emptiness, to enhance the experience of the self. In 
Abramović’s narrative, the very experience of embodiment and process, particularly 
the meditative experience of being here and now has been taken as the foundation 
for establishing of the ‘other’ and has enabled Abramović’s to critique “our Western 
culture”, particularly the Western experience of time (Abramović in Wijer and 
Kamphof 1990:308). Abramović’s construction of suchness and the no-thinking mind 
is complicit with the dualistic ordering of experiences and the essentializing of ‘East’ 
and ‘West’. In fact, it is the exact mechanism that produces the dynamic of closeness 
and distance and consequently, delivers the presence of “The Artist”. The desire to 
overcome the default separation in Abramović’s narrative amplifies the identity of the 
self. Thus, the theatricality of being here and now in The Artist is Present is 
performed. The more the volume of being here and now is amplified, the more 
present the self (and the other) becomes.  
 
 As concerns Nāgārjuna’s and Zhuangzi’s principles, the concept of the 
meditative mind refers to the process by which the identity of the subject is dispersed 
and the self is unable to be localised by any temporal and spatial markers. My 
performance offers a definition of being-here-and-now that differs from Abramović’s 
version, and demonstrates a process of dis-identification from The Artist is Present 
to … is Present. In the process, the subject is un-localisable. When identification is 
suspended, one stops building the home of the self. When assembly of the self via 
the accumulation of experiences ceases, the meditative mind emerges. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Kongwu, what the meditative mind refers to is that when identification with the 
contents of experience is suspended, the identity of self/other as the illusion of 
continuity cannot be established. One does not appropriate the embodied 
experience as the source to set up the self/other. Abramović’s version of no-thinking 
mind seduces the identification. The very primacy of process and embodiment, 
particularly ‘being here and now’, becomes the way to set up the other and secure a 
unified subject as the centre of experience. The performance … is Present 
articulated a circulation of how the presumed dualistic values were undone, when 
one dis-identified with the contents of experience. To emphasise the process of 
experience and embodiment does not lead to the metaphysical speculation of the 
identity of the subject as the centre of the experience.  
The concepts of self and time are the two illusions of continuity, and the 
fundamental conceptual blocks to order experiences. Through the meditation, the 
practitioner directs the attention away from the content of experiences, but to the 
process of experience itself. Therefore, one sees the looping process of how the self 
is generated by the habit of identification, and the self produces the associations to 
assure the identity of self. The self is producing experiences, and the looping effect. 
The self is producer and the product of this habitual pattern. The meditation suggests 
that one realises that self is the experience. There is not any separation between self 
and experience. The liberation refers to the capacity for breaking from the looping 
effect, and experiencing without the habit of identification. The meditation suggests a 
way of observing: instead of finding a true authentic version of self from inside, one 
realises that the self cannot be found. What can be found is only experience.  
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  The illusion of continuity is the belief we make in every moment of breathing. 
By the concepts of time and self, we perform the transformation of life, and believe in 
self or nonself, emptiness or non-emptiness, and either the present now, or the 
future hope. Making belief is a habit of longing, grasping experiences, and investing 
emotions to increase the theatrical volume of the realness. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Performance can alter habitual patterns of perceiving. On the other hand, it can 
break these patterns and expand the potentiality of experience by reflecting how we 
use such fundamental elements as the concepts of time and self to build a ‘reality’ 
with which we engage. The integration of Kongwu into performance raises the 
question of how the present becomes ‘the present’, how experiences become ‘the’ 
experience, and what 'being-here-and-now' and the ‘meditative mind’ mean, 
particularly as concerns the relationship between the process of embodiment and 
identity. 
 
In reconsidering the looping effect that language forms, Kongwu suggests a 
spatial organisation that unsettles the position of the observer. The observer's self, 
the 'I', is dispersed through the multiple perspectives in ink landscape painting and 
by the orchestration of gazes by the multiple closed circuits in Poem without 
Language. The traceless writing of Chinese calligraphy on water in Poem without 
Language echoes Zhuangzi’s linguistic strategies and resonates with Paik’s 
approach to media. When the expected function of writing is disrupted, the writing 
becomes traceless and the act of writing itself comes to the forefront. Paik empties 
the contents and disrupts the expected function of media. In so doing, he shifts the 
viewer’s attention from the message to the mechanism by which the media produces 
and transmits the message.  
Kongwu’s distrust of language suggests not only a different approach to 
spatial organisation, but also the approach to media, akin to the principles of 
meditation. We can use media not only to evoke our habitual way of perceiving, but 
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to trace the functioning of experience and, subsequently, stop the habit. In the TV 
Buddha series, Paik used closed circuits to investigate the act of viewing. In Poem 
without Language, the orchestra of gazes creates multiple perspectives that remind 
us of the looping effect, that is, that what we see is the result of selective seeing, and 
forces one camera to look at the result of its viewing, a projection on the wall, which 
generates an endless doubling; the camera’s eyes contemplate their own 
functioning. Poem without Language, thus, exploits the convenience of technology, 
which serves as an extension of the human body and mind, as suggested by 
McLuhan (1967). As an outside-in approach to perception, technology externalises 
inner perceptual patterns, retracing our process of experiencing. Likewise, 
meditation shifts attention away from the content of experience, to the process of 
experience itself. A similar refocusing occurs when Kongwu migrates into 
performance practice; the observational techniques that are key to meditation 
become integral to the observational functions performed by electronic devices.   
Flesh-to-flesh and flesh-to-machine communication is not so different, if we 
consider how the mechanism of identification comes into play. In performance 
installations, electronic technologies imitate our methods of perceiving, evoke 
associated concepts, and trigger emotive influences. This chain reaction creates a 
sense of the real. In the loop, things become things, time becomes time, and the 
identity of the self and other emerge. The act of perceiving creates the real. In Paik’s 
Real Fish/Live Fish, the “real fish” swims in a closed circuit of languages and 
symbols. The “live fish” swims in an electronic flow of TV and camera. The two fish 
are swimming in the closed circuit, and the 'being' of the observed is the result of 
selective seeing with differentiation. Both the “real” and “live fish” swim in the 
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identification mechanism; the observer identifies with the pointers and creates 
associated emotions and feelings.  
In the performance, … is Present, the conversation between the real and the 
TV performer creates a recycling of identification and dis-identification. The TV 
performer mimics not only the actions of the 'real' performer, but the logic of 
experiencing that the 'real' performer uses to amplify the experience of the self. The 
juxtaposition of two types of performers in … is Present undermines Abramović’s 
narrative, in which the human body and performance art are prioritized over video 
and theatre, thereby stimulating "the live presence" that characterizes Abramović’s 
work (Abramović in Biesenbach 2010:95). The habit of identification can happen with 
the use of video and body as media for artistic practices. The conjunction of ‘real’ 
and mediatised modes of performance shows how experiences become the 
experience we thought them to be and how the act of seeing forces our experiences 
to be the property of an entity in a defined position, that is, to bring things into 
presence for us. The recycling logic implied in the relationship between the TV and 
the 'real' performer in the performance … is Present becomes an allegory for how we 
habitually experience the self and reveals how we can suspend the habit of 
identification.  
 
Performance often emphasises the quality of being in the present and the 
primacy of experience. For Cage, when one listens to sounds without musical 
language and without referencing past accumulations, the sounds "come into being 
of themselves" (Cage 1961:70). This is precisely because one has the "discipline" 
(Cage in Kaye 1996: 19) to listen to sounds without the mediating functions of "like 
and dislike" (Cage 1961:133). Cage's operation of silence invites the listener to listen 
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to sounds without the past. This is possible because one has the capacity to 'return 
to the present', a phrase popularly used in discussions of Chan/Zen philosophy.  
My work, One Street, Three Persons, Different Narratives, and Different 
Memories reconsiders our experience of 'time' as an illusion of continuity and, 
furthermore, exposes the production of 'now'. In the installations, the conjunction of 
the three persons’ versions of 'the present' and 'the past' reveals how the concepts 
of past and present need each other to operate and reconsiders how the act of 
experiencing consolidates many potentials into 'the present’. The present is the 
accumulation of past, already-there concepts and experiences. In other words, we 
habitually make the present become the past. ‘Experience’ is the result of ordering, 
of positioning the observer as the centre, using language and concepts, and of 
determining what can be included in the boundaries of perception. 
 
For Kongwu, 'the return to the present' does not mean that one can localise 
'nowness' if one experiences in 'this' way, according to Buddhist or Daoist wisdom. 
However, by retracing the production of ‘now', we can exhaust the affective 
influences triggered by the accumulation of the past and such dualistic pairs as likes 
and dislikes, as well as our responses to such influence. ‘The return to the present’ 
refers to a process of exposing the construction of the ‘now’ and thereby, opening up 
endless potentialities.  
That time never arrives means that time is not a medium 'in' which events 
take place. In other words, we cannot locate an event's being in time. Subsequently, 
Kongwu's attitude towards time questions the emphasis habitually placed on 'being 
here and now' and the process of embodiment, particularly the tendency to perceive 
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that the very experience of being present contributes to identity-self formation in 
performance.   
The title of Abramović's The Artist is Present implicitly describes the 
experience of the no-thinking mind as it induces identification and suggests identity 
is necessary to make the experience of being here and now possible. Abramović's 
version of being here and now enhances the presence of the self. The very 
experience of process and embodiment – specifically, the meditative experience – 
serves to set up the other and localise a unified subject as the centre of experience. 
Abramović's construction of suchness is, thus, complicit with the dualistic ordering of 
experiences.  
Responding to Abramović's construction of suchness, the performance … is 
Present articulates a different version of being here and now and a meditative mind 
that refers to 'embodiment without identity' and 'experiences without experiencer'. 
The performance … is Present defines the meditative mind as one that results from 
the suspension of identification, when identity ceases to exist. The primacy of 
process and embodiment neither induce identification, nor enhance the identity of 
the self. In other words, Kongwu’s version of being here and now exhausts the 
temporal and spatial indicators that localise the 'self'. The performance ... is 
Performance erases the subject The Artist and maps out a trajectory of Kongwu 
derived from Nāgārjuna's and Zhuangzi's principles. The performance critiques 
Abramović's version of being here and now and suggests a different understanding 
of the meditative mind in relation to identity.  
 
Kongwu and its relationship to performance suggest an attitude, a way of 
experiencing and conducting attention, whereby the looping effect of language is 
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disrupted, time never arrives, and the mechanism of identification is suspended. 
Kongwu’s incorporation into performance invites reconsideration of Buddhist and 
Daoist understandings of 'the return to the present' and 'living in the present' and 
questions the validity of the 'experience' and 'present' that we consider to result from 
dualistic ordering. Moreover, it challenges the 'relations' constructed by dualistic 
positionings of the self/other and before/after. The boundary of attention determines 
what is included and excluded in our experiences. That experience is what can be 
noticed suggests the observer in the observed and the constant interaction of the 
observer and the object of the perception. What Kongwu conducts is not a lifting of 
spirit, a salvation, but a loop of mindfulness: “observing the body in the body, 
observing the feelings in the feelings, and observing the mind in the mind” (Hanh 
2006:132). The loop, hence, fosters realisation that an observer may become a 
participant (Hanh 2006:132). By taking notice of the enclosed circuit of language and 
symbols, one discovers the many potentialities made available by releasing one’s 
mind from the constraints of identification and selection. In becoming more aware of 
the identification mechanism that fosters emotive investment, stimulates affective 
influence and value judgments, and triggers active responses, one can, thus, also 
disrupt the habit that makes one play in the river of time and perform the theatre of 
the self in the architecture of reality.   
 
 
 
 
 
167 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Abbemuseum, Stedelijk Van, and Kölnischer Kunstverein. 1985. Modus Vivendi: Ulay & 
Marina Abramović, 1980-1985. Stedelijk Van Abbemuseum. 
Abramović, Marina. 2001. Marina Abramović: Public Body: Installation and Objects, 
1965-2001. Charta. 
--. 2004. Marina Abramović: Student Body. Charta. 
--. 1995. Marina Abramović: Cleaning the House. New York: Academy Eds. 
--. 2010. Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present. New York: Museum of Modern Art. 
--. 2011. “Marina Abramović - A Conversation.” Retrieved January 23, 2014 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iIL7stvnvBs&feature=youtube_gdata_player). 
--. 2013a. “Experimenting on Consciousness, Through Art.” NPR.org. Retrieved January 
23, 2014 (http://www.npr.org/2013/08/16/212613891/experimenting-on-
consciousness-through-art). 
--. 2013b. “What Is Performing Art?” MAI - Marina Abramović Institute. Retrieved 
February 13, 2014 (http://www.marinaAbramovićinstitute.org/mai/mai/3). 
Abramović, Marina, Velimir Abramović, and Kunstmuseum Bern. 1998. Marina 
Abramović: Artist Body: Performances 1969-1998. Edizioni Charta. 
Abramović, Marina, and Ulay. 1980. “That Self.” Netherlands Media Art Institue (LIMA) 
Catalogue.Retrieved 
(http://catalogue.nimk.nl/site/?page=%2Fsite%2Fartist.php%3Fid%3D3). 
Auslander, Philip. 2000. “Liveness, Mediatization, and Intermedial Performance.” Degrés: 
Revue de synthèse à orientation sémiologique No.101(Spring). Retrieved August 14, 
2014 (http://lmc.gatech.edu/~auslander/publications/liveness.pdf). 
168 
Auslander, Philip. 2008. Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture. London; New 
York: Routledge. 
Avedon, John F. 1980. An Interview With the Dalai Lama. Littlebird Pubns. 
Baas, Jacquelynn. 2005. Smile of the Buddha: Eastern Philosophy and Western Art from 
Monet to Today. 1st ed. University of California Press. 
Baas, Jacquelynn, and Mary Jane Jacob. 2004. Buddha Mind in Contemporary Art. 1st 
ed. University of California Press. 
Barad, Karen. 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke University Press Books. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1999. Illuminations. London: Pimlico. 
Berger, Douglas. 2005. “Nāgārjuna.” Retrieved September 20, 2011 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/nagarjun/). 
Berman, Muchael. 1997. “Time and Emptiness in the Chao-Lun.” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 24(1):43–58. 
Bernstein, David W. 2002. “Cage and High Modernism.” in The Cambridge Companion to 
John Cage, edited by David Nicholls. Cambridge University Press. 
Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London; New York: Routledge. 
Biesenbach, Klaus. 2010. “Interview with Marina Abramović.” Pp. 92–98 in Back to 
Simplicity: Marina Abramović. Luciana Brito Galeria. 
Billeter, Jean François. 2011. Lectures on Zhuangzi [莊子四講 Leçons Sur Tchouang-
Tseu]. Taipei: Linking Publishing [聯經]. 
Blau, Herbert. 2002. “The Human Nature of the BOT: A Response to Philip Auslander.” 
PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art 24(1):22–24.  
Blom, Ina. 1998. “Boredom and Oblivion.” Pp. 63–90 in The Fluxus Reader, edited by 
Ken Friedman. Academy Editions. 
169 
Bolter, J. David, and Richard Grusin. 2000. Remediation: Understanding New Media. MIT 
Press. 
Bohm, David. 1996. The Special Theory of Relativity. Psychology Press. 
Brecht, George, and Julia Robinson. 2005. George Brecht: Events - A Heterospective. 
Bilingual. Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther Konig. 
Bryson, Norman. 1988. “The Gaze in the Expanded Field.” in Vision and Visuality, edited 
by Hal Foster. Dia Art Foundation. 
Cage, John. 1958. Solo for Voice 1 By John Cage. For Solo Voice. Modern. Composed 
1958. Edition Peters (6750). 
--. 1961. Silence: Lectures and Writings. New edition. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan 
University Press. 
--. 1962a. 0’00“ (4’33” No.2). Henmar Press, Inc. 
--. 1962b. “Interview with Roger Reynolds.” in John Cage. Frankfurt am Main: Peters. 
--. 1969. A Year from Monday: New Lectures and Writings. Wesleyan University Press. 
--. 1970. Song Books: Solos for Voice 3-92. Henmar Press. 
--. 1979. Empty Words: Writings “73-”78. 1st ed. Wesleyan University Press. 
Cage, John, and Daniel Charles. 1981. For the Birds. Boston: Boyars. 
Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University 
Press. 
Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Chaudhuri, U. 2002. “Beyond a‘ Taxonomic Theater’: Interculturalism after 
Postcolonialism and Globalization.” Theater 32(1):33–47. 
Chen, Gu-Ying. 1999. Contemporary Interpretations on Zhuangzi. Taiwan Shangwu 
Publisher. 
170 
Cixous, Hélène, and Mireille Calle-Gruber. 1997. Hélène Cixous, Rootprints. Routledge. 
Clifton, Robert. 2005. “Space-Time.” P. 843 in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
edited by Ted Honderich. OUP Oxford. 
Cox, Rupert. 2003. The Zen Arts: An Anthropological Study of the Culture of Aesthetic 
Form in Japan. 1 edition. Oxon: Routledge. 
Davis, Erik. 2004. Techgnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information. 
Updated ed. London: Serpent’s Tail. 
Debord, Guy. 1983. Society of the Spectacle. Black & Red. 
Decker-Phillips, Edith. 2010. Paik Video. illustrated edition. Barrytown/Station Hill Press, 
Inc. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1973. Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s 
Theory of Signs. 1 edition. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Dobrila, Denegri, and Marina Abramović. 1998. Marina Abramović. Performing Body. 
Charta. 
Dogen, and Kazuaki Tanahashi. 1985. Moon in a Dewdrop. San Francisco: North Point 
Press. 
Fagg, Lawrence W. 2003. The Becoming of Time: Integrating Physical and Religious 
Time. Duke University Press. 
Faure, Bernard. 1991. The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen 
Buddhism. Princeton University Press. 
Faure, Bernard. 1996. Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the 
Chan Tradition. Princeton University Press. 
Finkelstein, David Ritz. 2004. “Emptiness and Relativity.” in Buddhism & Science: 
Breaking New Ground, edited by B. Alan Wallace. Motilal Banarsidass Publisher. 
Forsee, Aylesa. 1963. Albert Einstein: Theoretical Physicist. New York: Macmillan. 
171 
Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things. Routledge. 
Friedman, Ken. 1998. “Fluxus and Company.” in The Fluxus reader, edited by Ken 
Friedman. Academy Editions. 
Gann, Kyle. 2010. No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’33". Yale University Press. 
Goffman, Erving. 1986. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. 
Northeastern University Press. 
Grosz, Elizabeth A. 1999. Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. 
Cornell University Press. 
Grunenberg, Christoph, and Beat Wismer. 2011. “Foreword.” in Nam June Paik, edited 
by Sook-Kyung Lee and Susanne Rennert. Harry N. Abrams. 
Hanh, Thich Nhat. 2006. Transformation and Healing: Sutra on the Four Establishments 
of Mindfulness. Berkeley, California: Parallax Press. 
--. 1988. The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajñaparamita Heart Sutra. 
edited by Peter Levitt. Berkeley, California: Parallax Press. 
Hanhardt, John G. 2004. “Paik for TV and Video: Global Groove 2004.” Pp. 10–27 in 
Nam June Paik: Global Groove. New York: Guggenheim Museum. 
Hanhardt, John G., and Caitlin Jones. 2004. Nam June Paik 2004: Global Grove. 
illustrated edition. Guggenheim Museum Publications,U.S. 
Hansen, Al. 1970. “On Cage’s Classes.” Pp. 122–24 in John Cage, Documentary 
monographs in modern art, edited by Richard Kostelanetz. New York [N. Y.]: 
Praeger. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1998. “What Is Metaphysics?” Pp. 82–96 in Pathmarks. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Heisenberg, Werner. 1958a. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. 
London: Allen & Unwin. 
172 
Heisenberg, Werner. 1958b. “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics.” 
Daedalus 87(3):95–108. Retrieved March 22, 2011 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/20026454). 
Heisig, James W., and John C. Maraldo. 1995. Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto 
School, & the Question of Nationalism. University of Hawaii Press. 
Higgins, Dick. 2001. “Intermedia.” Leonardo 34(1):49–54. Retrieved February 6, 2010 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1576984). 
Ho, I-Lien. 2009. “Choreographing Cultural Identities: On the Case Study of Cloud Gate 
Dance Theatre of Taiwan’s ‘Cursive I’ and ‘Cursive II.’” (Unpublished Dissertation), 
University of Cambridge. 
Holledge, Julie, and Joanne Tompkins. 2000. Women’s Intercultural Performance. 
Psychology Press. 
Huntingdon, C. W. 1989. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian 
Madhyamika. Hawaii: University of Honolulu. 
Iles, Chrissie. 1998. “Marina Abramović Untitled.” Grand Street (63):186–94. Retrieved 
September 8, 2012 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/25008276). 
--. 2003. “Marina Abramović: Staring at the Ocean.” in Marina Abramović: The House 
with the Ocean View. Charta. 
Inada, Kenneth K. 1974. “Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach.” Philosophy East 
and West 24(2):171–79. Retrieved November 4, 2010 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398020). 
Jameson, Fredric. 1992. Signatures of the Visible. Routledge. 
Jay, Martin. 1988. “Scopic Regimes of Modernity.” in Vision and Visuality, edited by Hal 
Foster. Dia Art Foundation. 
173 
--. 1994. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought. 1ST edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kalupahana, David J. 1974. “The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality.” 
Philosophy East and West 24(2):181–91. Retrieved November 4, 2010 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398021). 
Kao, Yu-Kung. 1991. “Chinese Lyric Aesthetics.” in Words and Images: Chinese Poetry, 
Calligraphy, and Painting, edited by Alfreda Murck and Wen Fong. Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. 
Kapchan, Deborah A. 1995. “Performance.” The Journal of American Folklore 
108(430):479–508. Retrieved February 27, 2011 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/541657). 
Kaplan, Janet A. 1999. “Deeper and Deeper: Interview with Marina Abramović.” Art 
Journal 58(2):7–21. Retrieved September 8, 2012 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/777944). 
Kaprow, Allan. 1966. Assemblage, Environments & Happenings: Text and Design with a 
Selection of Scenarios by Nine Japanese of the Gutai Group...and Others. New 
York: Abrams. 
Kaye, Nick. 1996. Art into Theatre: Performance, Interviews and Documents. 1st ed. 
Routledge. 
--. 2006. Multi-Media: Video - Installation - Performance. 1st ed. Routledge. 
Kohn, Livia. 2010. Sitting in Oblivion: The Heart of Daoist Meditation. Three Pines Press. 
Koller, John M. 1974. “On Buddhist Views of Devouring Time.” Philosophy East and West 
24(2):201–8. Retrieved November 4, 2010 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398023). 
Kostelanetz, Richard. 2003. Conversing with Cage. 2nd ed. New York;London: 
Routledge. 
174 
Larson, Kay. 2012. Where the Heart Beats: John Cage, Zen Buddhism, and the Inner Life 
of Artists. Penguin Press. 
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard University Press. 
Lee, Sook-Kyung, and Susanne Rennert. 2011. Nam June Paik. Harry N. Abrams. 
Lepecki, Andre. 2006. Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement. 1st 
ed. Routledge. 
Lim, Bliss Cua. 2009. Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique. 
Duke University Press. 
Loy, David. 1992. “What’s Wrong with Being and Time A Buddhist Critique.” Time & 
Society 1(2):239–55. 
--. 1996. “Zhuangzi and Nagarjuna on the Truth of No Truth.” Pp. 50–67 in Essays on 
Skepticism, Relativism and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, edited by Paul Kjellberg and 
Philip J. Ivanhoe. SUNY Press. 
--. 1999. Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. Humanity Books. 
Marranca, Bonnie. 1991. Interculturalism and Performance: Writings from PAJ. New 
York: PAJ Publications. 
May, Jon, and Nigel Thrift, eds. 2001. TimeSpace: Geographies of Temporality. London: 
Routledge. 
Media Art Net. 2005. “Paik, Nam June: TV-Buddha.” Retrieved March 24, 2014 
(http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/tv-buddha/images/3/). 
--. 2005. “Paik, Nam June: Exposition of Music – Electronic Television.” Retrieved August 
10, 2014 (http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/exposition-of-music/?desc=full). 
Mehra, Jagdish. 1987. “Niels Bohr’s Discussions with Albert Einstein, Werner 
Heisenberg, and Erwin Schr6dinger: The Origins of the Principles of Uncertainty and 
Complementarity.” Foundations of Physics 17(5):461–506. 
175 
Muller, Charles, ed. n.d. “Zhiguan: Cessation and Observation.” Digital Dictionary of 
Buddhism. Edition. Retrieved October 2, 2012 (http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-
bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E6%AD%A2%E8%A7%80). 
Munroe, Alexandra, ed. 2009. The Third Mind: American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-
1989. 1st ed. Guggenheim Museum. 
Nāgārjuna, and Jay L. Garfield. 1995. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford University Press. 
Nāgārjuna, and Tingjie Han. 1997. Zhonglun [中論,The Book of Middle-Way]. Gaoxiong 
Xian: Foguang wenhua shiye youxian gongsi. 
Nāgārjuna, and David J. Kalupahana. 1991. Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: The 
Philosophy of the Middle Way. Motilal Banarsidass Publ. 
Nāgārjuna, and Tingchu Jia. 1997. Dazhi Dulun [大智度論, Great Treatise on the 
Perfection of Wisdom]. Gaoxiong Xian: Foguang wenhua shiye youxian gongsi. 
Newton, Isaac. 1729. Principia: Vol. I: The Motion of Bodies. University of California 
Press. 
Paik, Nam June. 1974. Nam June Paik: Videa “N” Videology, 1959-1973. Everson 
Museum of Art.  
Paik, Nam June, Kunsthalle Bremen, Wulf Herzogenrath, and Sabine Maria Schmidt. 
1999. Nam June Paik: Fluxus/Video. Bremen: Der Kunstverein. 
Paik, Nam June, Jon Ippolito, and John G. Hanhardt. 2004. Nam June Paik: Global 
Groove. New York: Guggenheim Museum. 
Paik, Nam June, Susanne Neuburger, and Museum Moderner Kunst (Austria). 2009. 
Nam June Paik: Exposition of Music: Electronic Television: Revisited. Verlag der 
Buchhandlung Walther König. 
176 
Phelan, Peggy. 1993. “The Ontology of Performance: Representation without 
Reproduction.” in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance. Routledge. 
Pritchett, James. 1996. The Music of John Cage. Cambridge University Press. 
Said, Edward W. 2003. Orientalism. Penguin. 
Scarry, Elaine. 1987. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. 1st ed. 
Oxford University Press.  
Searle, John R. 1998. “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society.” Analyse & Kritik 
20:143–58. 
Sengzhao, and Xiuping Hong. 1996. Zhao lun [肇論]. Gaoxiong Xian: Foguang wenhua 
shiye youxian gongsi. 
Sharf, Robert H. 1993. “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.” History of Religions 33(1):1–
43. 
--. 1995. “Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited.” in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto 
School, & the Question of Nationalism, edited by James W. Heisig and John C. 
Maraldo. University of Hawaii Press.  
Stalling, Jonathan. 2010. Poetics of Emptiness: Transformations of Asian Thought in 
American Poetry. 1st ed. Fordham University Press. 
Stooss, Toni, and Thomas Kellein. 1993. Nam June Paik: Video Time - Video Space. 
Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 
Streng, Frederick J. 1967. Emptiness: a Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville, Abingdon 
Press. 
Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, and Christmas Humphreys. 1970. Essays in Zen Buddhism (third 
Series). New York: Weiser. 
Swanson, Paul Loren. 1989. Foundations of T’ien-T’ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the 
Two-Truth Theory in Chinese Buddhism. Jain Publishing Company. 
177 
Tan, Mingran. 2008. “Emptiness, Being and Non-Being: Sengzhao’s Reinterpretation of 
the Laozi and Zhuangzi in a Buddhist Context.” Dao 7:195–209. 
Thompson, E. P. 1967. “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past & 
Present 38(1): 56 –97. 
Tomkins, Calvin. 1965. The Bride and the Bachelors: Five Masters of the Avant-Garde. 
Penguin/Viking. 
Varela, Franscisco J., Evan T. Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. The MIT Press. 
Viola, Eugenio, and Diego Sileo. 2012. The Abramović Method. Bilingual. 24 ORE 
Cultura s.r.l. 
Wallace, Alan. 2005. “The Intersubjective Worlds of Science and Religion.” in Science, 
Religion, and the Human Experience, edited by James D. Proctor. Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
Wallace, B. Alan. 2000. The Taboo of Subjectivity: Towards a New Science of 
Consciousness. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Westerhoff, Jan Christoph. 2010. “Nāgārjuna.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Retrieved March 26, 2014 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/nagarjuna/). 
Westgeest, Helen. 1998. Zen in the Fifties: Interaction in Art between East and West. 
illustrated edition. Reaktion Books. 
Wheeler, John Archibald. 1996. At Home in the Universe. Woodby, N.Y: American 
Institute of Physics. 
Wijers, Louwrien. 1996. Art Meets Science and Spirituality in a Changing Economy: From 
Competition to Compassion. Academy Editions. 
178 
Wijers, Louwrien, and Ike Kamphof. 1990. Art Meets Science and Spirituality in a 
Changing Economy. SDU. 
Wijers, Louwrien, and Johan Pijnappel, eds. 1990. Art Meets Science and Spirituality. 
London; New York: Academy Editions; St. Martin’s Press. 
Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wolff, Christian. 1965. “On Form.” Pp. 26–31 in Die Reihe 7: Form-space. Bryn Mawr, 
Pennsylvania: T. Presser Co. in association with Universal Edition, London. 
Wu, Kuang-Ming. 1993. “Zhuangzi’s Body Thinking.” in Ideas of Qi and Body in Ancient 
Chinese Thought [中國古代思想中的氣論及身體觀], edited by Rubin Yang. Taiepi: 
Juliu Tushu Gongsi 巨流圖書公司. 
Xi, Mi. 1983. “The Dao of Deconstruction: The Comparison between Derrida and 
Zhuangzi.” in Phenomenology and Literary Criticism, edited by Shu-sen Zheng. 
Taipei: Dongda Press. 
Xiong, Wan, ed. 1998. The Stories in Cassock: Biographies of Masters. Taipei: Dongda 
Press. 
Yang, Rubin, ed. 1993. Ideas of Qi and Body in Ancient Chinese Thought [中國古代思想
中的氣論及身體觀]. Taiepi: Juliu Tushu Gongsi. 
Yip, Wai-lim. 1993. Diffusion of Distances: Dialogues Between Chinese and Western 
Poetics. University of California Press. 
Zhuangzi, and Angus Charles Graham. 1981. Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters. Hackett. 
 
 
 
 
